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Summary 
The demand for improved safety, efficiency and dynamic demand-capacity 
balancing due to the rapid growth of the aviation sector and the increasing 
proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in different classes of 
airspace pose significant challenges to avionics system developers.  
The design of Next Generation Flight Management Systems (NG-FMS) for 
manned and unmanned aircraft operations is performed by addressing the 
challenges identified by various Air Traffic Management (ATM) modernisation 
programmes and UAS Traffic Management (UTM) system initiatives. In 
particular, this research focusses on introducing automated Separation 
Assurance and Collision Avoidance (SA&CA) functionalities (mathematical 
models) in the NG-FMS. The innovative NG-FMS is also capable of supporting 
automated negotiation and validation of 4-Dimensional Trajectory (4DT) 
intents in coordination with novel ground-based Next Generation Air Traffic 
Management (NG-ATM) systems.  
One of the key research contributions is the development of a unified 
method for cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA, addressing the 
technical and regulatory challenges of manned and unmanned aircraft 
coexistence in all classes of airspace. Analytical models are presented and 
validated to compute the overall avoidance volume in the airspace 
surrounding a tracked object, supporting automated SA&CA functionalities. 
The scientific basis of this approach is to assess real-time measurements and 
associated uncertainties affecting navigation states (of the host aircraft 
platform), tracking observables (of the static or moving object) and platform 
dynamics, and translate them to unified range and bearing uncertainty 
descriptors. The SA&CA unified approach provides an innovative analytical 
framework to generate high-fidelity dynamic geo-fences suitable for 
integration in the NG-FMS and in the ATM/UTM/defence decision                  
support tools. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“Innovation is hard. It really is. Because most people do not get it.                           
Remember, the automobile, the airplane, the telephone, these were all considered 
toys at their introduction because they had no constituency. They were too new”. - 
Nolan Bushnell 
1.1 Research Context and Motivation 
Scientific advances in microelectronics, sensing technologies, data fusion techniques 
and automation are driving the design and development of high-performance and 
reliable avionics systems for manned and unmanned aircraft operations. The 
proliferation of avionics systems has been significant in both civil and military aviation. It is 
to be noted that civil avionics systems account for 35-40 % of the total aircraft cost while 
more than 50 % of the total cost in Research & Development (R&D) of military aircraft is 
spent on avionics systems [1]. Global and regional air traffic is growing at a rapid pace 
and it is predicted that current air passenger traffic will double in the next 15 years [2]. 
Therefore, R&D efforts in aviation are now focussing on the introduction of novel systems 
that enhance safety, cost-effectiveness and operational efficiency as well as address 
the environmental sustainability aspects of the air transportation system. Accordingly, a 
number of large-scale and regional research initiatives are addressing the avionics and 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) modernisation challenges [3, 4]. The prominent 
programmes in Europe include Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research 
(SESAR) and the Clean Sky Joint Technological Initiative (JTI) for Aeronautics and Air 
Transport. These two programmes are defining future air transportation in Europe by 
addressing the challenges and benefits of increased air traffic growth [5 - 8]. The 
Advisory Council for Aviation Research and Innovation in Europe (ACARE) has set an 
ambitious target aiming to address the environmental sustainability of aviation in its 
Strategic Research Agenda [9, 10]. Across the Atlantic Ocean, the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
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(NASA) Environmentally Responsible Aviation (ERA) programmes are the major research 
initiatives leading the transformation efforts in the USA [11, 12]. Under the Airspace 
Operations and Safety Program (AOSP), NextGen technologies are developed to further 
improve the safety of current and future aircraft in collaboration with the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), industry and academic partners. Specific projects include 
Airspace Technology Demonstrations (ATD), Shadow Mode Assessment Using Realistic 
Technologies for the National Airspace System (SMART-NAS) for Safe Trajectory Based 
Ops (TBO) and Safe Autonomous Systems Operations (SASO). Other programmes 
worldwide include OneSKY in Australia, Collaborative Action for Renovation of Air Traffic 
Systems (CARATS) in Japan, SIRIUS in Brazil and the Future Indian Air Navigation System 
(FIANS) [13]. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in its Global Air 
Navigation Capacity and Efficiency Plan (Doc 9750) has identified the following four key 
overarching performance improvement areas [14]:  
 Efficient flight path; 
 Optimum capacity and flexible flights; 
 Airport operations; 
 Globally interoperable systems and data. 
The requirements set by the modernisation programmes largely provide the design 
drivers for avionics and ATM system developers, who are faced with the following key 
challenges: 
 Improving safety; 
 Improving efficiency; 
 Providing cost-effective solutions; 
 Increasing demand-capacity balancing; 
 Improving environmental sustainability of aviation.  
The combined objectives are illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1. Combined objectives. 
Safety Capacity Efficiency 
Cost-
effectiveness 
Flexibility Interoperability 
Environmental 
Sustainability 
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Scientific advances in Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management 
(CNS/ATM) and Avionics (CNS+A) systems are required to achieve the ambitious goals 
set by national and international aviation organisations. The CNS+A concept was first 
introduced by the ICAO Future Air Navigation Systems (FANS) committee and was later 
implemented by Boeing, Airbus and other original equipment manufacturers as FANS-1 
and FANS-A products. The key CNS+A concepts are [13]: 
 Four Dimensional (4D) Trajectory/Intent-Based Operations (TBO/IBO); 
 Performance-Based Communication, Navigation, Surveillance (PBC/PBN/PBS), 
supporting Performance-Based Operations (PBO); 
 TBO/IBO facilitated by System Wide Information Management (SWIM); 
 Enhanced ground-based and satellite-based surveillance, including Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance (ADS) and automated self-separation; 
 Improved Human Machine Interface and Interactions (HMI2), interoperability for 
airborne and ground interfaces and increased levels of automation; 
 Enhanced Line-of-Sight (LoS) and Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLoS) aeronautical 
communications, involving a substantial exploitation of data-links; 
 Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) to allow all stakeholders involved in flight 
planning and management to participate in the enhancement of system 
performance by utilising more accurate information from airborne systems; 
 Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) and Dynamic Airspace Management 
(DAM). 
These CNS+A concepts enable more accurate estimation of CNS performance and 
involve higher levels of automation. It is to be emphasised that in recent years, 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are being extensively employed in a variety of civil 
and military applications as these vehicles provide cost-effective and safe alternatives 
to manned aircraft in a wide range of operational scenarios. UAS offer a safer and cost-
effective alternative to manned aircraft in dangerous, sensitive and/or dull tasks 
because of the absence of a pilot on board the aircraft.  These distinctive abilities of UAS 
are a result of adopting a number of enabling CNS+A concepts and technologies in a 
phased manner and the widespread availability of a number of diverse airborne sensors 
and systems. Accurate and fail-safe algorithms for navigation, guidance and effective 
control of the platform are required to accomplish such missions. Currently, UAS can only 
operate in segregated airspace, where collision risks are largely eliminated by 
preventing or strictly controlling entry into this class of airspace by other aircraft. In order 
to address the challenges of integrating UAS in all classes of airspace, and in existing 
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ATM and future UAS Traffic Management (UTM) systems, the required levels of safety and 
operational regulations need to be determined. Recent research shows that small UAS 
could pose less risk to life and inanimate objects on the ground when compared with 
manned aircraft [15]. The long term vision of the aviation community is to achieve 
coordinated manned and unmanned aircraft operations in all classes of airspace. Initial 
steps have been taken in this regard by the launch of programmes such as NASA’s 
Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) initiative [16]. Some recommendations for 
research in the area of manned and unmanned aircraft coexistence in all classes of 
airspace and aerodromes have been identified as part of the Aviation System Block 
Upgrades (ASBU) by the ICAO [17]. Due to the fact that there are no definitive standards 
available now, there are a number of groups and special committees working on UAS 
including ASTM F38, EUROCAE WG-73, ICAO UASSG and RTCA SC-228 [18 - 20]. 
Specifically, in the CNS+A context, the first recommendation addressing the operational 
and certification issues for civil UAS was issued by the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) 
CNS/ATM Steering Group [19]. Some key recommendations include the development of 
innovative methods and algorithms for dynamic allocation of airspace resources as well 
as the introduction of CNS+A technologies enabling unrestricted access of UAS to all 
classes or airspace. Subsequently, the EUROCAE Working Group (WG-73) endeavours to 
address:  
 UAS operations and collision avoidance functions; 
 Command, control, communication, spectrum and security issues; 
 Airworthiness and continued airworthiness. 
The architectures, interfaces, communication protocols, data elements and message 
formats for operation of UAS are defined in the NATO Standardisation Agreement 
(STANAG) 4586 [21]. In terms of general applicability, the Joint Architecture for 
Unmanned Systems (JAUS) provides a better perspective than STAGNAG 4586. The JAUS 
standard Domain Model (DM) and a reference architecture provide mechanisms for 
UAS interoperability including integration into the airspace, architecture framework, 
message formats and a set of standard messages [22]. UAS support is one of the key 
performance improvement areas identified by the ICAO for ASBU [17]. In the TBO 
context, the following are included: 
 Initial integration of UAS into non-segregated airspace: implementation of basic 
procedures and functions including Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) for operating UAS; 
 UAS integration in traffic: implementation of defined procedures addressing lost 
link as well as enhanced SAA functions; 
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 UAS transport management: implementation of UAS operations on the airport 
surface and in non-segregated airspace similar to manned aircraft. 
The integration of UAS into the non-segregated airspace requires recommendations 
from committees for standardisation (RTCA SC-203, ASTM F 38, EUROCAE WG 73, and 
others), which aim to develop the Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards 
(MASPS). In this perspective, the key CNS+A systems/elements are: 
 LoS and BLoS communication systems; 
 High-integrity airborne and ground-based UAS navigation systems and integrated 
fail-safe avionics architectures; 
 The adoption of fused cooperative/non-cooperative surveillance systems 
incorporating collision avoidance and collaborative conflict resolution 
capabilities in a network centric operational scenario; 
 Provision and integration of Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance 
(SA&CA) capabilities in the Next Generation Flight Management System                      
(NG-FMS); 
 Interactions between Guidance, Navigation and Control (GNC) and Track, 
Decision-Making and Avoidance (TDA) loops. 
Other issues that are addressed for a safe integration of the UAS in the airspace include 
the definition of automation functions and standards for Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) 
interactions, operational contingency procedures and certification processes. 
Additionally, the air safety nets that can be used as a last resort necessity have to be 
clearly defined for all UAS types to address the emergency scenarios rising in a CNS+A 
context. Cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA performance-based requirements 
are currently developed in a research context and need to be accepted into a 
regulatory framework in order to support the UAS operational improvements [23, 24]. The 
initial integration of UAS requires capabilities including ground-based SAA systems and 
the adoption of a combination of policies, procedures, and technologies intended to 
facilitate safe airspace access. The SAA technology will be integrated in the flight 
management system of the UAS to meet collision and hazard avoidance responsibility 
and to provide situational awareness. UAS integration in traffic requires the development 
of on board SA&CA algorithms, which must be able to fulfil the requirements for 
detecting and successfully resolving any mid-air collisions in non-segregated airspace for 
both cooperative and non-cooperative targets [23, 24]. In particular, this technology 
enabler will cope with both air and ground obstacles of various characteristics (natural 
and man-made) including long and thin structures such as electrical cables, poles and 
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aerial obstacles such as other UAS and manned aircraft. Significant impacts are also 
expected in the areas of SAA airworthiness and design standard evolutions.  The UAS 
research community is working on a number of SA&CA algorithms to replicate and even 
to provide a higher level of performance of the see-and-avoid (S&A) capability of 
humans. Despite a huge number of efforts that have been devoted to the integration of 
UAS in non-segregated airspace, the standards as well as a certification framework for 
SA&CA has yet to be established. Furthermore, the maturity of SA&CA techniques and 
enabling technologies is considered very limited when viewed in the perspective of civil 
airworthiness regulations for manned aircraft, raising concerns to certification authorities 
and airspace users [25, 26]. Furthermore, large amounts of established reliability data are 
not available as in the case of civil aviation. The separation assurance function is not 
addressed in conjunction with the collision avoidance problem. A unified approach to 
SA&CA for manned and unmanned aircraft is required to meet the challenges of UAS 
integration and to provide a pathway to certification. One of the key technology 
enablers to achieve this goal is the implementation of suitable hardware components 
and data fusion techniques for cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA tasks. Such 
functions will provide manned and unmanned aircraft the capability to consistently and 
reliably perform equally or even to exceed the see-and-avoid performance while 
allowing a seamless integration of unmanned aircraft in the ATM and UTM network. In a 
typical operational scenario, the host aircraft (manned/unmanned) would have to 
ensure the required separation (horizontal and vertical) is maintained with other traffic 
and also have to see/sense in advance any potential conflicts and avoid them. The host 
aircraft and other traffic are conventionally equipped with a different set of non-
cooperative sensors and cooperative systems as shown in Figure 1.2.  
Automated SA&CA tasks have to be carried out to ensure safety and in order to allow 
the exploitation of the enhanced CNS+A concepts and capabilities, new ground-based 
and airborne CNS+A systems have to be designed and developed. The key technology 
enablers are novel CNS technologies onboard the aircraft (manned and unmanned) 
and CDM based ground systems.  These CNS+A systems include: 
 Modern avionics and ground-based systems for planning and real-time execution 
of 4-Dimensional Trajectory (4DT) functionalities, including multi-objective 4D 
trajectory optimisation, negotiation and validation in the TBO/IBO context. These 
include the airborne component - NG-FMS and the ground component - Next 
Generation ATM (NG-ATM) system; 
 Network-centric systems for strategic, tactical and emergency scenarios; 
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 Enhanced ground-to-ground, air-to-ground and ground-to-air communication 
systems; 
 Avionics, Ground and Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (ABAS/ GBAS/SBAS) 
enabling multi-constellation Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) as primary 
means of navigation; 
 Enhanced ground-based and satellite-based surveillance including the 
exploitation of non-cooperative sensors and cooperative systems supporting 
automated SA&CA functions; 
 High-integrity, high-throughput, secure and reliable Next Generation 
Aeronautical Communication System (NG-ACS) networking all the CDM 
stakeholders; 
 CNS+A systems for UAS, targeting coordinated operation of manned and 
unmanned aircraft; 
 Systems that satisfy the Required Navigation Performance (RNP), the Required 
Communication Performance (RCP), the Required Surveillance Performance 
(RSP) and ultimately the Required Total System Performance (RTSP).  
 
Host Aircraft
Traffic A Traffic B
Traffic C
Traffic D
Cooperative System and 
Non-cooperative Sensor
Cooperative System Cooperative System
Non-Cooperative Sensor
Non-Cooperative Sensor
 
Figure 1.2. Automated SA&CA tasks. 
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The CNS systems provide better and more precise airborne navigation services, optimal 
collision avoidance and separation assurance, as well as secure and reliable 
communication links.  
1.2 Research Gap Identification 
State-of-the-art aircraft are equipped with FMS, which provide automated navigation 
and guidance services that are largely restricted to the use of 3D trajectories. Time is not 
used as a control variable, although setting Required Time of Arrival (RTA) and Estimated 
Time of Arrival (ETA) at en-route waypoints and at the destination respectively provide 
some initial implementations of time based operations. Hence a NG-FMS is required for 
the full implementation of TBO/IBO.  
On the other hand, one of the key challenges for the aviation community is to introduce 
the SA&CA capability for manned and unmanned aircraft. It is also timely that a solid 
mathematical framework be used for certifying the SA&CA. The maturity of the available 
SA&CA techniques and enabling technologies is considered very limited when viewed in 
the perspective of civil airworthiness regulations for manned aircraft, raising concerns to 
certification authorities and airspace users. With the growing adoption of UAS for a 
number of civil, commercial and scientific applications there is a need to certify SA&CA 
systems according to established national and international standards.  
1.3 Research Questions 
This thesis addresses the challenges of introducing novel software algorithms in flight 
management system (specifically separation maintenance and collision avoidance 
automation functionalities for manned and unmanned aircraft) and answers the 
following key research questions: 
 How are innovative analytical models adapted within the trajectory-based 
operations context? 
 How is a unified approach to cooperative and non-cooperative separation 
assurance and collision avoidance realised for manned and unmanned aircraft? 
 How is the safety and efficiency of aircraft operations improved by the 
introduction of automated separation assurance and collision avoidance 
algorithms? 
 How are the automated separation assurance and collision avoidance tasks 
affected by the performance of onboard navigation and tracking sensors? 
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1.4 Research Aim 
This research endeavours to develop and implement novel mathematical algorithms for 
automated SA&CA tasks. Within this framework, the key aim to develop a unified 
methodology for cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA.  
The aim of this research work is:  
To develop novel mathematical models (software functionalities) for manned and 
unmanned aircraft NG-FMS primarily focussed on improving safety and efficiency by 
providing automated SA&CA functions.  
1.5 Research Objectives 
The following objectives were identified:  
 Perform a detailed review of the existing literature on modern FMS focussing on 
GNC and TDA functions; 
 Define the system level functional architecture of a NG-FMS suitable for manned 
and unmanned aircraft operations; 
 Adapt suitable NG-FMS models and algorithms for on board planning and 
optimisation of four dimensional trajectories to support TBO/IBO in the CNS+A 
context; 
 Perform simulation case studies to test the validity of the NG-FMS models and 
algorithms for safe and efficient operations; 
 Develop the mathematical models required to introduce a novel unified 
approach to cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA for manned and 
unmanned aircraft; 
 Evaluate the mathematical models introduced for SA&CA in representative 
simulation case studies (multiple manned and unmanned aircraft operations);  
 Define possible pathways for certification of SA&CA functions, allowing safe and 
unrestricted operations of manned and unmanned aircraft in the future UTM 
context. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
The methodology followed in this work is presented below: 
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In the first phase, a comprehensive review of all existing work in the flight management 
system functionalities, challenges of UAS integration into all classes of airspace and 
SA&CA algorithms was undertaken. 
In the second phase, novel mathematical models were developed to determine the 
overall uncertainty volume in the airspace. These models were then evaluated to test for 
fitness of use. The design and development of NG-FMS (including identification of 
optimal system architecture and algorithms required for TBO/IBO) was carried out. 
Furthermore, a performance analysis was carried out to investigate and explore the 
potential of the unified approach to cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA for 
manned and unmanned aircraft. 
In the third phase, modelling and simulation activities were performed to validate the 
NG-FMS algorithms for 4D trajectory optimisation and SA&CA tasks. 
The research methodology adopted is summarised as follows: 
 NG-FMS requirements definition; 
 Conceptual design and development of the NG-FMS implementing dedicated 
functions for manned and unmanned aircraft operations: 
- NG-FMS conceptual design;  
- Development of tailored algorithms for 4D trajectory optimisation 
supporting TBO/IBO; 
- Implementation of near real-time 4DT estimation, negotiation and 
validation functions, in synergy with ATM Decision Support Systems (DSS) for 
TBO/IBO; 
- Mathematical modelling and implementation of a unified approach for 
cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA functions; 
- Tailoring of tracking and avoidance algorithms for implementing the 
unified approach to separation maintenance and collision avoidance for 
non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios; 
 Verification of the NG-FMS functions by performing modelling and simulation 
activities. The application case studies are in a MATLAB/Simulink simulation 
environment. Case studies that are representative of typical manned/unmanned 
aircraft operational flight envelope were also considered. Additionally, the 
facilities available at the THALES Australia Centre for Advanced Studies in ATM 
(CASiA) including TopSky - ATM solutions and at the RMIT University avionics and 
ATM system laboratory were utilised to verify some of the software functionalities.  
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1.7 Thesis Outline 
This section provides a general outline of the successive chapters of this thesis. In chapter 
2, the theoretical background and algorithms of the GNC and TDA loops are presented. 
The chapter starts with an introduction to state-of-the-art FMS and its functions. The 
chapter then goes on to describe the SA&CA algorithms currently employed. Some 
theoretical description of various multi-sensor data fusion techniques used for tracking in 
the context of SA&CA are also described. The chapter also presents some general 
considerations on SA&CA requirements in terms of available information, functions, 
implementation and regulatory issues. 
Chapter 3 provides the general design principles of NG-FMS. More specifically, it 
provides an overview of system requirements, functions and implementation of NG-FMS 
for manned and unmanned aircraft. Furthermore, the navigation, guidance and 
performance management algorithms employed in NG-FMS are also described. The 
general architecture of the simulation environment integrating the developed NG-FMS 
system and the NG-ATM system is then summarised.   
The unified approach to cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA is described in 
Chapter 4. The mathematical models required for the unified approach are then 
documented in this chapter. Furthermore, the automated separation maintenance and 
collision avoidance functions of NG-FMS are discussed in this context.  
Performance analysis of navigation and surveillance sensor/system errors is presented in 
Chapter 5. Covariance analysis and other statistical methods employed for 
determination of navigation and tracking errors are described in detail. Some 
description of assumptions and of the solutions used for conflict detection, resolution 
evaluation and autonomous avoidance trajectory generation are also presented. 
Pathways to certifying avionics systems that provide SA&CA functionalities in manned 
and unmanned systems are also described. Appendix A provides a summary of multi-
sensor data fusion techniques implemented for UAS integrated navigation systems. 
Appendix B provides a compilation of the certification standards, Acceptable Means of 
Compliance (AMC), Guidance Materials (GM) and recommended practices. 
Chapters 6 and 7 include the various case studies performed for evaluating the unified 
approach in both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. The sensor modelling 
techniques and assumptions used to choose various scenarios are spelled out. Key 
aspects of the Human Machine Interface and Interaction (HMI2) design based on the 
presented case studies are summarised in Appendix C. 
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Chapter 8 provides an overview of the methodology to apply the unified approach to 
SA&CA in an UTM context. Preliminary simulation case studies are also presented for 
validation of the presented SA&CA algorithms in the UTM framework. 
Finally chapter 9 ends with conclusions drawn from this work. Recommendations for 
future research work are also presented. A list of relevant publications developed based 
on the work carried out during this PhD research is provided in Appendix D. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
“The first rule of any technology used in a business is that automation applied to an 
efficient operation will magnify the efficiency. The second is that automation 
applied to an inefficient operation will magnify the inefficiency”. - Bill Gates 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the system architecture and algorithms employed in FMS. The two 
key avionics system loops required to provide automated guidance, as well as SA&CA 
functionalities are described in this chapter. A background on the currently available 
SA&CA algorithms is presented. The chapter also provides a background of the role of 
SA&CA in the modern ATM and UTM systems, describes the development process of 
SA&CA functions, provides a review of the Conflict Detection and Resolution (CD&R) 
algorithms and presents the case for introducing a unified approach to SA&CA within 
modern avionics systems for manned and unmanned aircraft. A theoretical summary of 
various multi-sensor data fusion techniques tailored for accomplishing an effective 
SA&CA is also presented. 
2.2 Avionics and ATM System Modernisation 
The present day ATM system originated as a result of a mid-air collision over the Grand 
Canyon (US) in 1956. It is essential to modernise the existing infrastructure (air and  
ground) to attain substantial benefits in safety, efficiency and environmental 
sustainability of aviation, and to ensure optimal demand-capacity balancing [1]. The 
limited capacity of the ground infrastructure has to be increased by introducing 
dynamic capacity-demand balancing to cope with growing air traffic [2]. The European 
and U.S. airspace are good examples for this development. There are generally two 
categories of airspace namely regulatory and non-regulatory. Within these two 
categories, there may be controlled, uncontrolled, special use, and other airspace. With 
a share of 65% in worldwide air traffic, the world’s busiest airspace areas and capacity 
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problems have been experienced in the past in both of these areas [3]. The lessons 
learned from the traffic situations in these areas are becoming driving factors supporting 
the redesign of the existing ATM system. In the Australian context, by 2021, Airservices 
Australia is looking at providing air traffic control services using an advanced and 
integrated ATM system through collaboration with the Department of Defence, The plan 
is to unify the Australian skies under a new, harmonised ATM system under the OneSKY 
program to support integrated civil and military air traffic operations [4]. This will enable a 
new level of operational and cost efficiency and safety, while also reducing delays for 
the travelling public and providing opportunities to improve environmental outcomes. 
The benefits of a combined civil and military air traffic management system, delivered 
under the OneSKY Australia program, will include safety and efficiency improvements, as 
well as cost savings and reliability. The key features are: 
 Improved safety and efficiency; 
 One flight information region; 
 Modular and adaptable systems; 
 Greater use of four dimensional trajectories. 
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) global ATM operational concept 
defines a general framework for the ATM system operational concept. The concept 
foresees that the key conceptual change for traffic synchronisation will be the 
implementation of 4-Dimensional (4D) trajectory optimisation algorithms [5]. The 
trajectories are expected to be negotiated between the airborne and ground systems, 
and are targeted to be conflict-free. Regarding airspace user operations, the concept 
anticipates that individual aircraft performance, flight conditions and capacity-demand 
balancing will allow dynamically-optimised 4D trajectory planning, negotiation and 
validation. In the context of conflict management, the concept identifies a three-
layered approach namely: Strategic Conflict Management (SCM), Separaration 
Provision (SP) and CA. 
SCM is considered to be achieved through airspace organisation and management 
and covers the earliest planning stage up to shortly pre- departure. ICAO uses the term 
strategic in this context, as opposed to tactical; because pre-flight phases do not 
possess the same real deadlines as flight short term CD&R. Though, especially for long-
haul flights, strategic conflict management may also be applied after departure, 
depending on the best means to resolve a conflict. Strategic conflict management is 
comprised of: 
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 Airspace organisation and management; 
 Demand and capacity balancing; 
 Traffic synchronisation. 
SP is the second layer of conflict management, which guarantees that aircraft are 
separated according to the applicable standards. According to ICAO, separation 
provision may be seen as an iterative process in which a conflict is detected, and then a 
resolution is identified and communicated to the conflicting entities. The execution of 
the resolution is monitored and, in case applicable minimum separation is not achieved, 
resolution manoeuvres are identified. ICAO defines the operator for separation 
management (separator) as the agent responsible for separation provision which can, 
depending on the separation mode, also be delegated to an aircraft. Several notions 
are defined in this context of conflict management including: 
 Self-separation: the airspace user is responsible for separation in respect to one or 
more hazards; 
 Distributed: different predetermined separators are defined for different hazards; 
 Cooperative: role of separation is delegated temporarily until a termination 
condition sets in.   
Hazards to which aircraft need to be separated from are classified as: 
 Airborne: 
- Other aircraft; 
- Terrain; 
- Atmospheric constraints (weather, wake turbulence, etc.); 
- Restricted airspaces. 
 Ground: 
- Vehicles operating in the airport (including other aircraft on the taxiway or 
runway); 
- Other obstructions while on the apron and manoeuvring area. 
Common to both hazard situations is that for each hazard a separator needs to be 
responsible for separation provision. The authority is vested on air traffic service providers, 
governed by regulations and standards set out by international/national aviation 
authorities providing guidelines for enforcement rules, discrepancies, etc. Collision 
avoidance is essential in both layers, when strategic conflict management and 
separation provision have failed.  
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In additional to the need for implementing automated SA&CA functionalities for 
increasing safety, efficiency and demand-capacity balancing, there is also the 
requirement for supporting safe and widespread UAS operations. A system similar to an 
ATM system is envisaged to be implemented and it is foreseen that low-altitude UAS 
operations will occur in the same airspace where today’s gliders, general aviation and 
helicopter operations occur [6]. Hence automated SA&CA functionalities are required to 
be implemented for safe and efficient manned/unmanned aircraft as well as 
multiplatform coordinated operations. These automated guidance and SA&CA 
functionalities can be implemented as software modules (mathematical models) in 
novel FMS onboard manned and unmanned aircraft, which is the focus of next section. 
2.3 Flight Management Systems 
Automated navigation and flight guidance functions on board modern aircraft are 
designed to guide the aircraft along a safe and efficient trajectory. The first modern FMS 
was introduced onboard the Boeing 767 in 1982 [7]. The original systems had 16-bit 
processors using bit-slice technology and removable memory cards with 128 KB of 
Random Access Memory (RAM), 128 KB of Read-Only Memory (ROM), clock rates of only 
24 MHz. A dedicated hard drive provided 100 KB of non-volatile storage. State-of-the-art 
FMS are primarily responsible for providing automated navigation and guidance services 
from take-off to landing. The hardware components of modern FMS include the Multi 
Control Display Unit (MCDU) and FM dedicated processor. FMS of modern aircraft 
typically have a 64-bit Power PC micro- processor, 120 MB of RAM, 50 Mbytes of flash 
memory and a clock rate of 800 MHz. The FMS operates in close relation with the 
Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS). Flight plans are generated by the state-of-the-
art FMS in coordination with the Airline Operation Centre (AOC) and Air Navigation 
Service Provider (ANSP). The modern FMS is hence an integrated set of avionics systems 
that provides the flight crew with the ability to operate an aircraft in compliance with 
the ANSP requirements in a manner that meets the expectations of the AOC. The flight 
path of an aircraft is represented in the FMS as lateral and vertical profiles over time. 
Typically, an FMS Flight Plan (FPLN) consists of lateral FPLN and vertical FPLN, which is in 
turn divided into a number of segments, sections and integral steps. Each segment is 
constructed based on a given set of local objectives with respect to the variables 
provided by the guidance component. The core of an FMS consists of one or more flight 
management computers/embedded processors and one or more Multifunction Control 
Display Units (MCDU). The software component embedded in the FMS processor 
performs the following functions [8, 9]: 
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 Positioning and navigation algorithms involving a number of multi-sensor data 
fusion techniques; 
 Guidance computations in terms of lateral and vertical guidance algorithms; 
 Trajectory generation and optimisation algorithms; 
 Short-term and long-term performance computation algorithms; 
 Dual and single FM mode (single and dual) protocols; 
 Processing, sorting and selection of databases; 
 Built-In-Test Equipment (BITE) and monitoring; 
 Interface management. 
A conceptual representation of a state-of-the-art FMS architecture is shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1. State-of-the-art FMS architecture. 
The Primary Flight Display (PFD) and the Navigation Display (ND) are the most commonly 
used HMI2 that provide display information to the crew. The lateral flight planning activity 
includes an initialisation FPLN and lateral revisions. The same concept applies to the 
vertical FPLN as well. The main navigation functions include [8]: 
 Selection of navigation modes; 
 Radio navigation functions including manual and auto selection; 
 Inertial Reference System (IRS) initialisation and alignment; 
Ph.D. Thesis - Next Generation Flight Management Systems for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Operations                
- Automated Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance Functionalities  
20 
 
 GNSS initialisation. These might include Global Positioning System (GPS), Galileo, 
GLObalnaya NAvigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS), BeiDou (or 
Compass), Indian Regional Navigational Satellite System (IRNSS), Quasi-Zenith 
Satellite System (QZSS) or a combination of the available constellations. 
The traditional databases associated with FMS are Magnetic Deviation (MAG DEV), 
Performance Database (PERBDB) and Navigation Database (NAVDB). In addition to 
these databanks, weather, demographic distribution, digital terrain elevation, 
environmental and Object Modifiable Databases (OMD) can be introduced for 
TBO/IBO. The FMS navigation function is interfaced with the NAVDB, which is updated 
every 28 days as a pre-flight process, based on the ICAO’s Aeronautical Information 
Regulation and Control (AIRAC) cycle. The NAVDB is structured to provide information 
on standard navigational aids, waypoints, holding patterns, and airport information. 
Airport data include information on terminal gates, runways, Standard Instrument 
Departure (SID), Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR) approaches and missed 
approach procedures. Uncertainty in the navigation performance requires large 
separation distances between aircraft to ensure safety. This is often considered as a 
technical constraint limiting the dynamic airspace allocation in the next generation ATM 
(SESAR/NExtGen) environment. Hence, performance-based navigation enabled by the 
introduction of satellite navigation systems (GNSS) are employed to improve the RNP in 
order to meet the requirements specified in RTCA DO-236B.  
State-of-the-art FMS provides automated navigation functionalities for estimation of the 
aircraft’s position using the World Geodetic System (WGS-84) system coordinates. The 
position of the aircraft is determined by using information from multiple navigation 
sensors including the Inertial Reference System (IRS), VHF Omnidirectional Range (VOR), 
Distance Measuring Equipment (DME), Instrument Landing System (ILS) and Microwave 
Landing System (MLS). With the development of satellite-based navigation systems, 
GNSS data are becoming the main source of navigation information in all flight phases. 
In addition, FMS sends radio tuning commands for VOR, DME and ILS sensors based on 
the radio frequencies retrieved from the navigation database [8, 9]. Turning of radio 
parameters (frequency, etc.), is performed either manually by the pilot, or automatically 
by the FMS by performing database management queries on the NAVDB. Engine 
parameters and aircraft configuration from the Mode Control Panel (MCP), throttle 
management and other pilot controls are provided to the thrust management module 
of the FMS. This module supports the generation of vertical flight guidance steering 
commands and provides engine-trim commands to the Full Authority Digital Engine 
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Control (FADEC) or other engine control units. The FMS thrust management function also 
offers the abillity to control the throttle with minimum fuel consumption. 
The vertical FPLN defines the speed, altitude and time constraints at each waypoint 
based on the lateral FPLN plan, temperature, atmospheric pressure, aircraft weight, wind 
conditions, aircraft performance (given by PERFDB), cost index and flight predictions 
(short and long term). The state-of-the-art FMS have advanced design features primarily 
employing an intuitive use of the system and thereby reducing significantly the crew 
workload. These functions are summarised in Table 2.1 [10]. 
The cost index varies among various airlines, routes and the selected FPLN.  The cost 
index is used to compute the best trip cost, which evidently affects the speed 
(economical CAS/Mach speed) and altitude used in the vertical FPLN. Climbs are 
computed with a transition from constant Calibrated Air Speed (CAS) to constant Mach 
number assuming maximum climb thrust. Cruise segments are calculated at constant 
Mach number and descents are programmed with a transition (dictated by a transition 
altitude) from constant Mach number to constant CAS using ide thrust. The cost index is 
given by: 
           
         
         
                                                  (2.1) 
The cost index is dictated by the cost of fuel/kg, time cost per minute of flight (given by 
hourly maintenance cost, flight crew/cabin crew cost, depreciation/leasing cost) and 
time of flight. A lower cost index this value put more emphasis on reducing fuel flow. With 
a higher value the emphasis changes to high speed. The total cost is given by: 
         Cost = Fuel Used + Cost Index * Time                                     (2.2) 
Each FMS manufacturer provides a different range of CI and predominately, this index 
varied from 0 to 99 or from 0 to 999.  
Taking the Airbus A380 as a reference, the CI varies from 0 to 999 denoting maximum 
range and maximum time respectively. Furthermore additional CIs can be introduced 
such as long range cruise, maximum endurance and maximum range cruise. The 
conventionally used CI is often revised when deviations occur between the nominal 
flight plan and what is being actually flown, based on the aircraft dynamics and 
environmental/external conditions. Typical deviations are delayed departures at airports 
or errors in the predetermined en-route winds/weather conditions.  
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Table 2.1. State-of-the-art FMS functions. 
CREW FUNCTIONS -Overfly a designated terrain point/waypoint/navigational aid 
-Add/Delete a WPT of the initial Flight Plan 
-Avoid a new reported Threat Zone 
-Change initial Assault Landing to an alternate destination 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Worldwide standard and users navigation databases 
-Standard navigation database (ARINC 424) 
-Standard databases for aircraft performance and magnetic deviation  
-Multi-sensor localization 
-Manual position updating 
-Position monitoring 
Predictions based 
upon modelled 
aircraft 
performances 
-Aircraft weight management 
-Flight phase parameters computation 
-Time and fuel prediction 
-Range/ Endurance computation 
Tactical features  
 
-Low Level Flight 
-Air dropping 
-Assault landing 
Lateral navigation  
 
-Active flight plan (all ARINC 424 leg types) 
-Temporary flight plan with multiple revisions 
-Secondary flight plan with chaining capability 
-SID, STAR, approach management 
-Holding patterns 
-Lateral offset 
-Overfly/fly by selection 
-Reverse route, Direct to -RTA management 
-Time/Altitude constraints management 
Vertical navigation -Multiple steps 
Digital Map  
 
Source Data Format: 
-Vector, raster and various picture formats 
-Matrix: Digital terrain elevation database 
Map Display Format: 
-2D/3D high resolution digital map generation 
-Combined elevation, raster and vector databases 
-Hypsometric and anti-collision display modes 
-Vertical profile 
Map Management 
through keyboard 
and cursor unit  
 
-Altitude point or zone 
-Zoom 
-Map reference point change 
-Decluttering 
Radio Management  -VOR-DME-civil navaids -VHF-ATC mode S 
Training and Mission 
Planning System 
(TMPS) 
 
-FMS training on PC-based environment 
Preparation and download of: 
-Navigation data base 
-Aircraft performance and magnetic deviation data base  
-Routes preparation and download 
-Communication plan 
 
Ph.D. Thesis - Next Generation Flight Management Systems for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Operations                
- Automated Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance Functionalities  
23 
 
Similarly to the way a strategic CI is adopted for a given flight, a dynamic tactical CI is 
often defined in a state-of-the-art FMS. For any given CI, flight legs are constructed 
according to DO-206. Accordingly, non-deterministic legs-such as course legs or legs 
ending at an unspecified position-are often avoided, since they could involve problems 
for air traffic separation and bring added complexity to the FMS path construction by 
being dependent on the aircraft performance [11 - 13].  DO-206 recommends the use of 
track legs with a specified terminator. In particular, the use of track legs is advantageous 
with respect to course legs, since they do not depend on wind conditions and avoid 
problems related to magnetic variation.  Among the deterministic terminators, the most 
relevant are the Waypoints (WPs). In particular, the users can define the WP position on a 
horizontal plane in a variety of ways as summarised in Table 2.2 [13].  
Typically, a WP constructed in FMS can be of two different types, according to the way 
by which the conjunction between the relative legs is flown (Figure 2.2): 
 Fly-By (also named short turn): the WP is not overflown and the aircraft links the 
two legs with a turn; 
 Fly-over (also named fly-through): the WP is overflown and then the aircraft 
returns on the leg. 
Table 2.2. Waypoint categories. 
WP category Description 
PBD Polar coordinates (bearing and range) from another fix. 
PB/PB Intersection  of  bearings  from  two  defined WPs. 
ATO 
Specified by an Along-Track Offset (ATO) from an existing flight path 
fix. 
LAT/LON 
WP is defined at the point an aircraft is entering a specified latitude 
or longitude. 
LAT/LON 
crossing WP 
WP is placed at the intersection of a specified point (LAT/LON) with 
the active FPLN. 
Airways 
intersection 
First point at which two given airways intersect. An airway is a 
defined route consisting of a number of waypoints. 
Runway 
extension WP 
WP is placed at a given distance from the runway threshold along 
the runway heading. 
Abeam WP 
Activation of DIRECT TO function. Abeam WPs are created at their 
abeam position on the DIRECT TO path. 
FIR/SUA 
intersection WP 
WP is placed at the cross between the active flight plan and the 
Flight Information Region (FIR) or Special User Areas (SUA) boundary. 
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(a)                                                (b) 
Figure 2.2. Waypoint types (a) fly-by and (b) fly-over. 
RTCA DO-206 recommends the use of fly-by type WPs, since in most cases the next 
waypoint in the planned trajectory is not accurately predictable if there are any 
deviations [14]. The requirement to be levied on unmanned aircraft FMS is to prove the 
required levels of safety in the presence of anomalies such as unexpected traffic, on 
board failures, and conflicting data. This is essential because existing lateral and 
longitudinal autopilots in commercial aircraft (and business jets) can support flight in all 
flight phases but do not provide the capability for fully autonomous flight.  
Automation is mostly considered rigid in the current implementation because the 
avionics system designers have largely preferred simplicity over adaptability in their 
strategies [15]. To operate efficiently in controlled airspaces and to realise coordinated 
operations of manned and unmanned aircraft, all aircraft are required to be equipped 
with a FMS that replicates current functionality, including precise following of the 
approved flight plan, a Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) system 
monitoring capability and Human Machine Interface and Interactions (HMI2) capability 
[16, 17]. The steering commands generated by the FMS are used to automatically follow 
the FPLN. Manoeuvres (given by ARINC 424 flight legs) are performed with respect to the 
change of one guidance mode to another [18]. In this case, the guidance of the aircraft 
is managed entirely by the FMS. In a selected mode, the pilot takes over the control of 
the flight guidance systems, imposing a different set of modes and guidance 
parameters. The selected mode is often used during take-off and landing phases. Other 
instances of employing a selected mode occur when alerts are raised from a path 
monitoring block, or when collision threats are provided. A conceptual representation of 
the FMS guidance loop is shown in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3. FMS guidance loop.  
The guidance modes can be categorised into lateral and vertical guidance modes. The 
lateral mode is used to control the altitude of the aircraft by implementing algorithms for 
modifying and fine-tuning the roll angle. Similarly the vertical mode is used to control the 
perpendicular motion of the aircraft by implementing algorithms for modifying and fine-
tuning the pitch angle. The typical lateral modes of operation are summarised in Tables 
2.3.  
Table 2.3. Lateral guidance modes [19]. 
Mode Description 
Runway (RWY) 
[MANAGED] 
Activated after pilot sets thrust levers to FLX or Take Off/Go Around 
(TOGA). This mode is categorised into: RWY mode - Activated to 
maintain the runway middle. Runway Track (RWY TRK) mode - 
activated after take-off and passes 30 ft Radio Altitude (RALT). 
Navigation 
(NAV)[MANAGED] 
This mode is used for en-route navigation and non-precision 
approaches. It will capture and track the lateral guidance. 
Approach (APPR) 
[MANAGED] 
In the lateral guidance, this mode captures and tracks the lateral 
guidance for ILS localizer and VOR non-precision approaches. This 
mode is selected manually by pressing the Approach (APPR) 
button on the Flight Control Panel (FCP). First it will arm APP NAV 
mode. It is similar to NAV mode and guide the aircraft to a target 
flight path. If there is no Final approach Fixed (FAF) point defined 
in the flight plan before next airport, LOC mode is activated. 
Go-Around (GA) 
[MANAGED] 
GA TRK - This mode generates a command to track a heading 
reference. Only activated during a GA. 
Heading Track (HDG- 
TRK) [SELECTED] 
This mode generates a command to capture and maintain a 
selected heading reference. The heading reference can be 
adjusted by the pilot. 
Roll Out             
[MANAGED] 
This mode guides the aircraft along the runway following an 
automatic landing. 
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The speed (CAS/Mach) and thrust are controlled by the auto-throttle subsystem. In 
general, generic modes such as navigation, climb, etc. are typically managed modes 
while other modes including heading, altitude hold and speed hold can be either 
managed or selected modes. Vertical guidance modes (Table 2.4) are controlled by the 
Auto-Pilot and Flight Director (AP/FD). Then the Auto-Throttle (A/THR) controls the target 
Speed/Mach (SPD/MACH) and fixes thrust to react to the AP/FD mode selected.  
Table 2.4. Vertical guidance modes [19]. 
Mode Description 
Speed Reference 
(SRS) [MANAGED] 
It commands the aircraft pitch in order to maintain a speed target and 
guides the aircraft during take-off, initial climb and after a GA. 
 
 
 
Climb (CLB) to 
Descent (DES) 
To change altitude, the auto-throttle commands constant thrust and 
aircraft pitch to maintain the aircraft speed. This mode is also known as 
the Pitch Mode. There are many types of these modes: 
OP CLB and OP DES [SELECTED]: Open climb or open descent such 
that aircraft reach an altitude without considering the altitude 
constraints. 
CLB and DES [MANAGED]: The aircraft will level off at an altitude 
constraint. 
EXP CLB and EXP DES [SELECTED]: Similar to OP CLB and OP DES but 
differs in the speed target the aircraft assumes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Altitude (ALT) 
The aircraft will maintain the pressure altitude. This mode has multiple 
modes depending on the circumstances. 
ALT [SELECTED] and ALT* [CAPTURE]. These modes are activated once 
the altitude target is reached and one of climb or descent mode is 
active or VS mode is active. ALT* mode is activated first, and once the 
aircraft reaches level-off the ALT mode engages. 
ALT CRZ [MANAGED]: Similar to the previous ALT mode except that the 
selected altitude must be at or above Cruise altitude define in MCDU. 
ALT CST [MANAGED] and ALT CST* [CAPTURE]: This mode considers the 
altitude constraint. 
 
Approach (APPR) 
[MANAGED] 
Final Mode: Aircraft is guided along the vertical flight path as defined 
in the flight plan. If the flight plan contains no Non-precision part for 
the airport and ILS tuned-in, the glide slope mode is engages to 
capture the glide slope of the ILS. 
Vertical Speed 
(VS) / Flight Path 
Angle (FPA) 
[SELECTED] 
The aircraft will maintain the specified vertical speed (climb or 
descent) reference, defined by the vertical speed dial on the FCP or a 
Flight Path Angle. Once the altitude is read this mode will change                   
to ALT. 
FLARE 
[MANAGED] 
The aircraft is aligned with runway centerline on yaw axis and flare on 
the pitch axis, such that the AP/FD commands a suitable pitch angle 
for the flare. 
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The interaction between the A/THR and AP/FD are based on the pitch mode controls. If 
the AP/FD pitch modes controls the vertical trajectory or the pitch mode is not engaged 
then the A/THR modes controls the target SPD/MCH. However if the pitch mode controls 
a target speed or Mach then the A/THR controls the thrust. Typical thrust control by the 
A/THR is during the climb and descent modes. All the vertical guidance modes can be 
initiated, and controlled by, managed or selected mode.  
When designing flight guidance systems, it is also necessary to consider flight guidance 
protection to ensure safety. Flight guidance protection is a means to alert the flight crew 
when a hazardous situation is detected in the planned aircraft trajectory. Guidance 
protection laws programmed in the FMS depend on input data from Ground Proximity 
Warning System (GPWS), weather radar/wind shear alert systems and/or a Traffic Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS) [20, 21]. The design of control laws and guidance laws are 
based on the adoption of a state representation approach of flight dynamics including 
trim conditions, pilot models and stabilisation augmentation given by: 
         ⃗ ( )       ( )      ( )                                               (2.3) 
where   ⃗  is the control vector,    is the state vector,   ⃗⃗⃗   is the output reference vector,   is 
the feedback gain matrix and   is the feed-forward gain matrix. The flight control laws 
depend on the flight guidance mode employed (selected or managed mode). The 
development of f light control l aws is very intricate and it is a multi-disciplinary 
development process. The control laws need to be carefully designed in order to cope 
with the complexity of the control task itself. The interactions between FMS and Auto 
Flight Control System (AFCS) are illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4. FMS and AFCS interactions. 
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A typical FCS consists of control surface actuators, motion sensors and controllers. Either 
the pilot or flight guidance system provides the reference inputs i.e., command signals. 
The actuators translate the command signals into control surface deflections, while 
motion sensors detect the changes in aircraft motion variables (linear / angular 
accelerations and velocities). If there is a difference between the commanded state 
and measured state, the controller generates command signals in accordance with the 
implemented control law such that the actual state is driven towards the desired state. 
The guidance system continuously monitors the path of the aircraft. In the case of any 
deviation from the desired path, the guidance system issues path correction commands 
to the flight control system. The flight control system then translates these commands into 
control surface deflections to cause the required change in the motion of the aircraft. 
Usually, an AFCS contains two loops: an inner loop known as a Stability Augmentation 
System (SAS) and an outer flight path control loop known as an autopilot [22]. The 
purpose of SAS is to augment the values of certain stability derivatives of the aircraft 
through feedback control.  The SAS improves the flying qualities of an aircraft and helps 
in rejecting atmospheric disturbances. Usually, a SAS is engaged for the entire duration 
of the flight to ensure that the airframe exhibits a stable behaviour. A dedicated SAS is 
designed for each mode of aircraft motion. The most commonly used SAS functions are: 
yaw damper, pitch rate stability augmentation and roll rate damper. The autopilot 
enables an aircraft to follow a desired lateral / vertical profile, without any input from the 
pilot. Essentially, the autopilot facilitates an aircraft at a desired altitude / heading / 
airspeed. The autopilot comprises two sub-systems: the attitude control system and the 
flight path control system [23]. Attitude control systems are used to place an aircraft in 
the desired orientation in space and keep that orientation for the required duration of 
time. Flight path control systems allow an aircraft to follow a predefined path with high 
accuracy. The basic modes of an autopilot are listed below: 
Longitudinal Channel: 
 Auto-throttle (speed control); 
 Altitude hold/select mode; 
 Vertical speed hold/select mode; 
 Attitude hold mode (pitch attitude). 
Lateral Channel: 
 Attitude hold mode (roll attitude); 
 Heading hold/select mode. 
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2.4 Maintenance of Separation  
In this section, a short summary of the top-level components of airborne and ground 
surveillance systems are defined and a brief description of the lower-level services, 
functions, equipment, roles and procedures under each component are presented. The 
top-level components of the ATM system as given by ICAO are CM, traffic 
synchronisation, demand and capacity balancing, aerodrome/airspace operations, 
and airspace and service delivery management.  
2.4.1 Airspace Categories and Classes 
The airspace is deﬁned as the portion of the atmosphere controlled by a country above 
its territory, including its territorial waters or, more generally, any speciﬁc 3D area of the 
atmosphere [25]. According to CFR, Title 14, part 71-73 and the Aeronautical Information 
Manual, the US national airspace is divided into two categories and four types based on 
the complexity or density of aircraft movements, proximity to airports, altitude, the nature 
of the operations conducted within the airspace, the level of safety required, and the 
national and public interest. These categories and types are regulated as follows: 
 Explicit regulations for airspace class A, B, C, D, E, restricted and prohibited areas; 
 A non-regulatory framework that includes airspace class G, Military Operations 
Area (MOA), warning areas, alert areas, and controlled ﬁring areas. 
While classes are mutually exclusive, categories can be deﬁned within any class as 
needed. Categories are typically used to provide additional information to pilots about 
hazards activities common to the airspace. There are four types within these two 
categories: 
 Controlled airspace; 
 Uncontrolled airspace; 
 Special use airspace; 
 Other airspace. 
Airspace classes A through E, ordered from most restrictive to least, corresponds to 
controlled airspace. However, when overlapping airspace designations apply to the 
same airspace, the operating rules associated with the more restrictive airspace 
designation apply [CFR §71.9]. 
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2.4.2 Rules of the Air  
By definition, control areas are volumes of airspace that are sufficient to contain the 
flight paths of Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) or portions thereof for which it is desired to 
provide certain Air Traffic Services (ATS). Control areas also include ATS routes (airways) 
and Terminal Control Areas (TCA), frequently known as Terminal Manoeuvring Areas 
(TMA). Control zones complement control areas in their purpose and are specifically 
conceived to contain arrival and departure IFR flight paths in close proximity to the 
ground. For minor and isolated airports with limited IFR traffic, an appropriate 
combination of control zones and ATS routes is usually sufficient to contain IFR traffic 
safely. This is due to the fact that tactical deconfliction by ATM operators is almost never 
required and occasional peaks of traffic can be successfully managed by exploiting 
multiple approach and departure procedures and en-route holdings. Larger airports or 
combinations of multiple minor airports in close proximity to each other require more 
frequent tactical ATM interventions in terms of path stretching and separation measures. 
Whenever additional allowance for these tactical measures is necessary, TCA/TMA is 
established. In order to maximise safety of IFR traffic TCA/TMA are most commonly 
granted the highest levels of ATS, corresponding to airspace classes “A”, “B” or, less 
frequently, “C”.  
Due to their distinctive nature, TCA/TMA have become the paradigm of dense air traffic 
scenarios, where arriving, departing and overflying aircraft intersect leading to frequent 
conflict situations. The highest levels of ATS assigned to TCA/TMA, implies that most of the 
responsibilities for conflict detection, separation maintenance, sequencing and spacing 
lies on the ATM side. This is effectively the opposite of recreational airspace assigned 
classes “G” and “F”, and has important consequences for manned and unmanned 
aircraft SA&CA. 
CA algorithms have to take into account the same collision avoidance requirements of 
the rules of the air for manned aviation, delineated in the ICAO Annex 2 [24], in order to 
guarantee the Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS).   
Aviation regulations in eth United States, collectively known as Federal Aviation 
Regulation (FAR), are codiﬁed in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Title 14,  
Chapter I [26]. The CFR, along with supplementary material like handbooks, orders, 
advisory circulars and technical standards orders issued by the FAA, deﬁne appropriate 
standards, procedures, and practices to ensure that manufactures and operators are 
able to establish a minimum level of safety and reliability required for civil operations 
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[27]. Aviation authorities in other counties (UK, Australia, etc.) have an equivalent code 
of regulations applicable regionally. 
2.4.3 General Operation Principles and Flight Rules 
Code of Federal Aviation, Title 14, part 91 has established right-of-way rules, aircraft 
speed, minimum safe altitudes, equipment, instrument, and certiﬁcate requirements, 
maintenance, preventive maintenance, special ﬂight operations i.e. aerobatic ﬂight, 
ﬂight test areas, etc. for the US. Federal regulations do not permit pilots to ﬂy below 
10,000 ft or in proximity of airspace Class B, C, and D at speed exceeding 250 knots. It is 
not allowed for aircraft to operate close to another aircraft in a way that creates a 
collision hazard. The pilot is required to contribute to collision avoidance by being alert in 
order to “see and avoid” other aircraft [CFR §91.111].  The ﬂight rules that need to be 
considered for implementing effective SA&CA algorithms for manned and unmanned 
aircraft are summarised as follows: 
 Right-of-way rules – Except water operations: When an aircraft has the right-of- 
way, other traffic shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or 
ahead of it unless well clear [CFR §91.113]. The main right-of-way rules are: 
- The aircraft that is in distress has right of way over all other traffic; 
- Landing aircraft or aircraft on ﬁnal approach to land have right of way over 
other aircraft in ﬂight or operating on the surface. If two or more aircraft are 
landing then the aircraft at the lower altitude has the right of way; 
- Aircraft being overtaken have the right of way. Overtaking aircraft shall alter 
course to the right to pass well clear; 
- In an head-on scenario, each aircraft shall alter course to the right to pass well 
clear; 
- In case of a converging scenario: 
 when the aircraft are of the same category, then the aircraft to the other’s 
right has the right of way; 
 if the aircraft are of different categories, then both aircraft have to follow 
the rules provided in CFR; §91 for converging encounters. 
 Aircraft speed: The minimum safe airspeed deﬁned by the [CFR; §91.117] is 250 
knots (288 mph) for any particular aircraft operating below 10,000 ft MSL. 
However, the minimum safe airspeed is 200 knots (230 mph) for any aircraft 
operating at or below 2,500 ft above the surface within 4 NM of the primary 
airport of a Class C or Class D airspace area. In regards to Class B, [CFR §91.117] 
indicates that no person may operate an aircraft in the airspace underlying a 
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Class B airspace designated for an airport or in a VFR corridor designated through 
Class B airspace at an indicated airspeed of more than 200 knots (230 mph); 
 Minimum safe altitude: According to [CFR §91.199], the minimum safe altitudes 
are categorized as follows: 
- Over congested areas: an aircraft shall maintain an altitude of 1,000 ft above 
the highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 ft of the aircraft; 
- Non-congested areas: minimum of 500 ft Above Ground Level (AGL) shall be 
maintained (except over open water or sparsely populated areas); 
- Anywhere else: an aircraft should maintain an altitude such that if the engine 
fails, an emergency landing may be executed without undue hazard to 
persons or property on the surface. 
 Failure of power unit(s): in case of power unit failure, the aircraft shall not fly 
below the altitude necessary to make an emergency landing; 
 Land clear rule: when in densely populated areas, the aircraft shall not fly 
below the altitude necessary to make a landing outside of the congested 
area, in the event of a power unit failure; 
 Flying over open air assemblies: when flying over an organised open-air 
assembly of more than 1000 persons, the aircraft shall fly above 1000 ft. Such 
an altitude permits landing in the event of a power unit failure. 
The CFR Title 14, Part 91 deﬁnes two types of ﬂight rules, namely visual ﬂight rules and 
instrument ﬂight rules, which apply to all aircraft except moored balloons, kites, 
unmanned rockets, and unmanned free balloons.  
The CFR Title 14, Part 27 (Airworthiness Standards: Normal Category Rotorcraft) and CFR 
Title 14, Part 29 (Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Rotorcraft) provide the 
airworthiness standard for normal and transport category rotorcraft respectively. In most 
countries, at airports/helipads, established standard departure and arrival procedures 
ensure that (wherever possible), twin engine Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) 
aircraft do not fly over residential areas below 1500ft. Normal flight is permitted down to 
1000ft over residential areas and lower levels are permitted during landing and take-off. 
The following conditions shall be applied in the authorisation of VTOL aircraft when flying 
according to VFR:  
 such flights may be conducted during day only, unless otherwise permitted by 
the competent authority; 
 by the pilot: (i) clear of cloud and with the ground surface in sight, (ii) the flight 
visibility is not less than not less than 800 m; (iii) fly at a speed of 140 kts (instrument 
Ph.D. Thesis - Next Generation Flight Management Systems for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Operations                
- Automated Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance Functionalities  
33 
 
air speed) or less to give adequate chance to observe other traffic and any 
obstacles to avoid a collision and take and timely actions if necessary.  
In some circumstances, VTOL aircraft need to fly at lower altitudes (law enforcement, 
search and rescue, emergency, medical and surveying purposes, etc.), which might 
require authorisation from the regulatory authority. If a VTOL aircraft pilot requires to cross 
a controlled zone around an airport, it may be necessary for the ATCo to hold the VTOL 
aircraft in one place until it is safe to continue operations.  
2.4.4 Separation Standards 
Separation standards refer to the minimum distance that aircraft operating in controlled 
airspace and at airports with an operational control tower must keep between them 
[28]. Different separation standards apply to aircraft operating under IFR and VFR. In 
Australia, aircraft flying under IFR in controlled airspace up to 29,000 ft altitude are 
separated by 1000 ft vertically, unless they are separated horizontally. When above 
29,000 ft, the vertical separation increases to 2000 ft, except in airspace where Reduced 
Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) is applied. It is generally guaranteed that when 
aircraft are separated vertically, horizontal separation can be reduced without 
compromising safety. In controlled en route airspace, the horizontal separation standard 
between aircraft flying at the same altitude is 5 Nautical Miles (NM) while in terminal 
area airspace, the minimum separation is 3 NM. For general aviation aircraft (non-
commercial aircraft) outside of controlled airspace, separation can be as close as 500 ft 
vertically and 500 ft horizontally. ICAO rules divide aircraft into three main categories 
including light, medium and heavy, in order to establish separation between aircraft 
based on wake vortices. The classification is based on the maximum take-off weight of 
the aircraft and the separation distances are based on experimental flight data (flight 
tests). The ICAO classification is provided in Table 2.7 (adapted from [29]). The only 
exception is for Airbus A380 aircraft, which has a different set of separation distance 
standards. 
An analytical model has been proposed for calculating the safe separation distance 
between aircraft and is especially valuable in non-cooperative sensor based aircraft 
separation. The safe separation distance is given by: 
   
   
   
                                                              (2.3) 
where   is the safe separation distance,   is the fraction of the available control moment 
that is used,   is the turbulent kinematic shear viscosity and : 
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where    is the incident flow velocity and   is the vortex core radius.   is given by: 
   
   
 
 
   
  
 
   
 
 
   
  
 
   
  
   
  
                                               (2.5) 
where   is a dimensionless factor specified by the wing planform,    and    are the 
volume loading (wing loading divided by span) of the preceding and following aircraft, 
   is the aileron area,   is the wing area,    is the moment arm of ailerons,   is the wing 
span,   is the core radius of the wing-tip vortices and   is the wing chord. It is to be noted 
that equation (2.3) is not symmetric (i.e., heavy-light is not equal to light-heavy). 
Table 2.5. ICAO separation standards. 
Designation 
Maximum              
Take-off Weight 
Aircraft             
Example 
* Separation Distances        
for a Pair of Aircraft 
Heavy W > 136 t 
Boeing B 747-400                      
(W = 396,893 kg) 
Heavy-Heavy 4 NM     
Heavy-Medium 5 NM 
Heavy-Light 6 NM 
Medium 7 t < W < 136 t 
Boeing B 737-300                      
(W = 70,080 kg) 
Medium-Heavy 3 NM     
Medium-Medium 3 NM 
Medium-Light 5 NM 
Light W < 7t 
Cessna Citation 500                      
(W = 5,375 kg) 
Light-Heavy 3 NM     
Light-Medium 3 NM 
Light-Light 3 NM 
 
*where the first aircraft is the leading aircraft and the second aircraft is the following aircraft.  
2.5 Collision Detection and Avoidance  
A key objective of the ATM modernisation concept is the delegation of the task of 
separation assurance from air traffic controller to the flight crew, where the whole 
task is supported by higher levels of automation. In order to be able to satisfy this 
goal, aircraft are required to implement automated means for airborne conflict 
management, which is categorised as: 
 Conflict detection, 
 Conflict prevention; 
 Conflict resolution. 
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Onboard systems will need to be able to identify violation of separation minima in 
strategic (long-term), tactical and emergency timeframes. Resolutions for these 
conflicts need to be computed in order to offer the flight deck crew alternative 
routing. In case coordination with other traffic participants is required, those 
updated trajectories need to be communicated, shared (involves negotiation and 
agreement of trajectories between two aircraft) and validated. This has to be 
achieved independent of ground infrastructure. 
One of the key goals of this thesis is to describe the system design aspects that will 
support airborne separation assurance and conflict management in line with the 
ATM modernisation as well as UTM concepts of operations.  
Over the years, many efforts have been made in order to develop SA&CA 
requirements and, in 2004, the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) 
Special Committee 203 (SC-203) was formed [30]. SC-203 was given the task of 
defining Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for SA&CA.  
Between December 2008 and March 2009, the FAA organized several workshops in 
order to define the capabilities that a SA&CA system should have to be compliant 
with the current rules governing the notion of “see-and-avoid.” The workshop 
published a document in October 2009 [31], where the sense-and-avoid concept 
was defined as “the capability of [an unmanned aircraft] to remain well clear from 
and avoid collisions with other airborne traffic”. Moreover, the workshop defined 
that a SA&CA system would be characterized by two components [32]: 
 A self-separation component that ensures a safe separation based on a 
variable time-based threshold. In this way, the aircraft remain “well-clear” of 
each other; 
 A collision avoidance component that operates when the safe separation is 
lost and an extreme manoeuvre is needed to prevent a collision. In fact, for 
the collision avoidance manoeuvre, a distance-based threshold is 
considered. 
The particiapnts of the workshop identified the SA&CA core and crosscuuting 
capabilities and they are summarised in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. 
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Table 2.6. SA&CA core capabilities [30, 31]. 
Core Capability Description 
Target Detection 
Ability to determine presence and location of any airborne 
object that presents a collision threat to the unmanned 
aircraft covered by this SA&CA system 
Target Tracking 
Ability to refine a detected airborne object’s position            
(2D or 3D) and velocity based on one or more target 
detection(s) from a single sensor 
Multi-sensor Data Fusion 
Ability to refine a detected airborne object’s position             
(2D or 3D) and velocity based on one or more target 
detection(s) or track(s) from multiple sensors 
Object Identification 
Ability to discriminate type and characteristics of a 
detected airborne object 
Threat Assessment 
Ability to determine risk of collision based on relative 
position (2D or 3D) and velocity of the detected airborne 
object and the unmanned aircraft covered by the               
SA&CA system 
 
Alerting 
 
Ability to communicate that a risk threshold                                
has been met 
Manoeuvre Selection 
Ability to determine the appropriate action needed to 
resolve identified collision risk(s) to the appropriate 
separation threshold 
Manoeuvre Notification 
Ability to communicate the selected manoeuvre in order 
to execute within the timing window 
Manoeuvre Execution 
Ability to execute the selected manoeuvre within the 
timing window 
Return-to-Home/Mission 
Ability of UAS to return to intended or amended course 
after an avoidance or separation manoeuvre is complete 
 
In order to define a set of SA&CA standards, for the certification and operational 
approval of unmanned aircraft, the FAA workshop identified five sub functions that 
a SA&CA system shall perform including: 
 Detection of conflicting traffic; 
 Determination of the right of way; 
 Analysis of the flight paths; 
 Maneuvering; 
 Communication. 
According to the performance of the on board SA&CA technologies, it is possible to 
obtain different encounter sensing dimensions. This design factor is defined as the 
extension of space surveyed for the conflict risks monitoring. The trajectory 
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information of other traffic is determined after performing multi-sensor data fusion of 
information obtained from the SA&CA technologies (Figure 2.5).  
Table 2.7. SA&CA crosscutting capabilities. 
Crosscutting Capability Description 
Pilot/Operator      
Presentation 
Ability to provide the pilot/operator with the required 
information required to perform/monitor the core SA&CA 
capabilities 
System Integration 
Ability to integrate the core capabilities into existing and 
planned manned and unmanned aircraft 
Certification/Qualification 
Ability to show through process and evidence that the 
SA&CA system meets an acceptable safety level 
Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS)/Procedure 
Validation 
Ability to conform to approved CONOPS and                  
operational procedures 
Data Standardization/  
Characterization 
Ability to enable collaboration and meaningful 
comparisons through databases, data standards and data 
integrity 
Airspace/ATM/UTM 
Ability to assess the impact on the airspace that UAS system 
performance and the performance of supporting systems, 
such as SA&CA, may have on ATM/UTM 
Traffic Separation Minima 
Ability to determine the separation standards and the 
environmental or operational conditions which inform 
SA&CA design 
 
 
Criticality analysis is carried out to prioritize (i.e. to determine if a collision risk threshold is 
exceeded for all tracked intruders) and to determine the action commands. If an 
evading action is required, the SA&CA system generates and optimises an avoidance 
trajectory according to a priority based cost function based on minimum distance, fuel, 
time and closure rate criteria with the aid of differential geometry algorithms to generate 
a smooth trajectory.   
Detection of conflict risks requires the identification of potential threats in the airspace 
close to the own ship; along with continuous data updates, collection and recording. 
Therefore it is necessary to provide the system with the tools to enable the detection and 
identification of specific type of threats.  These tools can be simple databases, e.g. for 
detecting ground threats, sensors set for the detection of moving threats, etc. 
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Obstacle/ Intruder Tracking 
(Trajectory Determination)
Criticality Analysis – Prioritizing, 
Declaration and Action Determination
Avoidance Trajectory / Separation   
Commands Generation
Sensor Management – 
Multi-sensor Data Fusion
Flight Management System
 Autopilot 
Flight Control System
 
Figure 2.5. SA&CA system processes. 
Consider a classical two aircraft conflict, where an aircraft on the lower segment 
flies at    m/s, and an aircraft on the upper segment flies at    m/s. The angle of 
incidence is   and D is the separation standard. 
Let: 
   
  
  
                                                            (2.6) 
If two aircraft are in conflict, the following inequality should be satisfied to avoid any 
conflicts. 
(     )
   (     )
                                           (2.7) 
The above second degree inequality will only be satisfied if the following equation holds 
true:  
(     )
   (     )
                                          (2.8) 
Equation (2.5) has at least one solution. Hence the discriminant is given by: 
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      (  
                
 )        (         )
                 (2.9) 
where the aircraft on the lower segment is at a distance    from the intersection point 
and the other aircraft is at a distance       must be positive and the extremal points 
  and    are given by: 
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)   (
  
  
)     
     
                                     (2.10) 
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)   (
  
  
)     
     
                                     (2.11) 
If the length of the segment is given by (  -   ), the function on   and   does not depend 
on   . It implies that the obtain information is sufficient and there is no uncertainty of any 
kind. Conflicts could be exactly predicted as soon as the position of the aircraft is known, 
even if they are very far away from the intersection point. A number of studies have 
shown that only one conflict out of three to five detected and monitored would really 
result in separation violation. For example, on simulated traffic on a busy day of 1999 in 
the French airspace above FL 320, when the uncertainties on trajectory predictions 
increase (since it was considered as free flight), the number of necessary maneuvers 
also increases dramatically [33]. Without uncertainty, 972 conflicts occur and 1041 
maneuvers are required to solve them. When a 2% uncertainty is considered on ground 
speed, and 5% uncertainty on climbing or descending rate, 2461 maneuvers are 
necessary to solve the detected conflicts. The number of maneuvers increases to 3881 
for a 5% uncertainty on ground speed and 15% uncertainty on vertical speed and it 
eventually reaches 6819 maneuvers with 10% ground speed and 30% vertical speed 
uncertainties [33].  Figure 2.6 illustrates relevant parameters in the well-clear based 
conflict detection method. 
Figure 2.6 shows the different SA&CA zones and the condition of CA. As can be seen, 
the Self-Separation Threshold (SST) and Self-Separation Volume (SSV) are boundaries 
where there is no threat, but an aircraft detected far away can be regarded as an 
obstacle. In controlled airspace, ATC ensures a safe distance is maintained from other 
aircraft, terrain, obstacles and certain airspace not designated for routine air travel. The 
ATC is in charge of giving the order to reconfigure the path and avoid crossing 
trajectories. The second volume is called the self-separation threshold. In this situation, 
ATC efforts may have failed, or another unresolved alarm may have occurred, and the 
aircraft detected turns out to be a threat. The SSV could be the only function provided 
given that the safety analysis demonstrates that the target level of safety can be met 
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with SSV alone. However, when all forms of SA have failed, we are now at the third 
volume and the CA (provided by the Collision Avoidance Threshold (CATH) boundary) 
takes appropriate action to prevent a threat aircraft from penetrating the Collision 
Volume (CV). On rare occasions the self-separation functions may conflict with ATC 
separation services, and as a general rule the aircraft follows the ATC separation 
services. 
2
0
0
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t
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N
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1000 ft
Collision Avoidance Threshold (CATH)
Self-Separation Volume (SSV)
Self-Separation Threshold (SST)
 
Figure 2.6. CATH, SSV and SST boundaries. 
2.5.1. Conflict Detection and Resolution Approaches 
Conflict Detection and Resolution (CD&R) algorithms are implemented to monitor the 
surrounding environment for both static and dynamic obstacles using onboard sensors 
and using information from the ground network. Cooperative systems and non-
cooperative sensors are employed for object detection in the surrounding airspace.  
To detect and resolve a conflict, it is important to assess and compare the trajectories of 
the host aircraft and the detected object. The trajectory prediction and computation 
module processes the raw sensor information and provides the trajectories of the host 
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aircraft and the tracked objects. When multiple sensors/systems are employed for 
tracking, then multi-sensor data fusion techniques are adopted. There are three basic 
models of trajectory prediction methods (Figure 2.7). In the nominal method, the 
trajectory is predicted directly from the sensor data without considering the possibility of 
any uncertainty or change. The output of the nominal trajectory predictor is a single 
trajectory computed from prior sensor measurements. The trajectory may be computed 
using different methods, i.e. linear prediction, Taylor series prediction, or prediction using 
the Kalman filter. The nominal method prediction is suitable for short-term predictions, 
where the probability of change is relatively low. The worst-case method is another 
modelling approach. This method covers the whole range of manoeuvres the aircraft 
may perform and uses a look-ahead time parameter to compute the area where the 
aircraft may occur. This area is then considered as the predicted trajectory. In the 
probabilistic prediction approach, the uncertainties are used to model the potential 
variations in the trajectory. To construct this model, all possible trajectories are 
generated (like for the worst-case prediction) and each trajectory is evaluated by the 
probability function. The probabilistic prediction is a trade-off between the nominal 
method and the worst-case prediction. The probabilistic prediction method is the most 
widely used technique, in which decisions are made based on the likelihood of the 
conflict.  
2.5.2. Theoretical Techniques for CD&R 
The flight plan, Position, Velocity and Attitude (PVA) as well as Trajectory Change Points 
(TCP) exchange approaches are bound to cooperative sensors only. The aircraft 
exchange parts of their flight plans, TCPs or other state information and in this case, the 
precise trajectory is known and no prediction is needed. The conflict resolution block 
resolves the collision using one of the collision avoidance methods (Figure 2.8). Some of 
the key methods are rule-based, game theoretic, field-based, geometric, numerical 
optimization, combined and multi-agent methods [34, 35]. 
In general, the existing conflict resolution solutions can be divided into two parts:  simple 
collision avoidance solutions, and localisation and mapping based solutions. Simple 
solutions are based on avoiding collisions by steering the vehicle in the opposite 
direction using different techniques. The biggest drawback of such solutions is the 
intervention into the steering which may not be desirable for the mission of the aircraft. 
These solutions do not allow an aircraft to control its distance from an obstacle which 
may be necessary [36 - 39].  
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Rule-based methods use a set of prescribed rules to avoid conflict. The sets of rules are 
fixed during the system design phase and originally were inspired by the VFR known from 
the civilian air traffic domain. 
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Figure 2.7. Trajectory prediction/estimation approaches. 
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Figure 2.8. Collision detection and resolution taxonomy. 
The second part can be described as localisation and mapping-based solutions. The 
map is loaded a priori and the fixed obstacles are provided in the associated database. 
Those solutions avoid collisions by mapping, positioning, and navigation within the map 
while the positioning and mapping is based on a complex localisation algorithm. 
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Compared to the first division, these solutions do not limit the mission, but the CA 
algorithm requires considerable memory and computational power compared to the 
already mentioned simple solutions, because of its complexity [40 – 42]. 
The rule-based methods use a set of prescribed rules to avoid conflict. The sets of rules 
are fixed during the system design phase and originally were inspired by the visual flight 
rules (VFR) known from the civilian air-traffic domain. In the game theory methods, the 
authors model the conflict as a two-player differential game. These algorithms are useful 
mainly for non-cooperative conflict resolution. The field-based methods treat each 
aircraft as a charged particle and are very close to a reactive control mechanism. 
Based on the current configuration (e.g. position of other platforms, weather condition, 
considered uncertainty), the field is computed. Geometrical approaches consider the 
whole trajectory of the airplane, not restricting to the currently observed solution. Various 
approaches optimize given objective functions while they are searching for the proper 
evasion manoeuvre. In many cases, these methods are considering only two-aircraft 
collision; for multi-collision situations they degrade and present sub-optimal approaches, 
or rely on the sequential application of two-aircraft collision avoidance, where safety is 
not necessarily guaranteed at all times. Geometrical optimization is a very complex 
problem, especially if all available actions (including change of heading, velocity, and 
altitude) are considered. The numerical optimization methods use a kinematic model of 
the vehicle together with a set of constraints, and then use cost metrics for the 
manoeuvre generation. The optimal evasion manoeuvre is then computed based on 
the most desired constraints. The major benefit of these methods is that the optimization 
criterion is clearly formalized and the final control is optimized with respect to the given 
problem definition. With increasing number of airplanes the problem becomes 
analytically unsolvable. The limitation of bounded receeding time horizon simplifies the 
problem. The multi-agent methods use the multi-agent framework for solution 
generation. Each aircraft is controlled by one agent. The agents are able to 
communicate and negotiate a solution using various utility functions [34]. 
2.5.3. Applied/Implemented Air Traffic Solutions for CD&R 
Various other CD&R algorithms have been employed in specific projects on SA&CA 
around the globe. Within the Smart Skies project, technologies were developed to 
facilitate the greater utilisation of the national airspace system by both manned and 
unmanned aircraft [43]. These technologies include an automated separation 
management system capable of providing SA in complex airspace environments and 
CA with dynamic and static obstacles; and a Mobile Aircraft Tracking System (MATS) 
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that utilises cost-effective primary radar and cooperative surveillance systems. The 
system includes manned and unmanned aircraft, virtual aircraft, public mobile data and 
Iridium communication links, an Automated Dynamic Airspace Controller (ADAC) and 
the MATS. 
The Mid Air Collision Avoidance System (MIDCAS) was a 4 year long European project 
funded by five European countries. Its goal was to demonstrate the baseline of 
acceptable solutions for the critical self-separation and mid-air collision avoidance 
functions to contribute to the integration of unman end aircraft in civilian airspace                        
[44, 45].  
The Autonomous System Technology Related Airborne Evaluation and Assessment 
(ASTRAEA) was a UK industry-led consortium focusing on the technologies, systems, 
facilities, procedures and regulations that will allow autonomous vehicles to operate 
safely and routinely in civil airspace over the UK [46 - 48].  
Sense and Avoid Flight Tests (SAAFT) were conducted by the Air Force Research 
Laboratory (AFRL) and Defense Research Associates, Inc. (DRA) in the US. AFRL 
established the SAAFT program to demonstrate autonomous collision avoidance 
capabilities in both cooperative and non-cooperative air traffic. The intent of the   
program was to equip unmanned aircraft with CA capabilities and thus allow them the 
same access to national and international airspace that manned aircraft have [49, 50]. 
2.6 SA&CA Technologies 
To operate in civil airspace, manned and unmanned aircraft are expected to maintain 
safe separation from other aircraft. New self-separation and Collision avoidance systems 
designed for unmanned aircraft are under development to meet this requirement. To 
maintain airspace safety, these new systems must interoperate safely with collision 
avoidance system onboard manned aircraft. Therefore, the interactions of manned 
aircraft collision avoidance and unmanned aircraft collision avoidance and self-
separation must be understood. Many of the SA&CA systems under development for 
unmanned aircraft provide horizontal guidance, alerting UAS to turn left or right to avoid 
intruders. In contrast, both TCAS (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System), the 
internationally-mandated collision avoidance system required onboard all large 
transport aircraft, and its planned successor ACAS Xa1 (Airborne Collision Avoidance 
System X), issue only vertical resolution advisories such as climb or descend.  
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2.6.1 State-of-the-art SA Technologies 
Currently most of the air traffic surveillance services around the world are achieved using 
Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) and Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR). PSR refers to a 
directed radio frequency source being reflected by an airborne object to a highly 
directional receiver that supports depiction of the source’s range and azimuth 
information on a display. While primary radar was adequate for military early warning 
systems in an environment, WWII added the requirement to assign an identity to all radar 
returns. This resulted in the development of the Military IFF (Identify Friend or Foe) radar 
beacon system in which an airborne transponder issues a coded reply to interrogation 
by a primary radar source (located on the ground or airborne).  
PSR is an independent and self-contained system, and it does not require the target 
(airborne aircraft) to carry any additional surveillance-related equipment. When the 
technology advanced, it was complemented by SSR for air traffic control. Through 
interrogation, all aircraft within the maximum possible range are expected to reply with 
their unique identification and altitude information, and thus enhancing the situation 
awareness for the ATCo. SSR is considered to be a dependent and cooperative 
surveillance system. Although SSR provides more detailed information when compared 
to PSR, SSR does not provide information on unequipped aircraft, or on aircraft whose 
SSR components have failed. Radar systems were employed for CA (Figure 2.9), until 
1974, when the FAA contracted the development of the BCAS or Beacon Collision 
Avoidance System which is a transponder related airborne framework. BCAS uses the 
replies from the Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS) transponders in 
response to the interrogations [51] as shown in Figure 2.10. At that time, ATCRBS 
transponders were introduced in all military flying machine and many airplanes. 
TCAS was initially developed in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s in response 
to a series of deadly mid-air collisions between United States civil aircraft [52]. Mandated 
internationally for large transport aircraft, TCAS has substantially reduced the risk of 
airborne collisions (Figure 2.11).  
TCAS alerting logic is based on linear extrapolation of intruder trajectories and a large 
set of heuristic rules [53 – 55]. There are three members of the TCAS family; TCAS I, TCAS II 
and TCAS III. TCAS I is a pilot warning indicator which displays proximate traffic and alerts 
the crew to other aircraft which may become potential near mid-air collision threats.  
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TCAS provides an effective collision avoidance function in traffic densities as high as 0.3 
aircraft per square nautical mile (24 transponder-equipped aircraft within five nautical 
miles of the TCAS-equipped aircraft).  
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Echo from Other Traffic
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Figure 2.9. Onboard collision avoidance system - early radar systems. 
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Figure 2.10. Onboard collision avoidance system – BCAS. 
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Figure 2.11. Onboard collision avoidance system – TCAS. 
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When TCAS operates in traffic densities of 0.3 transponder-equipped aircraft per square 
nautical mile or higher, it provides protection against collisions with other aircraft, so long 
as those aircraft are closing at speeds of less than 500 kt.  
TCAS is also capable of providing protection against aircraft closing at relative speeds of 
up to 1200 kt in airspace characterized by densities of less than 0.06 transponder-
equipped aircraft per square nautical mile, which is equivalent to eighteen transponder-
equipped aircraft within ten nautical miles of the TCAS aircraft. 
A TCAS I-equipped aircraft can receive limited alert and advisory information about 
aircraft in its vicinity. TCAS I also participates in cross-link communication with TCAS II 
equipped aircraft. TCAS I operates by listening for aircraft transponder transmissions 
(replies). The replies detected may have been: 
 unsolicited transmissions from Mode S transponders (squitters);  
 replies elicited by ground station or TCAS II interrogations (passive TCAS I);  
 replies resulting from low-power interrogations from TCAS I (active TCAS I).  
Additionally, TCAS I receives traffic advisory information from TCAS II aircraft. If an 
intruding aircraft is equipped with TCAS II, and if that TCAS II aircraft determines that a 
collision hazard exists, it will transmit advisory information to the TCAS I aircraft, which 
includes bearing (if available), range and relative altitude of the TCAS II aircraft with 
respect to the TCAS I aircraft. As an option, TCAS I can be implemented to provide an 
indication of the transmitting transponder's bearing. 
TCAS II, in addition, provides recommended vertical escape manoeuvres to the crew to 
avert potential Near Mid-Air Collisions (NMAC). The term TCAS IV is reserved for future 
TCAS equipment that has additional capabilities beyond those of TCAS II equipment; 
such as the ability to generate resolution advisories in the horizontal plane (e.g., "TURN 
RIGHT," "TURN LEFT"). The equipment described in this thesis does not have horizontal 
resolution capability. In this document, TCAS I is denoted TCAS I; the use of the 
unqualified term TCAS refers exclusively to TCAS II; and the last version is explicitly 
denoted as TCAS IV. As the development of TCAS Versions 7 and 7.1 exemplified, 
modifying the existing rules is extremely difficult and time consuming.  
TCAS II is intended to improve air safety by acting as a last-resort method of preventing 
mid-air collisions or near collisions between aircraft. By employing SSR technology, TCAS II 
equipment operates independently of ground-based aids and ATC. Aircraft equipped 
with TCAS II have the ability to interrogate airborne transponders to monitor range, 
bearing, and reported altitude of other aircraft in the vicinity and assess the risk of 
Ph.D. Thesis - Next Generation Flight Management Systems for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Operations                
- Automated Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance Functionalities  
48 
 
collision. Non-transponding aircraft are not detected. TCAS II Version 6.0 was first 
introduced in the United States in 1990 with collision avoidance logic. TCAS II Version 7.0 
was introduced in the US and Europe in 2000 and was subsequently mandated by ICAO 
for all commercial turbine-powered transport aircraft worldwide, having more than 19 
passenger seats or having a maximum take-off weight above 5700 kg. TCAS II is referred 
to as the Airborne Collision Avoidance System II (ACAS II) in ICAO terminology. TCAS II 
provides traffic advisories and if warranted, resolution advisories in the vertical plane. RAs 
are indications given to the flight crew; they recommend manoeuvres intended to 
provide separation from all threats, or restrictions to maneuvers to maintain existing 
separation. TCAS II operating procedures in the western world give RAs priority over ATC 
clearances and instructions, i.e., flight crews are instructed to follow an RA even when it 
conflicts with ATC guidance. Controllers have no knowledge of a TCAS RA, unless they 
are notified by the flight crew via the radio (resolution advisory information is provided 
by TCAS II to Mode S SSRs, but it is not normally presented to controllers). TCAS can track 
up to 30 airplane in an ostensible scope of 14 nautical miles for Mode A or C targets, 
and 30 nautical miles for Mode S targets. This data is passed to the collision avoidance 
logic in the onboard electronics to decide the TAs or RAs. 
The following section describes how to compute and update the CRS input variables 
Coarse_Altitude, Fine_Altitude, Own_Corrected_Alt, Fine_Altitude_Rate, Radio_Altitude, 
and ZRINT. These calculations use the parameters Init_Alt, Init_Alt_Rate, Alt_Accel, 
Ground_Level, and Quant specified in the encounter input file of the TCAS [56 – 60].  
At T=1 for own aircraft and at the time Encounter_Start is specified for other traffic, the 
altitude (Alt) and altitude rate (Alt_Rate) for each aircraft are set to Init_Alt and 
Init_Alt_Rate, respectively. At the end of each cycle (T=i) Alt and Alt_Rate are updated 
for each aircraft for the next cycle (T = i+1) as follows: 
                                                                 (2.12) 
                                                                    (2.13) 
Calculations for Alt and Alt_Rate always use the exact value of Alt, rather than rounding 
to the nearest 100 ft. The CRS input variables: 
 Coarse_Altitude; 
 Fine_Altitude; 
 Own_Corrected_Alt; 
 Fine_Altitude_Rate; 
 Radio_Altitude; 
Ph.D. Thesis - Next Generation Flight Management Systems for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Operations                
- Automated Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance Functionalities  
49 
 
 ZRINT.  
These input variables are calculated at the beginning of each cycle from these values 
as follows [56]: 
                                                                (2.14) 
                                                                 (2.15) 
                                                                  (2.16) 
                                                                   (2.17) 
                                                                 (2.18) 
              (             )                                     (2.19) 
              (            )                                     (2.20) 
These values are used to compute and update the CRS input variables RR (relative 
range), BEAR (bearing), and Bear_Meas (raw bearing). These calculations use the 
parameters Air_Speed, Init_Range, Range_Space, and Angle specified in the encounter 
Input File.  
Figure 2.12 illustrates an example of the encounter geometry. For all encounters, the own 
aircraft is assumed to be travelling at a constant speed in the positive x-direction. 
Forward_Range is the x-component of the distance of the other aircraft from own 
aircraft. Side_Range is the y-component of the distance of the other aircraft from own 
aircraft, with positive distance being measured to the right of own aircraft. Angle is the 
heading angle of the other aircraft measured clockwise from the x-axis. Initially, at the 
time Encounter_Start is specified, Forward_Range is set to Init_Range and Side_Range is 
set to Range_Space.  
At the end of each cycle Forward_Range and Side_Range are updated for the next 
cycle as follows: 
                               
                                   (        )                      (2.21) 
                          
                                   (        )                        (2.22) 
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Figure 2.12. Example of an encounter geometry. 
              and                are constant throughout each test and, if the value 
of Angle changes, it is updated before the new Forward_Range and Side_Range are 
computed. The CRS input variable RR is computed at the beginning of each cycle from 
these values as follows: 
     √              
             
                
                 (2.23) 
where Relative_Alt is the real altitude difference between own and other aircraft. 
Relative_Alt is computed using the altitudes computed in the previous paragraph: 
                                                                    (2.24) 
Finally, the CRS input variables BEAR and BEAR_MEAS are calculated at the beginning of 
each cycle as follows: 
             (
           
              
)                                      (2.25) 
                  (
           
              
)                                (2.26) 
and then adjusted for the quadrant in which the other aircraft is located.  
TCAS has been very successful in preventing mid-air collisions over the years, but the way 
in which the logic was designed limits its robustness [56 - 60]. Fundamental to TCAS 
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design is the use of a deterministic model. However, recorded radar data show that 
pilots do not always behave as assumed by the logic. Not anticipating the spectrum of 
responses limits TCAS’s robustness, as demonstrated by the collision of two aircraft in 2002 
over Überlingen, Germany. TCAS instructed one aircraft to climb, but one pilot 
descended in accordance with the air traffic controller’s instructions (illustrated in Figure 
2.13), leading to a collision with another aircraft whose pilot was following TCAS. If TCAS 
recognized the noncompliance of one of the aircraft and reversed the advisory of the 
compliant aircraft from descend to climb, the collision would have been prevented. To 
overcome the above issues and to ensure safe and effective collision avoidance in the 
future airspace environment, in 2009, the FAA TCAS program office began formal 
research on a next generation airborne collision avoidance system: ACAS X. Whereas 
TCAS logic is based on linear extrapolation and heuristic rules, ACAS X logic is based on 
a dynamic model of aircraft movement and a computer optimized lookup table of 
collision avoidance actions.  
In ACAS X, traffic alerts are issued to advise pilots that another aircraft is a potential 
threat and to prepare for a resolution advisory if necessary. A resolution advisory 
commands specific vertical-only manoeuvres that will satisfy safety goals with minimal 
manoeuvring. Resolution advisories include the following:  
 Climb or descend;  
 Level off; 
 Maintain climb or descend; 
 Don’t or limit climb or descent rate. 
Host Aircraft Other Traffic
TCAS
Trajectory
“Climb, Climb”
Actual
Trajectory
“Descend, Descend”
 
Figure 2.13. Limited robustness of TCAS. 
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Like TCAS, ACAS X avoids collisions by giving vertical guidance to an aircraft’s pilot. A 
typical scenario involves two aircraft: 
 the ownship, where ACAS X is installed; 
 another aircraft called intruder that is at risk of colliding with the ownship.  
The Collision Avoidance community defines a NMAC as being when two aircraft are 
within h_p = 500 ft horizontally and    = 100 ft vertically [61, 62]. ACAS X is designed to 
avoid such NMACs. ACAS X uses both discrete advisories to the pilot, and the continuous 
dynamics of aircraft, it is natural to formally verify it using hybrid systems.  
ACAS X prevents an NMAC by giving an advisory to the pilot of the ownship. From a 
table of advisories and their modelling variables, every advisory, except the clear of 
conflict (COC), has a vertical rate range of the form (      ̇   or (   ̇       for some 
vertical rate    ̇, which we call the target vertical velocity. We therefore model any 
advisory by its corresponding target vertical velocity   ̇, and a binary variable  , whose 
value is −1 if the vertical rate range of the advisory is (      ̇   and +1 if it is (   ̇      . 
Note that this symbolic encoding makes it possible to represent many more advisories 
and is therefore robust to changes in the set of advisories that ACAS X allows. It is 
assumed that the ownship pilot complies with each advisory within    sec, and that they 
accelerate with at least acceleration   , to bring the relative vertical velocity in 
compliance with the advisory. 
This design makes ACAS X substantially easier to adapt to specific aircraft, airspace 
procedures, and surveillance technologies. ACAS X is a family of adaptations, two of 
which are more predominantly employed: ACAS Xa and ACAS Xu. Both TCAS and ACAS 
Xa issue resolution advisories based in large part on the projected vertical trajectories of 
intruder aircraft. ACAS Xa is being designed as a direct replacement for TCAS, with the 
intent to provide improvements in safety and operational suitability. ACAS Xu is being 
designed for UAS, and as such it is optimized for the aerodynamic performance and 
surveillance systems characteristic of those platforms. ACAS Xu, unlike TCAS and ACAS 
Xa, is able to provide horizontal resolution advisory guidance. In this thesis, the 
interactions of a vertical collision avoidance system and a system providing UAS with 
horizontal guidance, ACAS Xu’s horizontal logic fills the role of the system providing 
horizontal guidance. Note that ACAS Xu is also able to provide vertical RA guidance, but 
this analysis is focused solely on its horizontal logic. Even though ACAS Xu is a collision 
avoidance system, the results of this work are applicable to any collision avoidance or 
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self-separation system providing guidance that may cause vertical manoeuvres within 
the collision avoidance timeframe. 
A UAS receiving only horizontal guidance would notionally be unconstrained in the 
vertical dimension, meaning it would be free to change its vertical rate at the same time 
it is directed to turn. Such changes to vertical rate could occur for a variety of reasons, 
including dynamic restrictions on the UAS (e.g., it is near its service ceiling, it may not be 
able to maintain its current climb rate and turn at the same time) or the actions of the 
UAS operator. If these changes to vertical rate occurred during the RA timeframe of an 
intruder equipped with TCAS or ACAS Xa, then the safety benefit provided by those 
systems could be degraded. For example, consider an encounter between a TCAS 
equipped manned aircraft and a UAS receiving horizontal guidance only. The TCAS 
aircraft is above the UAS and is descending towards it, while the UAS is climbing slowly 
near its service ceiling. As some point, TCAS issues an RA directing the manned aircraft to 
maintain its descent and cross altitudes with the UAS. At around the same time, the 
horizontal logic on the UAS directs it to turn. To comply, the UAS is forced to descend 
due to dynamic restrictions near its service ceiling. This creates a dangerous situation in 
which both aircraft are descending and the RA issued by TCAS will no longer resolve the 
encounter. 
In ACAS X, when a collision risk is detected, an alert as well as a suggestion for a 
potential resolution manoeuvre is provided to the pilot. The system is capable of tracking 
only aircraft equipped with a mode S transponder and can detect mode A/C 
transponders to a certain extent. The propagation of uncertainties in the trajectory states 
of two aircraft are modelled in ACAS as illustrated in Figure 2.14. These consist of 
uncertainties in the states of host aircraft and other traffic and the resulting dynamic 
uncertainty at the point of conflict. Various variants of ACAS X can be employed 
including [61] as summarised in Table 2.8. 
ACAS is different from a conventional CA system, in the sense that it does not include 
any autonomous resolution execution function. ACAS has characteristics and 
performance different from those required by a SA&CA system for UAS. One of the main 
reasons is that the different climb performance of various aircraft platforms (manned 
and unmanned) is not compatible with current TCAS requirements. More precisely, the 
limitations on the climb performance make it difficult for the unmanned aircraft remote 
pilot or the avionics systems to execute the manoeuvres suggested by TCAS advisories. 
General aviation aircraft and aerostatic balloons are not usually fitted with mode S 
transponders, requiring non-cooperative surveillance is required. Figure 2.15 shows the 
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top-level architecture of ACAS. The system receives sensor measurements every second. 
On the basis of these sensor measurements, the system infers the distribution over the 
aircraft’s current status. This status, or state estimation, takes into account the 
probabilistic dynamic model and the probabilistic sensor model. This state distribution 
determines where to look in the numeric logic table to determine the best action to 
perform (e.g., whether to issue an advisory and if so, the vertical rate to adopt). This 
processing chain is repeated once per second with every new sensor measurement. 
Critical to understanding the logic optimization process inherent are two important 
concepts. The first is a Markov decision process, which is essentially the probabilistic 
dynamic model combined with the utility model. The second is dynamic programming, 
which is the iterative computational process used to optimize the logic. 
State 
Uncertainty
Dynamic 
Uncertainty
 
Figure 2.14. Uncertainty propagation in ACAS. 
Besides being compatible with NextGen, ACAS X improves the safety of air travel and 
provides more operational suitability. In addition to protecting the traveling public on 
board every large commercial aircraft worldwide, ACAS X provides:  
 Reduced pilot workload (by reducing the number of confusing and surprising 
advisories);  
 Capacity to accommodate new surveillance inputs that provide more detailed 
and precise tracking data than currently used onboard transponders;  
 Ability to reduced fuel costs, emissions, and flight operating times, as well as 
increased arrival rates at airports;  
 A minimised number of interruptions to normal air traffic flow; 
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 A streamlined manufacturing operation process and reduced costs associated 
with system implementation and upgrades; 
 An integration platform to facilitate the use of unmanned aircraft in defence and 
commercial applications. 
Table 2.8. ACAS X variants. 
ACAS X Type Description 
Surveillance 
Technology 
Advisories 
ACAS Xa (active) 
 
It is the general purpose ACAS 
X that will make active 
interrogations to establish the 
range of intruders. ACAS Xa is a 
successor to TCAS II system. 
Active RADAR 
supplemented 
with passive 
Same as 
current TCAS 
ACAS Xo (operation) 
    
 
A mode of operation of ACAS 
X designed for particular 
operations for which ACAS Xa 
is unsuitable. It facilitates 
procedure-optimized alerting 
against a user-selected aircraft 
while providing global Xa 
protection for all other traffic. 
Active RADAR 
supplemented 
with passive 
Vertical and 
horizontal 
advisories 
ACAS Xp (passive) 
 
 
It is specifically intended for 
unmanned aircraft. It accepts 
a variety of surveillance inputs 
and uses decision-logics that 
are optimised for a wide variety 
of performance capabilities. 
Passive only 
Reduced 
advisory set 
ACAS Xu 
(unmanned) 
 
 
A version of ACAS X that relies 
solely on passive ADS-B inputs 
to track other traffic and does 
not make any active 
interrogation. It is intended for 
general aviation aircraft, which 
are not currently required to be 
equipped with TCAS II system. 
Potentially 
radar, EO/IR, 
etc. 
Vertical and 
horizontal 
advisories (for 
self-separation) 
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Figure 2.15. ACAS top-level architecture. 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) is operational in most countries. 
In Australia, ADS-B has almost complete coverage above FL250 and reasonable 
coverage down to 10,000ft.  ADS-B messages are transmitted via the Extended Squitter 
Mode-S transponder data link operating at 1090 MHz. Mode S ES capable transponders 
and ADS-B OUT equipage mandates are detailed in [63, 64]. Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance – Contract A (ADS-C) separation of Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) dependent 
aircraft outside of radar coverage are managed procedurally, resulting in large 
separation standards. ADS-C relies on the automatic transmission of reports from an 
appropriately equipped aircraft. The content and timing of reports is described as a 
“contract”.  Digital data link communications via satellite or VHF can be made from 
appropriately equipped aircraft (FANS 1/A) to enable reduced separation standards. 
The digital data link enables Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) and 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Contract (ADS-C).  
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) has been viewed as a low cost 
alternative and complement to the current primary surveillance radar. Typically, ADS-B 
refers to the function on a surface vehicle or airplane which broadcasts its state vector 
together with other relevant information periodically. ADS-B is developed to improve 
situation awareness, conflict detection, conflict avoidance, runway incursion avoidance 
as well as surveillance in remote areas without radar covering. Additionally, ADS-B 
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integrated with other capability is expected to enable airspace with self-separation 
similar to visual operation today in SESAR and NextGen programs. 
All the involved vehicles including aircraft, ground vehicles and other objects 
periodically transmit their identification, positional information as well as intent 
information using a broadcast data link. ADS-B is made up of the following components:  
 the transmitting subsystem which includes a message generation as well as 
transmission function at the source aircraft; 
 the propagation medium, and a receiving subsystem which is composed of 
message reception; 
 the report assembly functions at the receiving aircraft.  
Some ground-based users may have the capability to receive but not transmit. The ADS-
B system consists of three functional components: receiver aircraft, transmitter aircraft as 
well as ground station as illustrated in Figure 2.16. The characteristics and requirements of 
ADS-B make it a capable sensor for CA on small UAS in the National Airspace System 
(NAS).  
ADS-B 
Message 
Generation
ADS-B 
Transmitter
ADS-B 
Receiver
Report 
Assembly 
Processing
ADS-B 
Receiver
ATM 
System
Traffic 
Broadcast
ADS-B 
Messages
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Component
Applications
GNSS
Barometric 
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Inputs
Other 
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Input Layer
 
Figure 2.16. Functional component of ADS-B. 
One of the key aspects of ADS-B that makes it feasible for use on small UAS is the 
availability of ADS-B receivers that meet the SWaP constraints of a small UAS. Another 
key advantage of ADS-B is the long range at which information is available. While there 
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is a signiﬁcant amount of variation in the range of ADS-B signals, the shortest expected 
range is 10 NM.  But, at the same time, currently, most small UAS cannot carry ADS-B 
transponders. Furthermore, the density of ADS-B signals if all small UAS were equipped 
with ADS-B would lead to communication signal collisions in the broadcast algorithm. 
Additionally the long range of ADS-B is advantageous in that the quality of information 
transmitted over ADS-B does not degrade with range. Thus the accuracy of ADS-B is not 
dependent on the size, power, or range of the transmitter and receiver units. This is a 
signiﬁcant advantage over radar and optical sensors, and makes path planning for 
conﬂict detection and separation assurance at long ranges easier. 
However, the limitations of ADS-B system are: 
 It is heavily dependent on line-of-sight availability of GPS and ADS-B transmissions. 
Without GPS information, ADS-B transponders are unable to transmit usable 
position information. Air-to-air ADS-B transmissions also require line-of-sight visibility 
for reliable exchange of information. Bandwidth constraints of ADS-B can also be 
a limitation. Due to the fact that all ADS-B Out-capable aircraft must transmit a 
message at least once per second on the same nominal frequency, the ADS-B 
protocol speciﬁes a multiple access scheme. While the scheme is diﬀerent for the 
978 MHz frequency and 1090 MHz frequency, all multiple access schemes have a 
ﬁnite number of transmitters that they can support. This is especially applicable to 
small UAS, and there are limitations of employing Time Division Multiple Access 
(TDMA), which is typically used at 978 MHz; 
 The cost of procuring ADS-B equipage is another limitation. Certiﬁed ADS-B Out 
hardware costs typically range from $1,000 to $25,000 AUD. 
ADS-B uses three types of reports: 
 Surveillance State Vector (SSVR) report; 
 Mode-Status (MS) report; 
 On-condition report. 
Information provide by these reports are detailed below. The SSVR report contains 
information on the dynamics of the aircraft, which include geometric position, horizontal 
and vertical velocity, and heading. In addition, the quality of the SSVR element is 
contained in the MS report. The MS message includes current operational information of 
the transmitting aircraft including capability class codes, operational mode codes and 
SSV quality. The Capability Class (CC) code identifies the capability of a transmitting 
ADS-B participant including TCAS installation information, Cockpit Display of Traffic 
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Information (CDTI) capability, air referenced Velocity report capability, and trajectory 
change report capability. OM codes indicate the current operational mode of a 
transmitting element. The SSVR quality codes contain the Navigation Accuracy 
Category for position (NACp), Navigation Accuracy Category for Velocity (NACv) and 
Surveillance Integrity Level (SIL). All ADS-B participants must provide these SSVR and MS 
reports.  Upon reception of a state vector report, the system searches for a track of the 
same type (ADS-B, ADS-R, TIS-B) and with the same 24-bit address as the report. If no 
match is found, the system generates a new track containing the following parameters: 
 System time (track time of applicability); 
 Position time of applicability; 
 Velocity time of applicability; 
 Track type (ADS-B, ADS-R, TIS-B); 
 24-bit address; 
 Position (latitude, longitude, altitude); 
 Velocity (East/West velocity, North/South velocity, altitude rate); 
 Geometric Vertical Accuracy (GVA) = 1 (Version 2); 
 System Design Assurance (SDA) = 1 (Version 2); 
 State covariance matrices. (Covariance is a statistical concept, which seeks to 
describe how two variables are related to each other. Two variables are said to 
be positively related if they move in the same direction. The variables are 
inversely related if they move in opposite directions. Covariance is a tool to 
determine whether two variables are positively related or inversely related); 
 ID change flag = 0; 
 Index of correlated TIS-B track = null; 
 Time of correlation with TIS-B track = null; 
 Previous state (position and track time of applicability) matrix initialized as a row 
vector; 
 Estimated turn rate = null. 
 Navigation Integrity Category (NIC); 
 NACP = 5; 
 NACV = 1; 
 SIL = 0; 
Multilateration systems use a network of ground-based transceivers to localise aircraft 
based on the difference in time of arrival of aircraft transponder transmissions. 
Multilateration systems are currently deployed at a number of Class C CTR (for terminal 
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area airspace surveillance and separations services within the terminal manoeuvring 
area) and for en-route and terminal area surveillance.  Advanced Surface Movement 
Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS)   provides routing, guidance and surveillance 
for the control of the surface movement of aircraft and vehicles. The system is based on 
a number of existing surveillance technologies to provide situational awareness and 
alerting. It is a key technology for the prevention of runway and taxiway incursions and 
ground collisions.  A precision runway monitor is a surveillance system that supports 
reduced staggered separation for aircraft on the existing parallel Instrument Landing 
System (ILS) approaches of airports. It uses a primary radar sensor to provide accurate 
and high update rate surveillance of the approach and landing areas.   
A summary of airborne surveillance systems currently available is provided in Table 2.9. 
Table 2.9. Airborne surveillance systems. 
Airspace Conventional Systems State-of-the-art Systems 
Oceanic continental 
En-route airspace with 
low/high-density traffic 
Primary radar/Secondary 
Surveillance Radar (SSR) 
Very High Frequency (VHF) 
voice position reports 
OMEGA/ Long Range 
Navigation Customized 
Navigation Database 
(LORAN-CNDB) 
Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance (ADS) 
Continental airspace 
with high-density traffic 
Primary radar 
SSR Mode A (ATC 
Transponder Mode 
signifying aircraft call sign) 
SSR Mode C (ATC 
Transponder Mode 
signifying aircraft call sign 
and altitude) 
SSR Mode A 
SSR Mode C  
SSR Mode S (ATC Transponder 
Mode signifying call sign, 
altitude and  additional 
aircraft data) 
ADS 
Terminal areas with 
high-density 
Primary radar 
SSR Mode A/C 
SSR [Mode A/C/S]  
ADS 
2.6.2 State-of-the-art SA supported by an ATM System 
CM function of ATM System provides SA features for ensuring safety and avoidance of 
terrain, weather, wake turbulence, and airspace. CM can be further divided into: 
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 SCM, which is achieved through airspace organisation and management, 
demand and capacity balancing, and traffic synchronisation; 
 SP, which is the second layer and describes a range of primarily tactical sub-
functions intended to ensure separation minima are maintained. SP function 
includes the issuing of instructions, clearances and information advisories to 
airspace users. SP is supported by route adherence monitoring, cleared level 
adherence monitoring and approach path monitoring. In the future, ASAS will be 
available to complement the ATM SP functions (e.g., ADS-B In and Cockpit 
Display of Traffic Information);  
 ATM Collision Prevention (ACP) services are provided to aid pilots in maintaining 
well clear of other aircraft and hazards in the event that safe separation minima 
have been lost. From an ATM system perspective, this involves the issuing of safety 
alerts, which are defined as the provision of advice to an aircraft when an ATS 
Officer becomes aware that an aircraft is in a position that is considered to place 
it in unsafe proximity to terrain, obstructions or another aircraft. For example: 
- Aircraft conflict alerts – alerts initiated by an ATM system when an ATCo 
becomes aware of aircraft that are considered to be in unsafe proximity; 
- Terrain/obstruction alerts – the provision of advice to an aircraft when an ATS 
officer becomes aware that an aircraft is in a position which is considered to 
place it in unsafe proximity to terrain or obstructions. 
- PSR is operational at Class C aerodromes and some military aerodromes. ATCRBS 
SSR is used for approach and en-route surveillance in most nations. Coverage is 
primarily limited to areas surrounding the Control Area (CTA). The returned coded 
reply is processed by a SSR system. In the case of the modern Mode 3/A ATCRBS, 
the system provides coded aircraft identification (4 digits octal) and a Mode C 
pressure altitude. ATCRBS sends a directional interrogation signal during the radar 
volume scan on a 1030 MHz carrier frequency and expects a Mode 3/A (and 
Mode C) reply in the 1090 MHz band. The advent of denser air traffic has resulted 
in the need for a greater volume of data from the target transmitter (primarily for 
more detailed identification) and considerably faster and more reliable digital 
processing has given birth to a solution in the form of the Mode-S transponder 
standard. 
CM is a component of the ATM system that will be impacted by the integration of UAS 
into the current ATM system.  
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2.6.3 CA Sensors/Systems  
A number of non-cooperative sensors have been adopted as part of research projects 
dealing with developing CA functions. The technologies that have been used can be 
divided into two macro areas [65]: 
 Cooperative technologies that typically require a transponder on board the 
aircraft: they require other aircraft to equip with the same devices when sharing 
the same airspace. 
 Non-cooperative technologies that identify all the aircraft not equipped with a 
transponder or, for example, gliders, hot air balloons, and so on. They do not 
require other aircraft to equip the same devices when sharing the same airspace. 
Multi-sensor platforms for obstacle detection by using millimetre-wave radar, electro-
optic/infrared, Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) and acoustic sensors are currently 
employed. Ground-based CA systems using electronic sensors are also currently 
developed and they provide information for manoeuvre decision tasks especially in TMA 
operations. The adoption of a multi-sensory approach to CA (employing passive and 
active MMW radar, Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR), LIDAR and an Electronic 
Surveillance Module (ESM) for obstacle detection) has resulted in adequate 
performance in low- to medium-dynamics platform applications. A non-cooperative 
collision avoidance system for UAS utilising pulsed Ka-band radar and optical sensors has 
been developed [66]. Acoustic-based CA systems for small UAS may adopt a multi 
sensor platform with acoustic sensors that allows detection of obstacles and intruders in 
a 360 º FoV, and performs quick-reaction manoeuvres for avoidance [67]. This system 
allows all weather operations and offers advantages in terms of power consumption and 
cost. Encounter models and their applications to CA strategies address both 
cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios.  
Ground-based CA systems using electronic sensors, which are are also currently being 
developed [68]. These ground based systems provide information for manoeuvre 
decisions for terminal manoeuvring area operations. The states of the tracked obstacles 
are obtained by adopting Extended/Unscented Kalman Filter (EKF/UKF) or other multi-
sensor data fusion techniques, which are used in order to predict the trajectory in a 
given time horizon. On-board trajectory re-planning with dynamically updated 
constraints based on the intruder and the host dynamics is at present used to generate 
obstacle trajectories. Coarse-resolution radar based CA solutions are implemented for 
small size UAS and the information is often fused with data from an ADS-B system. In the 
Ph.D. Thesis - Next Generation Flight Management Systems for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Operations                
- Automated Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance Functionalities  
63 
 
case of cooperative scenarios, ADS-B and TCAS are adopted for implementing CA 
functions [69]. The avoidance trajectory is generated with the use of an on-board 
trajectory re-planning module, which has dynamically updated constraints based on the 
intruder and the host dynamics. The avoidance trajectories are also generated with the 
use of a nonlinear differential geometric guidance law based on a collision cone 
approach and dynamic inversion, which, combined with a first order autopilot, allows for 
satisfactory guidance of the vehicle. The possible synergies attainable with the adoption 
of different detection, tracking and trajectory avoidance algorithms are addressed in 
the later chapters of the thesis.  
In an operational perspective, guidelines and regulations are required to support the CA 
system requirements development. The requirements for designing and developing an 
effective CA system are derived from the current regulations applicable to the see-and-
avoid capability of manned aircraft. The proposed detection range and Field-of-Regard 
(FoR) must be adequate to ensure separation from the intruder, in order to prevent a 
probable near mid-air collision. This criterion is also naturally applicable in the case of 
small UAS, since the vast majority of mid-air collision events occur below 3000 ft. In the 
case of see-and-avoid, the main roles and responsibilities of pilot and crew are stated in 
FAA AC 90-48C and FAR §91.113 regulations as follows: vigilance shall be maintained at 
all times, regardless of whether the operation is conducted under IFR/VFR. Initial 
requirements recognized by SC-203 and other aviation/UAS working groups state that 
any UAS shall have a system capable of monitoring the surroundings at all times. This 
system has to maintain a minimum separation distance with any cooperative or non-
cooperative obstacle/intruder.  
2.6.4 Attributes/Capabilities of UAS SA&CA Technologies 
The attributes/capabilities of SA&CA technologies can be summarized as follows [65]: 
 Optical sensors (pixel/visual): 
- low cost, size, and weight; 
- suffer from various atmospheric disturbances; 
- have to be arranged in various positions on the aircraft; 
- a visual radar can be used that is highly comparable to a human’s ability; 
- dictated by the required Field-of-View (FoV); 
- payload size and mounting issues. 
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 Infrared sensors: 
- higher cost than optical sensors; 
- low size and weight; 
- useful in conducting night time operations; 
- operate under severe weather conditions; 
- to achieve the required FOV, sensors have to be arrayed  in various positions 
on the aircraft, taking up valuable external area; 
- some sensors do not pick up objects lacking some type of heat signature 
(cables or gliders);  
- development and integration efforts are generally expensive. 
 Microwave RADAR: 
- very mature technology; 
- useful in detecting the intruder aircraft at great distances;  
- generally bulky. 
 LIDAR: 
- the size of the detection cone is very small and it makes possible to target a 
specific obstacle; 
- the revisit rate is poor and it takes multitude of laser sensors to achieve the 
same rate as a microwave radar; 
- highly developed for large UAS but underdeveloped for small UAS; 
- high cost; 
- inadequate in adverse weather (light can be absorbed and reflected 
depending upon the external conditions). 
The essential criteria for designing an effective CA system are as follows: 
Quantitative: 
 The FOV has to be equivalent or superior to that of a pilot in the cockpit. This 
corresponds to a primary FOV of -60˚ vertically/70˚ horizontally and a secondary 
FOV of  -100˚ vertically and 120˚ horizontally; 
 Sufficient detection range. As an example, the detection range of various CA 
technologies available for UAS is shown in Figure 2.17. 
Qualitative: 
 Accurate and precise intruder detection (static and dynamic), recognition and 
trajectory prediction (dynamic); 
 Prior obstacle detection for allowing time for executing the trajectory avoidance 
manoeuvres; 
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 Effective fusion schemes for multi-sensor data augmentation, especially by tight 
coupling; 
 Identification of the primary means of cooperative and non-cooperative CA for 
integrity requirements.  
 
Figure 2.17. Detection range of CA technologies for UAS [65]. 
2.7 UAS Tracking, Decision-Making and Avoidance Loop 
The integration of UAS into all classes of airspace presents a series of challenges in order 
to ensure safe operations. One of the main challenges is the SAA capability, which 
enables UAS to perform equally or exceed the performance of the S&A ability of the 
pilot in manned aircraft systems. Both cooperative and non-cooperative SAA systems 
are being developed to enable UAS to routinely access all classes of airspace.   
The SAA capability can be defined as the automatic detection of possible conflicts by 
the UAS platform under consideration, resolving the collision risks and performing 
optimised avoidance manoeuvre tasks to prevent the identified collisions. Current 
advances in state-of-the-art airborne sensors and multi-sensor data fusion methods have 
led to a number of innovative-but at the same time dispersed-non-cooperative and 
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cooperative SAA solutions. Non-cooperative Collision Detection and Resolution (CD&R) 
for UAS is also considered to one of the major challenges that needs to be addressed 
carefully.  
2.7.1 TDA Functions 
The TDA loop consists of the following [70]: 
 Tracking: A group of sensors collect the required data from the surrounding 
environment. Tracking is accomplished by the continuous acquisition of 
obstacle/intruder data. The sub-functions include: 
- Data Acquisition: cooperative and non-cooperative detection; 
- Low-Level Tracking: individual sensor and system tracks; 
- High-Level Tracking: data fusion (optimal estimation). 
 Decision-Making: As other traffic/obstacles are tracked, suitable decision logics 
are employed for evaluating the risk and declaring an action to be taken (if a 
collision is identified). The sub-functions include: 
- Evaluate: trajectory estimation within a given time horizon, calculate risk of 
collision; 
- Prioritise: Risk of Collision (RoC) vs. threshold and low level tracking vs. 
threshold; 
- Declare: deterministic/stochastic decision making process. 
 Avoidance: Once a possibility of collision is detected, then the on board FMS 
determines an action to avoid the collision by re-generating and optimising the 
flight trajectory against the set constraints and performance parameters. 
- Determine Action: avoidance trajectories generation; 
- Command: avoidance trajectory communication to pilot, Flight Control 
System (FCS), Flight Management System (FMS); 
- Execute: manoeuvre execution, history function, return-to-path. 
Some relevant definitions are provided below. 
Environment sensing: monitoring the surrounding airspace using non-cooperative 
sensors/cooperative systems to detect and identify every potential hazard. The 
primary aim is to get a synthetic description of the surrounding airspace in terms of 
the current state of the threats including their position and, an accurate estimation 
of its future states. 
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 Conflict detection: information collected during environment sensing is 
elaborated to identify which of the detected objects are real threats; 
 Resolution estimation: the required resolution manoeuvre is identified if a 
conflict risk is detected. 
Advisories communications: advisories about conflict risks and the estimated 
resolution manoeuvres are reported to the pilot/remote pilot. The operator task is 
then to accept, reject or ignore the suggested trajectory changes. In fact, even 
though the unmanned aircraft platform is capable of operating autonomously, a 
SA&CA system must normally report to and share the responsibility for its tasks 
(including safety) with the UAS operator, linked to the UAS via a communication 
data links. The collision scenario at different time epochs is illustrated in Figure 2.18. 
Host Platform
Other
Traffic
 
Figure 2.18. Collision scenario at different time epochs. 
Autonomous resolution: execution of calculated resolution manoeuvres 
autonomously. It also refers to the execution of avoidance manoeuvres if the 
operator does not react to the advisory within the minimum safe time before 
impact. The GNC and TDA loops are illustrated in Figure 2.19. The SA&CA tasks are 
illustrated in Figure 2.20 [adapted from 71]. 
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Figure 2.19. GNC and TDA loops. 
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Figure 2.20. SA&CA tasks (adapted from [71]). 
2.8 Multi-Sensor Data Fusion Algorithms for SA&CA 
In Intelligent Surveillance Systems (ISS) technologies such as computer vision, pattern 
recognition, and artificial intelligence are developed to identify abnormal behaviors in 
videos. As a result, fewer human observers are needed to monitor more scenarios with 
high accuracy. This means that surveillance operations are constantly evolving in an 
increasingly autonomous fashion, where human interaction is needed less frequently. 
Multiple sensing is the ability to sense the environment with the concurrent use of several, 
possibly dissimilar, sensors [72]. The reason for multiple sensing is to be able to perform 
Ph.D. Thesis - Next Generation Flight Management Systems for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Operations                
- Automated Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance Functionalities  
69 
 
more tasks, more efficiently, in a reliable way [72]. However, when applied to UAS, 
engineering focus is on an increasingly intelligent approach to design and integration for 
incorporating multiple sensing elements. Therefore surveillance systems on board UAS 
are also being developed to reduce the workload of pilots and to increase autonomy in 
the vehicle. Surveillance systems use a number of sensors to obtain information about 
the surrounding environment. Visual and thermal sensors are two of the many sensors 
used. To fully exploit the fact that more than one sensor is being used, the information is 
fused using an approach called data fusion. Data fusion is implemented in research 
areas such as signal processing, pattern and image recognition, artificial intelligence, 
and information theory. A common feature of these architectures is that they 
incorporate multiple levels of information processing within the data fusion process [73, 
74]. More specifically, sensor fusion is the result of combining sensor data from diverse 
sources so the resulting information has less uncertainty than if these sources were used 
as an individual sensor. Current state-of-the-art airborne sensors and Multi Sensor Data 
Fusion (MSDF) methods for surveillance detection and tracking tasks, have employed 
non-cooperative and cooperative sensors/systems for SA&CA solutions. Data fusion of 
surveillance sensors utilizes these sensors/systems in order to detect and track obstacles 
and intruders.   
MSDF is an effective way of optimizing large volumes of data and is implemented by 
combining information from multiple sensors to achieve inferences that are not feasible 
from a single sensor or source [75]. MSDF is an emerging technology applied to many 
areas in civilian and military domains, such as automated target recognition, battlefield 
surveillance, and guidance and control of autonomous vehicles, monitoring of complex 
machinery, medical diagnosis, and smart buildings [76]. Techniques for MSDF are drawn 
from a wide range of areas including pattern recognition, artificial intelligence and 
statistical estimation [75]. There are many algorithms for data fusion which optimally and 
sub-optimally combine information to derive a processed best estimate. 
Mathematically, the type of system determines if the system can be optimally estimated. 
In general, linear systems can be optimally estimated with the original Kalman Filter and 
non-linear systems are sub-optimally estimated with approximation techniques which 
linearize the non-linear system. Real life navigation and surveillance applications are 
almost always described by non-linear equations therefore approximation techniques 
are commonly applied, some techniques include; the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF), 
Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF), Square Root-UKF (SR-UKF), Cubature Kalman Filter (CKF), 
Point Mass Filter (PMF) and the particle filter [77-79]. In the past three decades, the EKF 
has become the most widely used algorithm in numerous nonlinear estimation 
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applications [80]. In comparison to the UKF, the EKF is difficult to manipulate (i.e. 
computationally intractable) due to derivation of the Jacobean matrices. Furthermore, 
the accuracy of the propagated mean and covariance is limited to first order Taylor 
series expansion, which is caused by its linearization process [81]. The UKF overcomes the 
limitations of the EKF by providing derivative-free higher-order approximations by 
approximating a Gaussian distribution rather than approximating an arbitrary nonlinear 
function [82]. The UKF is more accurate and robust in navigation applications by also 
providing much better convergence characteristics. The UKF uses sigma points and a 
process known as unscented transform to evaluate the statistics of a nonlinear 
transformed random variable. Due to the advancements in modern computing 
technologies, algorithms such as the UKF and the PF can now be implemented 
effectively for real time systems.  The aim of this research is to adopt MSDF techniques to 
provide the best estimate of track data obtained from cooperative systems and non-
cooperative sensors. The UKF is used to processes the cooperative sensors and a PF is 
adopted to combine the non-cooperative sensor measurements. The PF or Sequential 
Monte Carlo (SMC) are a broad and well known category of Monte Carlo algorithms 
developed in the last two decades to provide approximate solutions to intractable 
inference problem. The methodology is used for nonlinear filtering problems seen in 
Bayesian statistical inference and signal processing. Using the PF for filtering or estimation 
problems, the observations are used to measure internal states in systems. The system 
dynamic process and sensors are also filled with random noise utilised in the filtering 
process. The objective is to compute the posterior distributions of states or hidden 
variable, from the noisy and partial observations. The main objective of a PF is estimating 
the posterior density of the hidden state variables using the observation variables if 
applicable. The PF is designed for a hidden Markov model, where the system consists of 
hidden and observable variables. The dynamical system describing the evolution of the 
state variables is also known probabilistically obtained from the prediction and updating 
process of the PF. A set of particles is initialised in the PF to generate a sample 
distribution, where each particle is assigned a weight, which represents the probability of 
that particle to be sampled from the probability density function. Weight disparity 
leading to weight collapse is a common issue encountered in these filtering algorithms; 
however it can be mitigated by including a resampling step before the weights become 
too uneven. 
ADS-B and TCAS are exploited in the MSDF architecture, which provide position and 
velocity estimates for the detection and tracking solution. The MSDF technique used to 
fuse the cooperative sensors is the UKF (which is MSDF technique N), the MSDF technique 
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used to fuse the non-cooperative sensors is the PF (which is MSDF technique NC) and the 
MSDF technique used to fuse the MSDF N and MSDF NC sensors is based on a memory 
based learning.  In order to estimate the non-linear functions, approximation methods 
are used. On-board trajectory replanning, with dynamically updated constraints based 
on the intruder and the host dynamics, is at present used to generate obstacle 
avoidance trajectories. The states of the tracked obstacles are obtained by adopting 
UKF/PF or other MSDF techniques, which are then used in order to predict the trajectory 
in a given time horizon.  
The real world may be described by nonlinear differential equations, and measurements 
may not be a function of those states. In many problems, in this case, the measurements 
are a linear function of the states, but the model of the real world is nonlinear.  In order 
to predict the track of the target object/aircraft MSDF techniques are used to obtain the 
best estimate and then a probabilistic model is used. The UKF is used to obtain a better 
estimate; therefore a better prediction will be obtained because the errors are 
essentially reduced. The detection information provided by several awareness sensors 
should be evaluated and prioritized taking into account the rest of the UAS information 
such as telemetry, flight plan and mission information [83]. A multi-sensor surveillance 
system includes function such as detection and tracking which utilize cooperative and 
non-cooperative information sources in a multi-sensor architecture. The output of an 
effective multi-sensor tracker provides a unified surveillance picture with a relatively small 
number of confirmed tracks and improved target localization. Global multi-sensor fusion 
and tracking should be capable of processing (potentially anomalous) AIS tracks and 
contact-level or track-level data from other sensors to produce a single, consolidated 
surveillance picture. The following filters have been used for implementing TDA loops 
[84]: 
Tracking for single object non maneuvering target 
1. Optimal Bayesian filter 
2. Kalman Filter 
3. Extended Kalman Filter 
4. Unscented Kalman Filter 
5. Point Mass Filter 
6. Particle Filter 
Manoeuvring object tracking 
1. Optimal Bayesian filter 
2. Generalized pseudo-Bayes Filters (of order 1 and order 2) 
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3. Interactive Multiple Models 
4. Bootstrap Filter (Auxiliary) 
5. Extended Kalman Auxiliary Particle Filter 
Single Object Tracking in Clutter 
1. Optimal Bayesian filter 
2. Nearest neighbour filter 
3. Particle filter 
4. Extended Kalman auxiliary particle filter 
Single- and Multiple-Object Tracking in Clutter: Object-Existence-Based 
Approach 
1. Optimal Bayes’ recursion 
2. Joint Probabilistic Data association (JPD) 
3. Interacting Multiple Models – Joint Integrated Probabilistic Data 
Association (IMM-JIPDA) 
Multiple-object tracking in clutter: random-set-based approach 
Random Finite Set Formalism (RFS) 
1. Optimal Bayesian multi-object tracking filter 
2. Probabilistic hypothesis density approximation 
Approximate filters 
1. Gaussian mixture probability hypothesis density filter 
2. Particle probability hypothesis density filter 
3. Gaussian mixture cumulative probability hypothesis density algorithm 
Object-existence-based tracking filter 
1. Integrated probabilistic data association filter 
 
Several well-known Bayesian filtering algorithms are employed for the single, multiple, 
maneuvreing and non-maneuvreing object tracking problem. Maneuvering objects are 
those objects whose dynamical behaviour changes overtime. An object that suddenly 
turns or accelerates displays a maneuvering behaviour with regard to its tracked position 
[84]. While the definition of a maneuvering object extends beyond the tracking of 
position and speed, historically it is in this context that maneuvering object tracking 
theory developed. This service has to incorporate 4D navigation in order to know at 
what moment the aircraft is going to arrive at the different flight plan waypoints.    
The Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF): 
The UKF is an alternative to the EKF, and shares its computational simplicity while 
avoiding the need to derive and compute Jacobians and achieving greater accuracy 
Ph.D. Thesis - Next Generation Flight Management Systems for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Operations                
- Automated Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance Functionalities  
73 
 
[84]. The UKF is based upon the unscented transformation process: this method 
approximates the moments of a non-linearly transformed random variable. The 
unscented transformation can be used as the basis of a non-linear filtering 
approximation which has the same form as the EKF but is derived in a quite different 
manner. The posterior PDF of xk using Bayes’ rule is given by: 
 (    
 )   (       
   )  (    
   )                                 (2.27) 
The UKF approximates the joint density of the state    and measurement    conditional 
on the measurement history      that is approximated by a Gaussian density expressed 
as: 
 (       
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This implies that: 
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In general, the moments appearing in these equations cannot be computed exactly 
and so must be approximated. The UT is used for this purpose. The state prediction is 
performed by predicting the mean and covariance matrix of     which represent the 
moments of transformation given by: 
    (    )                                                       (2.30) 
where the statistics are taken for      given  
   . The predicted mean and covariance 
matrix are given by: 
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Approximations to the predicted mean and covariance matrix are to be obtained using 
the unscented transformation. Sigma points     
        
  and weights         are 
selected to match the mean and the covariance matrix of  (      
   ). With   
   (    
 ) 
where        , the approximations for the predicted mean and covariance matrix are 
given by: 
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The measurement prediction: The predicted statistics for the measurement yk are 
moments of the transformation given by: 
    (  )                                                         (2.35) 
where the statistics of    given  
    are available from the prediction step. Hence we 
have: 
 (    
   )   ( (  )  
   )                                         (2.36) 
   (    
   )     ( (  )  
   )     (  )                              (2.37) 
   (       
   )     (    (  )  
   )                                  (2.38) 
Let   
      
  and         denote the sigma points and weights, respectively, selected to 
match the predicted mean and covariance matrix. The transformed sigma points are 
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 ),        . The UT approximations to the moments are [83]: 
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The resulting expression for the posterior probability distribution function is given by: 
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 )   (    ̂        )                                          (2.42) 
where: 
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As with the EKF, the UKF is strongly reminiscent of the KF, with the main difference being 
the dependence of the posterior covariance matrix on the observed measurements. In 
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UKF this occurs because the calculated sigma points generated in the UT process are 
moment approximations and are determined based on state estimates which are 
measurement dependent.  Before concluding, we note that the assumption of additive 
noise in the dynamic and measurement equations has been made only for the sake of 
convenience [84]. The UT is equally applicable for non-additive noise. For instance, if the 
dynamic equation is     (       ), then the quality undergoing a non-linear 
transformation is the augmented variable    [    
    
   , which has the statistics 
 (    
   )  [ ̂       
      
 ]
 
 and    (    
   )      (           ). The UT can be applied 
to the random variable    transformed through the function   to approximate the 
predicted state statistics. Since    is of dimension      , a larger number of sigma points 
will be required than for the case where the dynamic noise is additive. Similar comments 
hold for a measurement equation which is non-linear in the measurement noise. A 
summary of the UKF is given by below. 
Algorithm: 
1. Determine sigma points     
        
  and weights        to match a mean  ̂        
and covariances matrix         .  
2. Compute the transformed sigma points   
   (    
 ),        . 
3. Compute the predicted state statistics: 
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4. Determine the sigma points   
      
  and weights         to match mean  ̂      and 
covariance matrix       . 
5. Compute the transformed sigma points   
   (  
 ),        . 
6. Compute the predicted measurement statistics 
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7. Compute the posterior mean and covariance matrix 
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The Particle Filter: 
There are different methods for target tracking, but particle filtering is one of the most 
important and widely used methods. The particle filter is an implementation of Bayesian 
recursive filtering using a sequential Monte Carlo sampling method. It is used in statistics 
and signal processing, where it is known as a bootstrap filter and a Monte Carlo filter 
respectively [85]. The target state is represented by     where   is time.    is the set of all 
observations. The posterior density function  (     ) is represented by a set of weighted 
samples. Observations  (     ) can be non-gaussian. The main aim is the estimation of 
the probability distribution function of the target object by a set of weighted samples 
  {( ( )  ( ))        } such that ∑  ( )        [86]. Based on the observations, the 
likelihood of each particle is applied in weight assignment by the equation below in 
each step: 
 ( )   (        
( ))                                               (2.52) 
The particle filter consists of two stages, prediction and update. In the prediction state, 
next step particles are calculated by using current step particles and target state 
transition equations. In the update stage, the weights are assigned to new particles by 
the following equation [86]: 
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where   is the importance density function which is used in the sampling function. The 
posteriori density function is estimated by using the following equation: 
 (     )  ∑   
  (       )
 
                                          (2.54) 
The next step state vector is estimated by using the weighted average on current step 
particles with the following equation [86]: 
 ̂  ∑   
   
  
                                                       (2.55) 
Sequential Importance Resampling Particle Filter: 
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One of the basic challenges in implementation of a PF is the appropriate choice of the 
proposal density function. One of the common suboptimal choices of the proposal 
density function is the transitional prior distribution [86]. 
 (       
    )   (       
 )     (     )                              (2.56) 
By substituting  ( ) into each particle’s weight, a new weighting can be calculated 
based on: 
  
      
  (     
 )                                                  (2.57) 
In each step of the SIR algorithm, re-sampling is done after state estimation. After re-
sampling, weights of all particles are equal to 
 
 
 where   is the number of particles. 
Hence the above equation is modified as: 
  
   (     
 )                                                      (2.58) 
The implemented algorithm involves the initialisation of the particles using prior 
distribution of the tracked object. 
Then, for all the particles, the following steps are implemented: 
a. Prediction: Generate particles using dynamic model  
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b. Weighting: Calculate weight for particle  
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The normalization of the particle weights is given by: 
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c. Resampling:  
The particles are resampled and new particles are obtained with same weight 
and repeat from stage 2. 
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Statistical Learning Techniques: 
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Statistical learning theory is a framework for machine learning drawing from the fields of 
statistics and functional analysis. Statistical learning concerns itself with finding a 
predictive function for a task/problem.  The goal of learning is prediction. Learning falls 
into many categories, including supervised learning, unsupervised learning, online 
learning, and reinforcement learning. From the perspective of statistical learning theory, 
supervised learning is best understood. Supervised learning involves learning from a 
training set of data. Every point in the training set is an input-output pair, where the input 
maps to an output. The learning problem consists of inferring the function that maps 
between the input and the output in a predictive fashion, such that the learned function 
can be used to predict output from future input. In machine learning problems, a major 
problem that arises is that of over fitting. Because learning is a prediction problem, the 
goal is not to find a function that most closely fits the (previously observed) data, but to 
find one that will most accurately predict output from future input [86, 87]. Some 
examples of statistical learning techniques include, but are not limited to: artificial neural 
networks, instance based learning, learning with hidden variables and kernel machines, 
which are succinctly depicted in Figure 2.21 [88].  
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Figure 2.21. Intelligent techniques for SA&CA MSDF (Adapted from [89]). 
2.9 UTM System  
UAS Traffic Management (UTM) supports civilian low-altitude airspace and UAS 
operations [90]. The UTM system comprises of all of the elements required to support and 
execute UAS operations in the low-altitude airspace. Specifically, the integration of small 
size UAS (typically 55 lbs and below), is targeted in the NASA’s initiative under AOSP to 
ensure safety and operation efficiency.  
Some lessons learnt from low-altitude uncontrolled airspace operations of helicopters, 
gliders and general aviation aircraft can also be helpful. UTM system development 
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accommodates manned aircraft along with Line-of-Sight (LoS) and Beyond LoS (BVLoS) 
UAS operations in the low-altitude airspace. The supporting components include, but are 
not limited to, the NAS information, Communication and Technology (ICT) systems, UAS 
systems, regulations, policies, and procedures.  The operation of multiple conventional 
and autonomous transport vehicles is an important emerging issue to be considered in 
the development of future traffic management systems.  
 Near-term Goal: Safely enable initial low-altitude UAS as early as possible; 
 Long-term Goal: Accommodate increased demand with highest safety, 
efficiency, and capacity. 
Figure 2.22 depicts the functional description of the UTM, and its functions are shown in 
Figure 2.23.  
UTM SERVICES:
UTM based on autonomicity, autonomy                  
and autonomous operations
UTM CHARACTERISTICS:
• Authentication 
• Airspace design 
• Geofence definition 
• Weather integration 
• Constraint management 
• Sequencing and spacing 
• Trajectory changes 
• Separation management 
• Contingency management
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Figure 2.22. UTM system architecture. 
The UTM will support a wide variety of UAS, from those equipped with minimalistic 
avionics to autonomous UAS [91-95]. The inputs to UTM will include: UAV mission/business 
flight plan or trajectory, real-time weather and wind, predicted wind and weather, 
airspace constraints (dynamically adjusted), community needs about sensitive areas 
(dynamically adjusted), and three-dimensional maps that include man-made structures 
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as well as natural terrain. The UTM will need persistent Communication, Navigation and 
Surveillance (CNS) coverage to ensure and monitoring conformance to the constraints. 
This could be provided by a combination of low-altitude radar, cellular tower, satellite, 
and other means. The important aspect is that coverage is continuous robust, reliable, 
and redundant in order to ensure the monitoring and support needed for safe 
operations. Although the role of human operators needs to be carefully defined, it is 
anticipated that the humans will provide overall direction and goal-setting for the UTM 
system. The self-configuration aspect of UTM will determine whether the operations 
should continue given the current and/or predicted wind/weather conditions.  
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Figure 2.23. UTM functions and stakeholders. 
The self-optimization aspect of UTM refers to given the traffic demand, and how the 
airspace must be configured to make the operations most efficient in light of traffic 
demand. The self-protection aspect will ensure that all sensor data related to CNS and 
vehicles is accurate and operating at the desired integrity. Should the data integrity, 
sensor inputs, and precision reduce, the self-configuration aspect will identify the 
appropriate strategy such as increased separation buffer or gradually halting the 
operations. The self-healing aspect refers to safely returning to normalcy. The human 
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may be the ultimate decision-maker regarding the continuation and return to normalcy 
of the operations. 
A list of UTM functions is provided below: 
1. Airspace Operations and Management 
 Current: ~500 ft. and below; 
 Geographical needs and applications; 
 Rules of the airspace: performance-based; 
 Geofences: dynamic and static. 
2. Wind and Weather Integration 
 Actual and predicted winds/weather; 
 Operator responsibility. 
3. Congestion Management 
 Demand/capacity imbalance; 
 Only if needed –corridors, altitude for direction, etc. 
4. Separation Management 
 Airspace reservation; 
 Vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-UTM; 
 Tracking: ADS-B, cellular, & satellite based; 
 Traffic avoidance; 
 SA&CA to manned aircraft predicated on right of way; 
 Status and intent exchange in accordance with standards; 
 Collaborative decision making; 
 Contingency planning and response (system outages, unreported weather, etc.). 
5. Route Structure 
 Only where needed for safety or efficiency of flight; 
 Procedural rules-of-road (corridors, altitudes, etc.). 
6. Air Traffic Control 
 Integrated with manned air traffic control, where positive UAS control is required 
for safety or efficiency of flight; 
 Static or dynamic application (e.g., ability to respond in crisis situation where 
sustained mixed operations are required). 
7. Flow Management 
 Only where needed for safety or efficiency of flight; 
 Manage access into areas of operation, not particular operation; 
8. Contingency Management 
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 Large-scale GPS or cell outage; 
 Cyber-physical attacks. 
9. Track and Locate (cellular communication systems, ADS-B, satellite, etc.) 
 Conflict (V2V, sense and avoid) and hazard avoidance. 
10. Last and First 50 Feet Operations 
In terms of granting the required levels of operational safety when considering the 
integration of autonomous traffic in the existing ATM and planned UTM networks 
characterised by dense/mixed traffic and high levels of service, the emphasis is on 
network-centric equipment that can meet strict performance requirements while also 
supporting enhanced traffic management and optimisation functionalities. In particular, 
in order to grant the required surveillance performance and autonomous Separation 
Assurance and Collision Avoidance (SA&CA) capabilities for unrestricted access to 
controlled airspace, UAS surveillance equipment involve a combination of non-
cooperative sensors and cooperative systems. Ground-based and satellite based data-
link communication systems act as the backbone of LoS and BLoS Vehicle-to-Vehicle 
(V2V) and Vehicle-to-UTM (V2U) information exchanges [96].  
The UTM system development is aimed at introducing safe separation functionalities by 
exploiting the concept of dynamic geo-fences and providing a solution driven by the 
unified approach to SA&CA. In the long term and to support faster-moving hybrid 
unmanned vehicles, UTM research will have to develop efficient network-centric 
functionalities for trajectory prediction and negotiation both within individual controlled 
airspace/network sectors and across multiple sectors belonging to the same region, also 
considering the inbound/outbound flows from adjacent regions. Three different 
operating environments within the airspace systems that will be in the UTM system 
concept of operations are [90]:  
 UAS operations inside uncontrolled Airspace (class G): In this environment, no 
interaction with controlled air traffic will occur as the UAS operations occur 
outside of controlled airspace operations. However, UAS share the airspace with 
other airspace users, such as general aviation aircraft, helicopters, gliders, 
balloons, and parachutists; 
 UAS operations inside controlled airspace, but segregated from controlled air 
traffic: As many use cases of small UAS operations would benefit from operating 
near airports and inside controlled airspace, there could be segregated areas 
within the controlled airspace that can be made available for UAS operations. 
These could be transition tunnels or blocks of airspace that are made available 
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depending on current airport and airspace configurations and other criteria 
related to controlled airspace operations and 
 UAS operations integrated into the controlled air traffic flows: When UAS are 
integrated into the controlled air traffic flows they are expected to behave 
exactly like traditional aviation and meet all the requirements set forth currently 
for operations in the controlled airspace classes.  
SA&CA is the underlining core element of any UTM system implementation as shown in 
Figure 2.24. The approach will support both avionics/ATM system mediated scenarios as 
well as support a fully autonomous implementations.  
STAGE 1:
• Reservation of airspace volume
• Over populated land or water
• Minimal general aviation traffic in area
• Contingencies handled by UAS pilot
• Support for applications in remote areas 
such as agriculture, fire fighting, etc.
STAGE 2:
• Beyond visual line-of-sight 
• Tracking and low density operations
• Sparsely populated areas
• Procedures and rules
• Longer range applications
STAGE 4:
• Beyond visual line-of-sight
• Urban environments (also high density)
• Autonomous V2V and internet 
connectivity
• Large scale contingencies mitigation
• Support for applications in urban areas 
including news gathering, package 
delivery, etc.
STAGE 3:
• Beyond visual line-of-sight
• Over moderately populated land
• Some interaction with manned aircraft
• Tracking, V2V, V2UTM and internet 
connectivity
• Public safety
• Some support for applications in urban 
areas such as limited package delivery
Separation 
Assurance and 
Collision 
Avoidance
 
Figure 2.24. Role of SA&CA in UTM. 
In order to address the identified challenges, a number of strategies can be 
implemented. One such challenge is the definition of a number of UTM system 
operational geographies described for ensuring safety of UAS operations. There are 
multiple geographical regions specific to an operational plan including flight 
geographies, conformance geographies and protected geographies. The specifications 
of each of these defined geographical regions have been described within the UTM 
system. In a general case, the flight geography is dictated by the plan provided by the 
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UAS operator. Then the UTM system adds a conformance buffer and computes the 
conformance geography.  
Operation of the UAS is expected to stay within the conformance geography at any 
point of time, and all violations will be notified as appropriate. The UTM system then adds 
a second buffer and computes a protected geography that the system uses for 
deconflicting purposes. The final plan is prepared by also including constraints at the 
time of submission and then activation is performed. It is ensured that protected 
geographies from separate operations never overlap in 4D (space and time) with each 
other or with any no-fly constraint. Some envisioned rules for operation plan validation 
are: 
 at least one operational volume has to be included; 
 there cannot be more than 10 operational volumes; 
 the minimum time for validating each operational volume should be 2 minutes; 
 a minimum time for each operational volume (dictated by mission endurance 
requirements and operational complexity); 
 a fixed area for a flight geography (given by a polygon). E.g., 55756800ft² (2 
square miles); 
 a fixed length for a flight geography (given by a line string). E.g., 5280ft (1 mile). 
The UTM system verifies the identification (by assigning a unique number) and other 
information (e.g. maximum speed in given weather considerations). This information is 
used to determine the conformance geometry. The conformance buffer can also be 
determined using other variables such as vehicle type (fixed wing or rotor), Size, Weight, 
and Power (SWaP) requirements. UTM ssytem also verifies the validity of altitude 
information of a given plan by using the available digital terrain elevation data. The 
system also checks the plan and vehicle capability with respect to weather (wind) 
conditions and favourable conditions [97, 98].  
Flight geography is the topography submitted by the operator via the UTM system and it 
describes the physical location of the planned operation. A single flight geography 
contains the geographic information together with time data to effectively form a 
reservation for a 4D volume of airspace. Multiple flight geographies may be submitted 
with a single operation submission to form a chain of volumes that will be used by that 
operation. This allows for more efficient use of the airspace by reserving smaller pieces 
for longer running operations. The collection of flight geographies is called the operation 
volumes. Operational volumes are used for determining the dynamic geo-fences using 
the unified approach to SA&CA.  In a near-term implementation, the collection of 
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operation volumes would contain exactly one flight geography and the entire flight 
geography would necessarily be required to be within line of sight of the UAS Controller. 
In the long term, there could be either multiple flight geographies or at least one that 
may be beyond visual LoS of the UAS controller, or both. 
Conformance geographies are defined by the UTM System and are derived from the 
UAS operation centre submitted flight geography/geographies. There is exactly one 
conformance geography per flight geography. The approach is, if the operator submits 
a polygon area for the flight geography, the conformance geography would be 
represented by the same polygon. But efficient use of flight geography can be 
performed by using a structured polygon based approach, by constructing a group of 
hexagons and also by incorporating cellular infrastructure concepts. In that case, the 
operator submits a line string for the flight geography and the conformance geography 
would be a polygon containing that line string. If an active operation violates its 
conformance geography, there will be a trigger in the UTM system to mark that 
operation as nonconforming. The UTM system notifies the UAS operational centre that 
the operation is nonconforming and must take immediate corrective action to bring the 
operation back into conformance with its submitted plan.  
The UTM system defines an additional region around the conformance geography 
called the protected geography. This volume will be used by the UTM system to 
strategically deconflict operations from each other, along with other constraints in the 
system. If the UTM system defined protected geography for a proposed operation 
intersects any known constraints in the system, the proposed plan will be rejected. Thus, 
it is the protected geography that drives acceptance or rejection of an operational 
plan. The operational geographies are shown in Figure 2.25.   
Protected Geography
Conformance Geography
Flight Geography
 
Figure 2.25. UTM system concept - operational geographies. 
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When there are multiple UAS operating in the same topography, then operational 
geographies are defined distinctively for each UAS occupying the topography. The 
operational geographies of multiple UAS accessing the same topography are shown in 
Figure 2.26.   
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Figure 2.26. UTM system concept - operational geographies of multiple UAS. 
By evaluating these operational geographies, the NG-FMS generates 4D trajectories that 
are then evaluated for SA&CA, given the surveillance information from the UTM system. 
2.10 Dependency on LoS and BLoS Communications  
The airworthiness requirements regarding CA&CA capabilities are highly dependent on 
the operating modes. These modes are defined below. 
Visual line-of-sight is defined by ICAO as being “a mode of UAS operation in which the 
flight crew monitors the flight path in relation to other aircraft, persons, vehicles or 
structures through direct and unaided visual contact with the aircraft, in order to 
maintain separation and collision avoidance.” 
Beyond VLoS (BVLoS): In this mode the aircraft is controlled from a GCS that is equipped 
with necessary instrumentation and displays. When a communication relay is employed, 
say using satellites, it is generally referred to as Broad RLoS (BRLoS). An UAV can be 
operated in BRLoS but it can be still within the visual line-of-sight. There might be 
propagation effects including interference and others, but the UAV can still be observed 
in a clear sky.  
In VLoS flight conditions, unmanned aircraft are constrained to very low altitudes in order 
to be visible and also to enable control by the remote pilot/operator.  ICAO rules state 
that, except for take-off and landing flight phases, the minimum flight altitude has to be 
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above 500 ft. In BVLoS/BRLoS operations, SA&CA algorithms are required to support the 
remote pilot in the accomplishment of the following tasks: 
 maintaining appropriate separation distance from other airspace users; 
 avoidance of collision with terrain and obstacles; 
 avoidance of severe/adverse weather; 
 maintaining appropriate flight visibilities and distance from clouds; 
 visual observation of lighting and markings; 
 visual observation of any in flight interception signals; 
 visual observation of the landing/departure runway; 
 visual observation of next aircraft where reduced separation is approved. 
2.11 Towards Higher Levels of Autonomy 
Autonomy can be defined as the capability of making decisions without assistance by 
human operators. Autonomy in UAS is essential to both increase the utility of the UAS and 
the safety of its operation, as it allows the unmanned aircraft to avoid hazardous 
situations if failures occur in the C2 loop [99]. Levels of autonomy were initially defined by 
Sheridan [100]. Sheridan’s 10-level scale of autonomy is based on the decision-maker 
(human or system) and on how the decisions are executed. Different implementations of 
Sheridan’s scale were considered. UAS can be configured for autonomous, overridable, 
aided and deliberate operations and are listed in Table 2.10.  
These levels are based on information acquisition, information analysis, decision and 
action selection, as well as action implementation functions. According to the 
classification identified in the autonomous modes, UAS usually operates at Pilot Authority 
and Control (PACT) level 3 [100].  
The system communicates to the UAS GCS remote pilot any potential hazards that are 
detected and the suggested resolution to enable him/her to make a decision for 
executing an avoidance manoeuvre.  
However, in the case of imminent collision situations, if the remote pilot does not react in 
time, the SAA systems operates at PACT level 5 (autonomous mode of operations) and 
executes the avoidance actions.  The expert processing required is grant UAS the 
appropriate levels of autonomy can be attained either by knowledge-based algorithms 
or by more advanced forms of machine intelligence. Notwithstanding, it shall be noted 
that autonomous decision-making in UAS is not limited to safety-critical purposes, and 
usually accounts for other features, such as performance optimisation. Therefore, the 
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costs of certification could be managed by reducing the number of sub-systems/lines of 
code subject to certification requirements. Licensing already-certified software modules 
could also help manage these costs. However, unlike software safety, in terms of system 
safety requirements, new systems deploying certified algorithms still need to be certified 
themselves in very specific contexts, as the software may be running on different 
hardware, be configured differently, be employed in different operational contexts, etc. 
Table 2.10. Classification of autonomy levels (Adapted from [100)). 
Automation 
mode 
Operator 
Control 
Sheridan 
Scale 
Outline of the Human-Systems Interaction 
Autonomous Executive 9-10 
The system performs all aspects of decision-making 
and informs the operator after execution, if 
required, per pre-planned criteria or on operator’s 
request. 
Overridable Supervisory 6-8 
The system generates decision alternatives and a 
preferred option for execution and informs the 
operator in time for override intervention. 
Aided 
Consent-
Based 
3-5 
The system generates decision alternatives and 
recommends one to be carried out – but only after 
operator’s approval. The operator may select 
alternative options. 
Deliberate Manual 1-2 
The system executes commands initiated by the 
operator (the system may provide and/or 
recommend decision alternatives to the operator). 
 
The technologies for airborne and ground systems are largely evolving independent 
from UAS autonomy technologies except for the emerging air taxi (on-demand aviation) 
entrepreneurs who assume fully-autonomous, human-occupied platforms analogous to 
self-driving cars. Emerging technologies in the autonomous car domain are supporting 
the tasks to carry out by a human occupant, who has no particular driving expertise. 
Some recently evolving research is available about this emerging application that links 
UAS-centric autonomy technologies with manned aviation [101-103]. It is also required to 
consider the implications of the proposed UTM system techniques on existing policies 
and practices. These include addressing the new requirements for risk management 
(UAS collision with another UAS when flying over unpopulated areas), specifications, 
system architecture, required CNS performance, etc. [104-106]. 
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2.12 SA&CA Requirements 
It will be necessary that automated SA&CA systems provide a level of safety equalling or 
exceeding that of manned aircraft (Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations). In July 2004, 
an endeavour to set the standards for this equivalent level of safety was attempted 
when the ASTM subcommittee released Document F2411-04 (since amended to F2411-
04e1) “Standard Specification for Design and Performance of an Airborne Sense-and-
Avoid System” [107]. Since its release, this document has served as a guideline for 
developers and researchers working on UAS. In 2005, the United States Department of 
Defense (DoD) adopted these performance standards for its UAS program.  
In order to safely integrate UAS into all classes of airspace, UAS must adhere to the same 
separation standards as manned aircraft and thus must be able to complete an ATC 
clearance in a timely manner. However, UAS are inherently different from manned 
aircraft in several aspects that affect end-to-end response time [108, 109]. 
For manned aircraft, the pilot is on board the aircraft and the control input is wired to the 
control surfaces and other systems of the aircraft. For UAS, the pilot is in a control station 
that is removed from the aircraft and the control input must travel wirelessly through the 
air or through a satellite relay, depending on the data link architecture, adding a delay 
not present with manned aircraft. The variable control delays can make the control of 
the UAS more difficult [110]. A summary of the SA&CA requirements for manned and 
unmanned aircraft are provided below: 
General requirements include: 
 The SA&CA algorithms shall detect both cooperative and non-cooperative 
collision threats during day and night and consider adverse weather conditions; 
 The SA&CA algorithms shall notify the operator for any imminent collision risk and 
provide a collision resolution or execute an autonomous avoidance manoeuvre; 
 The SA&CA algorithms shall consider any direction or warning from other 
avoidance systems; 
 The SA&CA algorithms shall provide a recommended course to resume action 
after any avoidance manoeuvre.  
Requirements of SA and CA include: 
 The SA&CA algorithms shall warn the operator of obstacles within an estimated 
distance of 3000 m. In case of cooperative vehicles, the minimum separation 
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shall follow the standards stated by the FAA or other aviation regulatory 
authorities; 
 The generated avoidance manoeuvre shall be based in the standards 
established in FAR §91.113 Appendix 3; 
  The generated avoidance manoeuvre shall prevent mid-air collision and has to 
consider other avoidance manoeuvres generated by other systems such as 
TCAS; 
 If the pilot avoidance manoeuvre increases the risk of collision with any other 
obstacle the system shall override the pilot command; 
 If the pilot does not execute a return to course manoeuvre after an avoidance 
action, either from the FCS or from the operator, then the aircraft shall 
autonomously return to its original course.  
Requirements for implementing autonomous actions include: 
 The SA&CA algorithms shall execute an autonomous avoidance manoeuvre if 
the pilot does not perform the suggested resolution from the SA&CA system;  
 The SA&CA algorithms shall provide the operator the necessary information on 
the progress of the autonomous manoeuvre (time and weather permitting);  
 The SA&CA algorithms shall execute a return-to-course action after an 
autonomous manoeuvre is executed.  
UTM requirements include: 
 Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance, Prediction and Separation 
Management including SA&CA; 
 Persistent communication, navigation, and surveillance coverage under day and 
night conditions; 
 Communication, navigation, and surveillance coverage under all visibility 
conditions; 
 Ability to sense, detect and track all moving objects at an altitude up to 10,000 ft. 
Most of the UAS for package delivery, wildlife monitoring, fire fighting, crop 
dusting, and other applications will operate at much lower altitudes. A starting 
point is Class G airspace under 2000 ft; 
 Ability to predict potential collisions between UAS as well as between UAS and 
other moving objects including but not limited to birds, gliders, helicopters, model 
aircraft, general aviation aircraft, personal air vehicles, special purpose balloons, 
jet wind turbines, etc.; 
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 Ability to predict the trajectory for next mile and/or within the 5 minutes, 
whichever is higher. 
 Ability to monitor separation among UAS and predict conditions where the 
crossing or separation minima will be violated. The horizontal separation minima 
be set to 1 mile at the beginning of UTM activity and will be reduced over time; 
 Ability to provide persistent, redundant, coverage by sensors to areas where 
operations will be conducted. 
The SA&CA requirements presented above assume a pilot-centric, manned-vehicle 
perspective. But there is a requirement to look at existing policies and best practices to 
modify them based on the new UAS requirements. For example, there is a possibility that 
a UAS can hit another UAS without risk when an overflying unpopulated region, which 
requires suitable policy changes but they are still at an embryonic stage when writing this 
thesis. 
2.13 Research on SA&CA Avoidance Volumes 
Some work that has been previously performed on calculating the 
avoidance/uncertainty volume in the context of SA&CA (manual as well as automated) 
are highlighted below: 
 Collision Avoidance System and Method utilizing Variable Surveillance Envelope 
(Patent): In this work, the size and shape of the safety volume is monitored by the 
sensors and the volume is modified according to the speed and motion vectors 
of the aircraft or other traffic, so as to maximize efficient use of sensor capabilities 
and minimize the size, cost and power requirements of the system [111].  
 UAS Collision Encounter Modelling and Avoidance Algorithm Development for 
Simulating Collision Avoidance: Detection of other traffic is performed by defining 
a geometric sensor model and a collision cone approach. Avoidance algorithms 
consist of proportional navigation guidance that uses information from the 
collision potential between the unmanned aircraft and other traffic [112].  
 Dynamic Separation Thresholds for a Small Airborne Sense and Avoid System: In 
this method, the distance-based thresholds are replaced with time-based 
thresholds that account for intruder performance using turning flight geometry to 
implement a computationally inexpensive solution [113].  
 UAS Collision Avoidance Algorithm Minimizing Impact on Route Surveillance: An 
aggregated collision cone approach is implemented to detect and avoid 
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collision with two or more aircraft simultaneously (geometric collision avoidance 
system) [114].  
 UAS Insertion into Commercial Airspace - Europe and US Standards Perspective: 
The SC-203 and WG-73 definitions are considered, which define SAA to 
encompass two high level functions: Self Separation (SS) and Collision Avoidance 
(CA). Self-Separation is intended to resolve any conflict early, so that a UAS 
remains “well clear” of other aircraft and avoids the need for last-minute collision 
avoidance manoeuvres [115]. 
 3D Obstacle Avoidance Strategies for UASs (Uninhabited Aerial Systems) Mission 
Planning and Re-Planning: The research presented in this work focuses upon 
mission planning tasks. A planning algorithm is described, which allows the 
vehicle to autonomously and rapidly calculate 3D routes [6]. The calculation of 
routes is based on obstacle avoidance strategies and on specific vehicle 
performance constraints [116].  
 Development of a Mobile Information Display System for UAS Operations in North 
Dakota: This research focusses on estimating the current aircraft position 
uncertainty volume. The volume of any overlap of any aircraft's uncertainty 
volume with a UAV’s uncertainty volume determines the current risk [117]. 
 Sensor Resource Management to Support UAS Integration into the National 
Airspace System: The research aims at proving resource allocation strategies and 
ensures aircraft adhere to the minimum separation requirement.  An evolutionary 
algorithm is implemented and the Kalman filter's covariance matrices are used to 
determine positional uncertainty to predict separation requirement violations 
[118]. 
 Coordination of Multiple UAS for Tracking under Uncertainty: The research shows 
how Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) can be used for 
controlling fleets of UAS under uncertainty [119].  
 Self-Separation Support for UAS: Criteria are identified for defining requirements 
for a future SA and CA system Concept of conflict probing and the associated 
stability for the available data, interfaces and display are identified [120].  
 Analysis of Well-Clear Boundary Models for the Integration of UAS in the NAS: A 
definition of well clear is provided to the SA concept for the integration of UAS 
into civil airspace. This research by NASA presents a family of well-clear boundary 
models based on the TCAS II resolution advisory logic. Analytical techniques are 
used to study the properties and relationships satisfied by the models. Some of 
these properties are numerically quantified using statistical methods [121]. Figure 
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2.27 shows the well-clear threshold. Based on the current ATM operations, a 
conﬂict is deﬁned when an aircraft encounter happens within 3.5 NM of one 
another horizontally and within 2000 ft above an altitude level of 29,000 ft and 
1000 feet below the 29,000 ft level. A self-separation volume is defined much 
larger than the collision volume but it may vary in size with operational area and 
airspace class [121]. In this case, a conﬂict is defined to occur when other traffic 
enters the self-separation volume. The self-separation threshold is then deﬁned as 
the threshold boundary at which the host aircraft performs a maneuver to 
prevent other traffic from penetrating the self-separation volume. Hence, it can 
be the addition of the self-separation volume provides a performance goal that is 
analogous to the collision volume. The encounter geometry is then evaluated in 
the relative coordinate frame where the relative motion of the aircraft is analysed 
by investigating the dynamics of the intruder aircraft with respect to the host 
aircraft (Figure 2.28). 
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Figure 2.27. Well-clear threshold. 
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Figure 2.28. Well-clear based confliction detection method. 
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2.14 Case for a Unified Approach to SA&CA  
In addition to the unique airworthiness, spectrum, and security considerations that come 
with having the cockpit outside the aircraft, UAS have challenges in complying with 
several of the 14 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 91 (general operating rules). 
Specifically, compliance with the following critical rules is [122]: 
 Sec. 91.111 Operating near other aircraft: 
No person may operate an aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a 
collision hazard.  
 Sec. 91.113 Right-of-way rules - except water operations: 
When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is 
conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be 
maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other 
aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the 
pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it 
unless well clear. 
In response to the need for identifying the gaps in SA&CA functionalities, the U.S. Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) established the SAA Science and Research 
Panel (SARP) in February 2011. The SARP consists of a panel of experts in technologies 
necessary to provide UAS with the ability to sense and avoid other aircraft. It advises the 
UAS Airspace Integration IPT chaired within OUSD and is currently co-chaired by 
individuals outside of the DoD to provide a more independent perspective of the state 
of the research and science efforts. The outcome of the workshops conducted by SARP 
was threefold [122]: 
 A relationship between the, MIL-STD-882D safety methodology and the target 
level of safety methodology was proposed; 
 A method to identify the contribution of qualitative hazards/mitigations to a 
quantitative level of safety was proposed; 
 A list of disciplines that should undergo qualitative hazard analysis or comparable 
(instead of direct quantification) analysis was established. 
Figure 2.29 indicates the highest number of research gaps belongs to SA&CA 
certification and qualification. The SARP certification workshop was held with the 
objective of determining the research and science efforts needed to answer key 
questions related to civil use UAS SA&CA certification.  
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Figure 2.29. Number of SA&CA research gaps identified. 
The workshop participants examined 12 research gaps identified by the SARP specific to 
SA&CA certification/qualification as shown in Table 2.11. The highest number of research 
gaps belongs to SA&CA certification and qualification. The SA&CA certification 
workshop was held with the objective of determining the research and science efforts 
needed to answer key questions related to civil UAS SA&CA certification.  
Additionally, the following research questions arise in the context of UTM system 
implementation: 
 What is the minimum separation between UAS and other operations in the 
considered airspace? 
 How do we maintain safe separation among UAS, gliders, helicopters, model 
aircraft, general aviation, and in future, personal air vehicles? 
 What is the separation minimum among different types of manned aircraft, UAS 
and general aviation and other vehicles that operate in the same airspace? 
 What is the (minimum) requirement on UAS for SA&CA?  
 What are different architectures (ground-based and air based) for SA&CA and 
how they would work together? 
 What are the different SA&CA architectures to provide persistent coverage? 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Certification/Qualification
Pilot/Operator Presentation
System Integration
Data Standardisation/Characterisation
Threat Assessment
CONOPS/Procedure Validation
Maneuver Selection
Maneuver Notification
Object Identification
Target Detection
Target Tracking
Traffic Separation Minima
Alerting
Multi Sensor Data Fusion
Maneuver Execution
Return-to-Home/Mission
Number of
Research Gaps
Ph.D. Thesis - Next Generation Flight Management Systems for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Operations                
- Automated Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance Functionalities  
96 
 
 What are the different sensor options, redundancies and sensor data integrity 
needs? 
 What is the minimum equipage requirement on the UAS? 
 Where do we need geo-fencing? 
 What is the minimum functionality of the UTM in terms of airspace design, 
geofencing definition, self-configuration, weather/wind integration, congestion 
management, trajectory management, and separation assurance?  
 What are the inputs, outputs, and processing functions of UTM? 
Table 2.11. Research gaps for SA&CA (Adapted from [105]). 
Research Gap Description 
Airspace 
Characterisation 
How should airspace characterisation be included as part of 
SA&CA certification? 
Non-cooperative 
Data Collection 
and Assurance 
What types and amount of data must be collected from non-
cooperative sensors to assure the certifying authority that all non-
cooperative traffic is sensed? 
Safety Case 
What safety strategies and artefacts must be included in a SA&CA 
safety case? 
Human Factors 
What human factor considerations must be applied to GCS for 
certification? 
Commercial-off-
the-Shelf (COTS) 
Technologies 
How can COTS equipment be used for SA&CA system-of-systems 
that minimizes recertification and redesign? 
SA&CA 
Architectures 
How should SA&CA concept of operations and concepts of 
employment be matched to safe, cost-effective and optimal 
system architectures? 
Modelling and 
Simulation (M&S) 
How should the M&S tools used in the SA&CA certification process 
be evaluated and validated as accurate and representative of the 
SA&CA system? 
Airworthiness 
How do the service 3-tier airworthiness certification levels input into 
a target level of safety calculation for the SA&CA system? 
Segregated 
Certification 
What are the criteria to determine which parts of the overall SA&CA 
system can be certified independently (e.g., non-cooperative 
sensor, cooperative system) in a system of systems approach? 
Multi-UAS 
Integration & 
Coordinated 
Operations 
What are the certification challenges associated with multiple UAS 
operating in close proximity to each other (e.g., determining how to 
change SA&CA thresholds for formation flight)? 
FAR Compliance 
What challenges exist for all aircraft (manned and unmanned) in 
complying with the FARs in their present form (e.g., right-of-way rules 
in 14 CFR 91.113)? 
Software and 
Hardware 
Assurance 
How do civil assurance considerations in RTCA DO-178C software 
assurance and DO-254 hardware assurance apply to public UAS 
airspace integration? 
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All the existing SA&CA technologies do not provide a cohesive mathematical framework 
or and a system implementation approach that includes both cooperative and non-
cooperative means of implementing TDA loops and supports the case for certification. 
One of the key technology enablers to achieve the goal of safe integration of UAS in 
non-segregated airspace is the implementation of suitable data fusion techniques 
supported by a unified approach to non-cooperative and cooperative SA&CA. A 
unified approach would meet the requirements for manned and unmanned aircraft 
coordinated operations. Such SA&CA functionalities can provide UAS the capability to 
consistently and reliably perform equally the see-and-avoid performance of a human 
pilot in manned aircraft, while allowing a seamless integration of UAS in the current and 
planned dual-use civil/military ATM system and in the future UTM context. 
2.15 Conclusions 
This chapter provided an introduction to the system architecture and algorithms of Flight 
Management Systems (FMS). The Guidance, Navigation and Control (GNC) and 
Tracking, Decision-Making and Avoidance (TDA) avionics loops were described in detail. 
The existing Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance (SA&CA) procedures and 
algorithms currently employed were also presented. The key multi-sensor data fusion 
techniques tailored for accomplishing an effective TDA loop was also presented. 
Furthermore, the UTM system requirements and the implications on SA&CA technologies, 
standards and practices were also discussed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
NEXT GENERATION                                           
FLIGHT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS  
“The philosopher is nature's pilot. And there you have our difference:                                    
to be in hell is to drift: to be in heaven is to steer”. - George Bernard Shaw 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the system architecture and key design features of NG-FMS. The 
next generation airborne and ground (NG-FMS and NG-ATM) systems are first 
introduced. Then a system requirement analysis and a description of the novel 
functionalities required in an advanced NG-FMS are described. Subsequently, the main 
modules of the NG-FMS architecture that allow the generation of 4DT planning and 
optimisation algorithms are presented. The features required for achieving full 
interoperability with the NG-ATM system, enabling automated TBO/IBO are described. 
Validation of the adopted trajectory optimisation algorithms is performed through 
dedicated simulation test cases. 
3.2 NG-FMS and NG-ATM Systems 
In recent years, research interest has gathered in improving safety, capacity and 
efficiency of air operations as well as attaining environmentally sustainable solutions. In 
line with European Union’s SESAR, US’s NextGen, Australia’s OneSKY and other ATM 
modernisation programmes, research on NG-FMS is aimed to provide 4D TBO/IBO with 
NG-ATM and Next Generation Airborne Data Link (NG-ADL) systems.  
The efficiency and effectiveness of NG-ATM system are increased by introducing more 
information sharing and improving the operational and technological frameworks. 
According to the SESAR ATM master plan [1], the foreseen future deployments evolve 
from radar-based operations to TBO/IBO to achieve performance-driven ATM. As 
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covered in Chapter 2 (Section 2.6), the current surveillance infrastructure is largely 
composed of PSR, SSR, Mono-pulse Secondary Surveillance Radar (MSSR) and MSSR 
Mode-S. Recent technological advances including the emergence of ADS-B and Wide-
Area Multilateration (WAM) have reached maturity and are being deployed in many 
parts of the world supporting the evolution to performance-driven ATM.  In addition to 
ground-based surveillance, satellite based ADS-B is also becoming available as a source 
for surveillance information, especially in oceanic and remote areas. ADS-B is also 
supporting the development of new airborne surveillance operational services, including 
Air Traffic Situational Awareness (ATSA) and the Airborne Separation Assistance System 
(ASAS), which provide services such as sequencing and merging and self-separation in 
SESAR and NextGen. Future airborne applications will require changes in the avionics to 
process surveillance information in an automated manner and to display the airspace 
situation to the pilot.  
NextGEN is composed of programs including ADS-B, data communications, en-route 
automation modernization, terminal automation modernization and replacement, the 
national airspace system voice system and system wide information management. To 
reduce the costs inherent in ground based radar systems and improve aircraft tracking 
accuracy, an air traffic system based entirely on self-reporting traffic is proposed. The 
cornerstone of this program is ADS-B for SA&CA. When all users are capable of 
determining their three dimensional position and velocity vector, and then transmitting 
that information to the appropriate ATC facility, the requirement for ground based radar 
acquisition becomes obsolete. Because the system must remain safe and robust during 
transition, and because the cost of the mandated new equipment is an issue, there are 
many additional elements to the program to smooth transition.  This incentive came in 
the form of Broadcast Weather information, termed Flight Information Service – 
Broadcast (FIS-B). To provide effective situational awareness, each ADSB-in receiver must 
see all the traffic in the vicinity. With some users transmitting ADS-B on UAT and others on 
1090ES, it was necessary to provide a translating repeater and hence ADS-R 
(Rebroadcast) was introduced. Hence, the ATC received UAT transmissions, which are 
rebroadcast on 1090ES and vice versa. 
Because mandatory compliance is still a few years away, there are targets that will be 
identified by ATCRBS that are not reporting position on either 1090ES or UAT. In an 
endeavour to provide a comprehensive traffic picture, ATC provides a Traffic 
Information Service – Broadcast (TIS-B) with these additional targets to all ADS-B (out) 
equipped traffic. 
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In the CNS+A context, the NG-FMS acts as the airborne counterpart that implements the 
operational 4D trajectory concept. One of the key drawbacks in the current FMS is the 
inability to handle traffic uncertainties in a predictive real-time manner. This results in 
system inefficiencies that affect the system performance (both airborne and ground 
systems). Hence, it is of paramount importance to implement the TBO/IBO concept 
through the design and development of a NG-FMS and NG-ATM system providing [2]: 
 enhanced capability to exploit the CDM concept among all stakeholders utilising 
accurate real-time information acquired from the airborne counterpart. In this 
respect, the NG-FMS generates, synchronises and negotiates the predicted 
aircraft intents with the ground NG-ATM based on real-time CNS system 
performance, observed airspace and atmospheric conditions. CDM involves all 
stakeholders in the ground communication network including 4-PNV systems, Air 
Traffic Controllers (ATCo), Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP) and Airline 
Operation Centres (AOC); 
 introduction of higher levels of automation supporting role shifting of the ground 
NG-ATM system from traditional command and control oriented units to highly 
automated decision-making nodes in an interoperable environment. The 
transition is supported by the introduction of user-preferred trajectories 
downlinked from the aircraft. The changes to flight plans may be the result of  
weather and traffic hazards, emergency situations, and system 
degradation/failures resulting in a breach of agreed trajectory contract; 
 introduction of environment-related objectives based on cost functions to reduce 
emissions in all flight phases and noise at the vicinity of airports whilst minimising 
the total cost of a flight; 
 controlled time of arrival and strict adherence to required time of arrival 
enforced by both ground and airborne systems; 
 continuous synchronisation of trajectory and state information to support the 
introduction of time as a control variable in the trajectory optimisation process; 
 enhancing transition from voice communication to data-driven operations. 
An innovative ground based 4D Trajectory Planning, Negotiation and Validation (4-PNV) 
system for NG-ATM is assumed to be the 4DT planning, data exchange, negotiation and 
validation counterpart of NG-FMS. The 4-PNV system incorporates CDM and global 
optimisation criteria adhering to airspace constraints, and dedicated trajectory de-
confliction algorithms to enable IBO/TBO.  The 4-PNV system receives multiple options of 
4DT intents from each aircraft equipped with NG-FMS (both manned aircraft and UAS). 
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Then the 4-PNV system validates, through near real-time negotiation with the aircraft, the 
trajectory intents and resolves any traffic conflicts (implementing adequate separation 
and avoidance methods), and thus establishing an optimal and safe solution for each 
aircraft in the strategic and tactical timeframes. Three time horizons are defined, given 
the time before a predicted conflict or hazard. These include the Online Strategic                    
(OS – more than 20 minutes before the predicted conflict or hazard) and Online Tactical 
(OT – between 20 and 10 minutes look ahead) and emergency situations (less than 10 
minutes ahead). The introduction of Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance 
(SA&CA) functions within NG-FMS becomes especially significant in the emergency time 
horizon.  
Airspace constraints, flight path restrictions, and global optimisation criteria are shared 
by the 4-PNV system with the NG-FMS, which generate intents consisting of a number of 
flyable optimal trajectories. Figure 3.1 depicts the conceptual negotiation between the 
NG-FMS and the 4-PNV of a family of trajectory intents. 
Intent A
{traj. a1…an}
Traj. a2
optimal and 
conflict free
Confirm 
traj. a2
NG-ACS
NG-FMS
GROUND COMMUNICATION NETWORK - COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING (CDM)
II IIII
Intents B, C, D, E, F, G
{traj. b1…gn}
4-PNV + ATCO
ANSP AOC
NG-FMS
 
Figure 3.1. 4DT intent negotiation and validation. 
The key objectives of the NG-FMS/4-PNV trajectory negotiation and validation concepts 
are:  
 enhancing the performance of 4D trajectory optimisation process; 
 improving the human situational awareness without imposing excessive workload; 
 reducing air/ground 4D trajectory negotiation loops; 
 avoiding endless negotiation loops; 
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 avoiding unnecessary information exchange.   
The air-to-ground negotiation involves the process of receiving and validating the new 
set of 4DT intent from the 4-PNV system or sending the updated 4DT intent information to 
the 4-PNV system for validation. The air-to-air negotiation involves updating the aircraft 
state information and is specifically essential for updating information on any collision 
threats, if the aircraft have on board cooperative surveillance sensors. Introduction of 
new constraints or any updates triggers the NG-FMS/4-PNV system to initiate a strategic 
negotiation by up-linking new constraints. In case a negotiation is initiated by the 4-PNV 
system after onboard processing, the NG-FMS discovers performance or constraint 
violations (e.g., exceeding the aircraft performance characteristics), the NG-FMS 
downlinks a rejection message notifying that the aircraft is unable to satisfy the new 
constraints, together with a new intent for validation by the 4-PNV system. Specifically, in 
the tactical online context, either the NG-FMS or the 4-PNV system may initiate the intent 
negotiations, through the ATM system acts as a key decision maker. In general, the NG-
FMS would initiate the trajectory negotiations due to newly detected local weather 
changes, performance degradations, equipment failures or on-board emergency 
situations. Other manoeuvre-related factors such as inefficient heading changes, 
unachievable climb/descent rates and altitudes may also trigger negotiation loops. In 
the tactical online scenario, a single-loop negotiation is always sought, due to the 
reduced time and stringent traffic management requirements. Similarly, if a solution 
cannot be obtained through trajectory negotiation, then ATCo and pilots’ direct 
intervention will be considered. 
For example, consider a TMA case: when the aircraft is approaching its destination 
airport, the 4-PNV system might initiate a 4D trajectory intent negotiation process at 
specific predefined 4D waypoints. This 4D trajectory intent is then negotiated via data-
link between the 4-PNV system and the aircraft. The negotiation and validation process 
can be implemented by the following approaches: 
 A 3D flight plan can be agreed upon between the NG-FMS and 4-PNV system, 
considering all relevant constraints and approach procedures including Standard 
Terminal Arrival Route (STAR), GNSS curved approaches, ILS approaches, etc. at 
the destination airport. After the negotiation and validation process is complete 
for the 3D route, time can be introduced as a control variable in the NG-FMS 4D 
trajectory optimisation software, defining the ETA at the destination point and RTA 
at all the intermediate waypoints. Arrival management algorithms can then 
compute a controlled time of arrival within a specified window and ensure that 
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the aircraft is able to follow the validated 4D trajectory intent, thereby optimising 
the arrival sequence. The 4-PNV system, after coordination between the involved 
sectors, then sends the optimised intent to the  onboard NG-FMS system; 
 Instead of negotiating and validating a 3D flight plan and then negotiating a 4DT 
intent, these processes can involve a direct 4D trajectory intent negotiation and 
validation process during the trigger point. 
In the OS time horizon, the 4-PNV system acts as the main partner, since it captures an 
ever-updated global situational awareness, thanks to the ground network and the 
associated trajectory prediction algorithms. Uncertainties, such as long-term forecast 
weather phenomena, airport closures or sectors saturations trigger the 4-PNV system to 
initiate a strategic negotiation by uplinking new constraints to the NG-FMS. These 
constraints are used by the NG-FMS for on-board trajectory optimisation and 
negotiation/validation. If, after onboard evaluation, performances/constraint violations 
exist, the aircraft will downlink a rejection message together with a new intent to the 4-
PNV for validation. In the OT time horizon, either the NG-FMS or the 4-PNV may initiate 
trajectory negotiations.  The NG-FMS may initiate the trajectory negotiation due to freshly 
detected weather changes, performances degradation, equipment failures or on-board 
emergency situations. The fundamental objective of this is to compute an optimal 
trajectory addressing minimum fuel consumption, flight time, operative cost, noise 
impact and persistent contrail formation. Multiple negotiation loops will be allowed in 
the OS scenarios, as shown in Figure 3.2 but eventually prevented due to data-link 
bandwidth concerns.  In the OT time horizon, either the NG-FMS or the 4-PNV may initiate 
trajectory negotiations. The 4-PNV will act mainly as a key decision maker. The NG-FMS 
may initiate the trajectory negotiation due to newly detected weather changes, 
performances degradation, equipment failures or any on-board emergency situations. 
Other manoeuvre-related factors such as inefficient heading changes, and 
unachievable climb/descent rates and altitudes due to the actual aircraft weight may 
also be the cause of negotiation. In the OT scenario, a single-loop negotiation is always 
preferred and aimed for, due to the stringent time constraints. Similarly, if a solution 
cannot be obtained through trajectory negotiation, a direct intervention by the 
ATCo/pilot or both will be considered. Examples of the trajectory negotiation process are 
shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 (NG-FMS and 4-PNV system initiated respectively). 
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Figure 3.2. 4-PNV system initiated intent negotiation/validation loop. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. NG-FMS initiated intent negotiation/validation loop. 
The key long-term goals of ATM modernisation programmes include the integration of 
trajectory management processes in planning and execution [1, 3]. According to the 
SESAR concept of operations, these refer to the management, negotiation and sharing 
of the Shared Business Trajectory (SBT) as well as the management, updating, revision 
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and sharing of the Reference Business Trajectory (RBT), and finally the transition from the 
SBT to RBT (Figure 3.4).  
During the planning process the trajectory may undergo certain refinements which then 
lead to the RBT. For the flight execution the RBT is the reference. Upon deviation – 
intended or unintended – from the RBT, the Predicted Trajectory (PT) is calculated with 
the aim to return the aircraft to its RBT. 
This concept introduces the 4D Trajectory, which in SESAR is defined as ‘a set of 
consecutive segments linking waypoints and/or points computed by the airborne or by 
the ground systems to build a vertical profile and the lateral transitions; each point 
defined by a longitude, a latitude, a level and a time’. 
Shared Business Trajectory
Development Business Trajectory
Reference Business Trajectory
Formally 
Published
Planning 
Accomplished
Collaborative Decision Making
Internal Refinements
Airline Internal Planning
ATM System Level Planning
Execution
Comparison with Predicted/Nominal Trajectory
 
Figure 3.4. SESAR trajectory management concept. 
It is envisaged that the enhanced mission trajectory will be integrated into the TBO/IBO 
environment throughout all phases of trajectory planning and execution. The enhanced 
mission trajectory is subject to trajectory management processes and contains 4D 
targets and ATM constraints. The introduction of System Wide Information Management 
(SWIM) for air-to-ground, air-to-air and ground-to-ground information sharing supports 
ATM operational improvements and provides better situational awareness (including 
CDM) while airborne SA&CA systems supporting integration of UAS replicate the human 
ability to See-and-Avoid (S&A). It is been identified that UAS should have this capability, 
as it is one of the cornerstones of aviation, entitled ‘rules-of-the-air’, in which the pilot is 
ultimately responsible for the safety of the flight. Other aspects to be considered include 
avionics integration, CNS ground segment integration as well as test and evaluation 
algorithms [1]. 
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3.2 System Requirements and New Functions  
In addition to the navigation and guidance automated services, a NG-FMS offers a 
significant benefit by supporting 4-Dimensional trajectory planning, optimisation and re-
optimisation [4]. Furthermore, the introduction of SA&CA functions and CNS 
performance monitoring services are supported by the NG-FMS. In summary, the 
following novel functionalities are implemented in the NG-FMS: 
 navigation algorithms involving a number of multi-sensor data fusion techniques; 
 guidance computation (lateral and vertical guidance algorithms); 
 4D trajectory planning, generation and optimisation algorithms; 
 short-term and long-term performance computation algorithms; 
 advanced SA&CA algorithms; 
 CNS performance monitoring; 
 dual and single mode protocols in case of conventional two pilot aircraft; 
 single mode protocols for single pilot operations; 
 processing algorithms for navigation, performance, magnetic deviation, 
demographic and digital elevation terrain databases; 
 novel Human-Machine Interface and Interaction (HMI2) system protocols 
including adaptive forms. 
In addition to the traditional databases mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, weather, 
demographic distribution, digital terrain elevation, environmental and pilot modifiable 
databases are also introduced in the NG-FMS. The environmental performance of the 
NG-FMS requires additional data to be included in the existing databases or including a 
separate database exclusively for environmental functions. Noise abatement 
operational procedures in use today are: Noise abatement flight procedures including 
Continuous Descent Arrival (CDA), Noise Abatement Departure Procedures (NADP), 
modified approach angles, staggered, or displaced landing thresholds, low power/low 
drag approach profiles and minimum use of reverse thrust after landing. Other 
procedures include spatial management, including noise preferred arrival and 
departure routes and runways, flight track dispersion or concentration, as well as noise 
preferred runways for achieving benefits operationally and environmentally, and ground 
management. 
Multi-Criteria Departure Procedure (MCDP) enables trajectories to be optimised 
operationally and environmentally during the take-off and climb flight phases (Figure 
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3.5). The concept is based on NADP adopted from Procedures for Air Navigation 
Services/Operations ICAO document 8168 and is extended to emissions reduction [5].    
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Figure 3.5. Multi-criteria departure procedure. 
In addition to the conventional databases, the demographic distribution and digital 
terrain elevation databases are included for noise assessments. These allow the aircraft 
to reduce the take-off noise while taking into account actual aircraft parameters and 
ambient conditions. The 4DT optimisation algorithms for take-off and climb flight profiles 
ensure a combined optimization of noise and emissions while at the same time meeting 
the constraints of the planned mission including following the best Standard Instrument 
Departure (SID) from the available choices. For obtaining costs benefits in terms of fuel 
consumption and emission factors, the design is to achieve an optimum cruise level, but 
with a time varying cost function. These cost functions can be based on the priority 
levels agreed on a-priori basis by the CDM participants. An example of the performance 
weighting parameters used is listed in Table 3.1. Recently, multi-step algorithms are 
implemented in cruise phase that: i) “step to” a different cruise flight level at a fixed 
waypoint, ii) “step from” a fixed waypoint to another flight level and iii) “step level” at 
different cruise altitude. The current aircraft state vector, temperature and wind profile 
are considered for implementing the multi-step function. 
During cruise, the NG-FMS optimizes the set of vertical and lateral trajectories based on 
the aircraft performance and weather constraints (Figure 3.6). Path constraints are 
introduced in the optimisation loop as functions of either the system state or control 
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variables, and are defined to comply with the operational or safety procedures. These 
constraints include the No-Fly Zones (NFZ), weather cells and Persistent Contrail 
Formation Regions (PCFR). These constraints take into account traffic separation 
aspects, terrain obstacles, and weather hazards, as well as a primitive representation of 
noise-sensitive areas.  
Table 3.1. Performance weighting layout. 
Precedence 
Weightings 
                                       
I Kfuel   Ktime   KWC   Kcontrail   KCO    KHC   KSO    
II Kfuel 2 Ktime   KWC   Kcontrail   KCO    KHC   KSO     
III Kfuel   Ktime   KWC   Kcontrail   KCO    KHC   KSO    
IV Kfuel   Ktime   KWC   Kcontrail   KCO    KHC   KSO   4 
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Figure 3.6. Multi-criteria departure procedure. 
Fuel planning is indispensable to ensure safety and compliance to aeronautical rules. 
Fuel surveillance has always been part of pilot workload as performing a mission consists 
in making accommodations between safety, fuel savings and timing depending on the 
airline strategy. The strategies including cost index variation or speed changes to obtain 
a cruise speed that will permit the aircraft to perform arrival right on time, planning 
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around the optimum flight level, clearance at flight levels differing at a minimum value 
from the optimum flight level and “Direct TO” functionality use. The advantage of using 
“Direct TO” is the reduction of fuel consumption, along with a reduced flight time. In the 
descent and approach phase, enhancements such as the Continuous Descent 
Approach (CDA) concept are adopted even in dense traffic environments (Figure 3.7). 
The 4DT optimal descent profile is generated by the NG-FMS by considering speed, 
altitude and time constraints in the nominal path in addition to weather updates from 
the NG-ATM system. Since the optimum descents are based on idle thrust, they can 
differ from one aircraft to another; hence synchronization at the airport is essential to 
obtain the required fuel savings and environmental benefits. 
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Figure 3.7. Continuous descent approach procedure. 
The NG-ATM system receives multiple options of 4DT intents from each aircraft equipped 
with NG-FMS. These 4DT intents will be based on performance weighting that are 
collaboratively agreed upon and are targeting the global optimisation criteria. The 
system validates, through real-time negotiation with the aircraft, the trajectory intents 
and resolve traffic conflicts (implementing adequate separation and avoidance 
methods), thus establishing an optimal and safe solution for each aircraft. NG-FMS 
generates intents consisting of a number of flyable optimal trajectories (in order of 
priority). The 4DT intents are updated on a timely basis, as well as when there are 
changes. The intents contain information about the complete trajectory of the aircraft, 
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until it reaches its destination. The intent data includes all the waypoints (lateral and 
vertical), leg and turn information [6]. 
In 4D TBO, time is introduced as one of the variables that can be controlled during all 
flight phases. In initial TBO implementation, the RTA concept is introduced, which mostly 
involves variation of speed in the lateral profile. The cruise altitude is fixed for an idle-
thrust performance path in most cases to achieve an efficient variation of the ETA at the 
WPTs along the trajectory. Awareness of winds and meteorological data can be used for 
all relevant timeframes (strategic, tactical and emergency). The weather and 
temperature data for the entire flight plan is obtained from the AOC and is updated at 
regular intervals with the information obtained from the ground systems or other aircraft 
via the data link.  The 4DT optimisation problem includes a number of environmental 
objectives and operational constraints, also accounting for economic and operational 
performances, as well as weather forecast information from various external sources. 
Reduction of fuel consumption begins early in the process with route planning and the 
filing of the flight plan. Companies have tools to optimise flight plan depending on the 
predicted meteorological conditions, aircraft performances and available routes. The 
flight plans provided by operations centres can include steps meant to remain close to 
the computed optimum flight level. But these steps become geographical steps when 
they are uploaded into the FMS before departure, and pilots generally clear them at the 
beginning of cruise to update them as optimum steps using updated aircraft state.  
These various methods are very efficient to saving time and fuel, but they have to face 
operational limitations, which need to be taken into account: 
 flight envelope boundaries; 
 ATC clearance; 
 flight level availability; 
 traffic capacity of geographical zone. 
It is highly desirable to set up optimum flight levels or use DIRECT TO for achieving the RTA 
at the end of each flight phase and the ETA at the planned destination. Efficient 
trajectories, based on more precise, reliable and predictable three dimensional flight 
path will be optimized for minimum noise impact and low emissions and include agile 
trajectory management, in response to meteorological hazard.  
The sensing of atmospheric perturbations and atmospheric humidity is based on the 
characterization and surveillance of the environment. It is achieved by the employment 
of improved weather radar algorithms. These methods improve on board detection 
accuracy for potentially hazardous weather conditions. 
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3.3 NG-FMS Architecture  
The NG-FMS software is based on multi-objective and multi-model 4DT optimisation 
algorithms for strategic, tactical and emergency scenarios. The NG-FMS not also 
considers large fixed-wing UAS (likely be able to use a substantial part of the NG-FMS 
design given that they will operate in the NAS with other commercial transport aircraft), 
but also non-traditional designs (VTOL, hybrid configurations such as tilt rotor, etc.) and 
small UAS that are expected to be increasingly autonomous for safety as well as 
efficiency reasons. The NG-FMS have broad applicability to UAS and emerging on-
demand aviation operations and applications. The implications of older general aviation 
aircraft are also considered. The transition time from equipping all aircraft with NG-FMS is 
also crucial, during which the general aviation will still be in service without undergoing a 
retrofit of existing avionics or upgrading of new avionics systems (NG-FMS). Information 
exchange is supported by NG-ACS as shown in Figure 3.8. Emergency scenarios involve 
avoidance of other traffic and obstacles with data obtained from multi-sensor data 
fusion algorithms. Prevention of collisions takes into account weather and airspace 
sector information in addition to tactical intervention and emergency avoidance tasks.  
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Figure 3.8. NG-FMS and NG-ATM system interactions. 
The key NG-FMS software modules are: 
 4D trajectory planning and optimisation: to perform 4D trajectory planning and 
optimisation functions for strategic (offline and online), tactical (offline and 
online) and emergency tasks. The 4DT optimiser includes a model and constraint 
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suite. A number of performance criteria and cost functions are used for 
optimisation, including minimisation of fuel consumption, flight time, operative 
cost, noise impact, emissions and contrails. The databases include navigation, 
performance, magnetic deviation and environmental databases; 
 4D trajectory monitoring: to perform state estimation, calculating the deviations 
between the 4D trajectory intents and the estimated/predicted aircraft states; 
 Path correction: to correct for any deviations in terms of lateral, vertical and time 
profiles (required and estimated time of arrival). The generated steering 
commands are provided to the automatic flight control system; 
 Trajectory negotiation and validation: to carry out the process of negotiation that 
can be initiated by the pilot via the NG-FMS, making use of the information 
available on board, or by the air traffic controller via the 4-PNV system. The 
negotiation and validation of 4DT intents by the NG-FMS/4-PNV system is 
dependent on [10, 11]:  
 on-board validation based on synchronization, sufficient fuel, compliance 
with dynamics (time performances, turn performances, speed, altitude), 
obstacle separation, locally sensed weather, and compliance with health 
monitoring status; 
 ground-based validation based on air traffic separation (lateral, vertical, 
longitudinal), sector occupancy, airspace restrictions (special use areas) 
and time based restrictions (night time noise abatement procedures). 
 NG-FMS performance manager: to monitor the active 4D trajectory intents for 
errors and addresses the full set of CNS performance requirements throughout the 
different phases of 4DT intent negotiation and validation; 
 NG-FMS integrity manager: to generate integrity C/N/S caution (predictive) and 
warning (reactive) flags based on inputs from different sensors/systems and 
predefined decision logics (Figure 3.9). For instance, the main causes of GNSS 
signal degradations in flight, namely  antenna obscuration, multipath, fading due 
to adverse geometry and Doppler shift are identified and modelled to implement 
integrity thresholds and guidance algorithms in the Avionics-Based Integrity 
Augmentation (ABIA) system [7, 8]. 
The RNP, RCP and RSP integrity performance management modules provide information 
to the integrity management software modules that are used, in turn, to generate 
usable, timely and valid caution and warning alerts. Figure 3.10 shows a schematic of 
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the NG-FMS architecture. Airline, airspace, aircraft performance (derived from the 
performance database) and ATM operational constraints are taken into account in the 
trajectory prediction and performance optimisation tasks. Each aircraft equipped with 
NG-FMS generates 4DT intents. 4DT intents are defined according to the Flight 
Management Computer (FMC) ARINC 702A-3 characteristic as a string of 4D points that 
define the predicted trajectory of the aircraft along with the point type and turn radius 
associated with the flight path transition [9, 10]. Intent data are updated in situations 
such as a change in the nominal flight path, or the addition of new sequencing points 
and weather data. The trajectory computation and optimisation component of the NG-
FMS is reconfigurable with that of the ground-based counterpart to enable negotiation 
and validation updates in real-time (Figure 3.11). 
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Figure 3.9. NG-FMS integrity monitor. 
Additionally, the intents are recomputed according to flight plan revisions, weather 
updates, guidance mode modification, cost index modification and corrections for 
position uncertainties in real-time based on the 4D trajectory optimisation algorithms 
described earlier. The efficiency and effectiveness of 4DT planning, negotiation and 
validation functionalities of the NG-FMS are directly driven by the nature of information 
sharing. Subject to various in-flight changes, trajectory calculations are refreshed to 
maintain consistency and downlinked to the 4-PNV system via the NG-ACS. 
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Figure 3.10. NG-FMS overall architecture. 
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Figure 3.11. NG-FMS 4DT planner and optimiser. 
With the increasing levels of on-board automation, integrity monitoring and 
augmentation systems have occupied a fundamental role. Errors affecting the CNS+A 
systems (e.g., pseudo-range GNSS observables) are taken into account in evaluating the 
CNS performance. As illustrated in Figure 3.12, the performance manager module 
provides inputs to the Integrity Flag Generator (IFG) based on the errors affecting the 
CNS systems.  
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Figure 3.12. NG-FMS integrity flag generation. 
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The IFG uses a set of predefined Caution and Warning Integrity Flag (CIF/WIF) threshold 
parameters to trigger the generation of both caution and warning flags associated with 
CNS performance degradations. In case a warning flag is generated, a recapture 
command is used to trigger the 4DT regeneration and optimisation process. 
Figure 3.13 is a schematic block diagram of the NG-FMS performance management 
modules. The performance management tasks are defined for all CNS+A parameters. 
These modules receive data from the 4DT planner/optimiser module.  
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Figure 3.13. NG-FMS performance management. 
The RNP, RSP and RCP integrity performance management modules provide data to the 
integrity management blocks that in turn generate CIF/WIF. The CNS+A performance 
management blocks are interfaced with the NG-ATM system. 
The optimisation of 4DT trajectories is performed on-board by the NG-FMS. A number of 
manned and unmanned aircraft equipped with NG-FMS can be controlled by the 
ground command, control and intelligence system aided by LOS and BLoS 
communication links. HMI2 for the pilot and UAS remote pilot are equipped with 
navigation, tactical, health management and engine management displays. The 
ground inter-communication system consists of a ground-to-ground communication 
network. Figure 3.13 is a schematic block diagram of the CNS+A systems including NG-
FMS, NG-ATM and NG-ACS. In Figure 3.14, airborne systems (coloured) and subsystems 
(white) are represented by rectangular blocks, while ground-based systems are 
represented by hexagonal blocks. 
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Since the early UAS adoption stages, military operators have overcome most issues 
successfully by opportune implementations of airspace segregation. In particular, the 
combined operations of military UAS and manned aerial and terrestrial vehicles have 
been typically designed to minimise the reciprocal threats and introduce adequate 
safety margins. A similar approach has been pursued in the civil jurisdiction whenever 
commercial and recreational UAS operators have been granted access to limited 
portions of the airspace, where conventional manned aircraft operations are denied, 
such as in proximity to the ground. In these cases, the risk of Mid Air Collisions (MAC) 
between manned aircraft and UAS is effectively removed thanks to the reciprocal 
segregation in place. The introduction of a new regulatory framework and CNS+A 
decision support systems for TBO involve several important research activities including 
the development of 4DT algorithms for conflict-detection, planning, negotiation and 
validation that enable unrestricted access of UAS to all classes of airspace. The 
increasing adoption of UAS poses technological and regulatory challenges, which have 
hindered a quickly growing number of UAS operators, national regulators, and 
international aviation organisations.  
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Figure 3.14. CNS+A systems.  
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A progressive integration of UAS by means of a gradual exploitation of the conventional 
civil airspace structure and regulations has been considered. In particular, the safety of 
manned aircraft would be substantially unaffected if UAS were to be granted access to 
regions where conventional aircraft operations are very sparse. From this perspective, an 
integration of UAS starting from less restrictive classes of airspace is traditionally favoured. 
This would decrease requirements in terms of CNS and Avionics (CNS+A) equipment, 
and require limited compliance to ATM clearances. The less demanding requirements, 
especially in classes “F” and “G”, are certainly valued from the UAS perspective, as UAS 
reliability is still far from the levels offered by manned aircraft. Nevertheless, separation in 
these airspace regions is the responsibility of the pilots and based on visual detection 
and deliberate execution of avoidance manoeuvres according to the rules of the air. 
These aspects involve substantially higher technological challenges for UAS developers, 
as separation relies uniquely upon on board SA&CA and decision-making processes, 
hence higher levels of on board autonomy are required to mitigate the risks arising in 
connection to possible failures to the Command and Control (C2) loop involving the 
ground pilot. 
3.4 NG-FMS Algorithms  
The motion of an aircraft can be expressed in terms of a set of equations, representing 
the translational and angular accelerations. Applying Newton’s second law to the 
aircraft (which is considered to be a rigid body), the following equations are obtained: 
    
  
  
      ⃗⃗⃗⃗                                                         (3.1) 
 ⃗⃗   
  
  
   ⃗                                                            (3.2) 
where:  
   is the sum of all the applied forces; 
 ⃗⃗  is the sum of applied torques; 
 ⃗  is the angular momentum; 
  is the mass of the aircraft; 
   ⃗⃗⃗⃗  is the total velocity vector. 
 
The sum of external forces can be subdivided into: aerodynamic forces, gravitational 
force and propulsive force. The forces and moments about the six degrees of freedom, 
ore expressed as: 
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where  ⃗ ,   ,  ⃗⃗  are the linear velocities along the  ,   and  -axis respectively;    ⃗⃗  ⃗   ⃗⃗  ⃗   ⃗⃗  ⃗ 
are the forces acting on the aircraft along the three axes; and   ⃗⃗⃗⃗    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗     ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗ are the 
components of angular momentum along the three axes. The effect of angular 
velocities on linear velocities can be easily analysed. For example, considering the axial 
velocity   ̇, the pitch rate   increases the velocity by a factor   , but the yaw rate   
reduces it by a factor   . The equations for the linear velocities are given by [11]: 
  ̇                                                             (3.9) 
  ̇                                                            (3.10) 
  ̇                                                          (3.11) 
where  ,   and    are the rates in linear velocities and   is the roll rate. The above 
equations are differentiated to obtain: 
  ̈     ̇     ̇    ̇     ̇     ̇                                     (3.12) 
  ̈    ̇    ̇    ̇        ̇̇                                       (3.13) 
  ̈    ̇     ̇     ̇    ̇     ̇                                     (3.14) 
Substituting for   ̈   ̈ and   ̈ in the above equations, the below expressions are obtained: 
  ̈     ̇                          ̇   ̇                  (3.15) 
  ̈   ̇                         ̇   ̇                    (3.16) 
  ̈    ̇                         ̇   ̇                   (3.17) 
The forces acting on the element of mass are given by: 
  ⃗⃗  ⃗     ̈                                                        (3.18) 
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  ⃗⃗  ⃗     ̈                                                         (3.19) 
  ⃗⃗  ⃗     ̈                                                         (3.20) 
The inertia moments acting on the mass element are given by:  
      ⃗⃗  ⃗    ⃗⃗  ⃗                                                   (3.21) 
      ⃗⃗  ⃗    ⃗⃗  ⃗                                                   (3.22) 
      ⃗⃗  ⃗    ⃗⃗  ⃗                                                   (3.23) 
The forces and moments acting on the aircraft can be calculated by summing the 
above equations over the complete aircraft mass. Assuming that the centre of gravity of 
the aircraft coincides with the origin of the chosen axis system, the terms containing 
      and    in the above equations can be ignored, since their summation over the 
entire aircraft yields zero.  Therefore, the force equations are expressed as: 
  ⃗⃗  ⃗     ̈   ( ̇       )                                   (3.24) 
  ⃗⃗  ⃗     ̈   ( ̇       )                                   (3.25) 
  ⃗⃗  ⃗     ̈   ( ̇       )                                    (3.26) 
Similarly, the moments are expressed as: 
       ̇    (       )     ( ̇    )                           (3.27) 
       ̇     (       )     ( 
    )                         (3.28) 
       ̇     (       )     ( ̇    )                          (3.29) 
where               and     are the moments of inertia and are given by: 
     ∑   ( 
     )                                            (3.30) 
     ∑   ( 
     )                                            (3.31) 
     ∑   ( 
     )                                            (3.32) 
     ∑                                                       (3.33) 
The state-of-the-art FMS employ a 3-Degrees-of-Freedom (3-DoF) model for generating 
3D trajectories. NG-FMS generates 4DT intents composed by groups of single trajectories 
t belonging to the global set T. A number of algorithms have been adopted for 
trajectory generation and avoidance manoeuvres [12 - 15]. The consecutive TCPs are 
defined with respect to the previous waypoints by conditional probability and generate 
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fly-by and fly-over waypoints for each flight segment up to the destination. The NG-FMS 
trajectory optimisation algorithms are based on a 3-Degrees-of-Freedom (3-DoF) or 6-
Degrees-of-Freedom (6-DoF) Aircraft Dynamics Model (ADM) with variable mass. The 3-
DoF Equations of Motion (EoM) describing the aircraft states and governing the 
translational movements along the longitudinal, lateral and vertical axes are: 
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The above Differential Algebraic Equations (DAEs) incorporate three control variables 
    (       ) where   is the engine power setting,   is the load factor and   is the bank 
angle. The seven state variables are     (         h         )  where   is the aircraft 
(variable) mass,   is the geodetic latitude,   is the geodetic longitude,   is the altitude,   
is the true air speed,   is the flight path angle,   is the heading.     is the meridional 
radius of curvature,  T is the transverse radius of curvature, W is the wind velocity, T is the 
thrust, D is the drag and   is the nominal acceleration due to gravity of the Earth. This 
model assumes a rigid body aircraft with a vertical plane of symmetry, nil wing bending 
effect, a rigidly mounted aircraft engine on the vehicle body, zero thrust angle, 
negligible moments of inertia, varying mass only as a result of fuel consumption and 
uniform gravity. Wind effects are considered along the three geodetic reference axes. 
Earth’s shape is approximated as an ellipsoid using the World Geodetic System of year 
1984 (WGS 84) parameters. The lateral path is constructed in terms of segments (straight 
and turns) and is based on the required course change and the aircraft predicted 
ground speed during the turn. The specificity of the trajectory optimisation and optimal 
Ph.D. Thesis - Next Generation Flight Management Systems for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Operations                
- Automated Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance Functionalities  
133 
 
control with respect to other mathematical optimisation branches is the application to 
dynamical systems. Therefore, a key component in the optimisation formulation is the set 
of dynamic constraints, which are meant to reproduce the feasible motion of the system 
within the optimisation problem [16]. A system of DAEs, consisting of the time derivatives 
of the state variables, is usually adopted to introduce the system dynamics, and the 
dynamic constraints are therefore written as: 
 ̇( )   [ ( )  ( )                                                  (3.42) 
where   is a set of system elements. All non-differential constraints imposed on the system 
between the initial and final conditions are classified as path constraints, as they restrict 
the path, i.e. the space of states and controls of the dynamical system. In order to 
represent all possible non-differential restrictions on the vehicle motion, two types of 
algebraic path constraints are considered: inequality constraints and equality 
constraints. A generalised expression of an inequality constraint is [16]: 
  ( ( )  ( )    )                                                  (3.43) 
whereas an equality constraint can be written as: 
  ( ( )  ( )    )                                                 (3.44) 
Boundary conditions define the values that state and control variables of the dynamical 
system shall have at the initial and final times. Since in some instances the boundary 
conditions are not always restricted to definite values, it is useful to adopt a generalised 
expression including relaxed conditions. The boundary conditions are expressed as [16]: 
      [ (  )  (  )  (  )  (  )                                (3.45) 
where     is the initial time and    is the final time in the time domain. In order to optimise 
a given performance, it is necessary to introduce a scalar index: the performance index, 
which by means of a suitably defined cost function quantifies the achievement of that 
particular objective [16]. The optimal control problem can be tackled using direct and 
indirect methods. Global collocation methods, which are aimed at obtaining a direct 
solution of the optimal control problem, is attempted by enforcing the evaluation of the 
state and control vectors in discrete collocation points across the entire problem 
domain. Out of several global collocation methods, pseudospectral methods are 
considered as one of the most computationally effective technique available for the 
direct solution of large non-linear aircraft trajectory optimisation problems. They are 
based on a global collocation of orthogonal (spectral) interpolating functions.  
Uncertainties in input data, estimation models and in the trajectory propagation over 
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time make some key assumptions void. Hence pseudo-optimal solutions are adopted for 
generating 4D trajectory intents. The optimisation process is translated into the 
mathematical minimisation (or maximisation) of such a performance index. The 
optimisation problem consists of determining the controls u(t) and states x(t) that 
minimize a performance index,   given by the sum of Mayer ( ) and Lagrange ( ) terms 
as follows:  
   [ (  )  (  )  ]  ∫  
  
  
[ ( )  ( )                                   (3.46) 
The optimisation is classified as single-objective when an individual performance index J 
is introduced and multi-objective when two or multiple performance indexes Ji are 
defined. The NG-FMS receives the controlled time of arrival target defined by the 4-PNV 
system, which becomes the RTA to be used by the NG-FMS in determining the optimal 
trajectory states (final time). In general, NG-FMS software for all flight phases allow 
incorporation of a cost index based on a manually entered CAS/Mach or a combined 
pair. The cost index set by the mission operators is processed by the NG-FMS to set the 
gain matrix weight, time, fuel, emissions, noise and other costs. The time cost,  ti e is 
given by:   
 ti e   ttf                                                          (3.47) 
Fuel consumption optimisation is achieved by minimising the difference between the 
aircraft initial and final mass: 
 f e     (tf)-  (t )                                                  (3.48) 
In terms of aircraft emissions, although engine design and other factors play an influence 
on the total amount of emission release, engine emission is generally considered as a 
function of fuel burn, multiplied by a direct emission factor,  . Hence, the mathematical 
description of the emission rate,  e ission  defined with respect to emissions, e and time, t is 
given by: 
 e ission   ∫
 e
 t
    (tf) -  t  
tf
t 
                                    (3.49) 
This function is based on modelling the dependence of   on the engine power setting 
for turbofan engines. The navigation costs, J  is given by: 
     ∑ (
 
   √
    
       
 
    
      
                                     (3.50) 
where MTOM is the Maximum Take-Off Mass, DIS is the horizontal separation between 
aircraft and intruder,        depends on the country of implementation and URCH is the 
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Unitary Rate Charges for air traffic services. These charges were first established by 
EUROCONTROL for European countries. In order to implement the noise model, 
demographic distribution and digital terrain elevation data are considered. The terrain 
proximity cost,     is obtained as a trade-off between an early turn take-off, low path 
angle climb, low clearance margin from obstacles output and a very steep climb, long 
straight departure and increased obstacle clearance margin solution [19]. The numerical 
solution of the trajectory optimisation problem is performed by primarily combining the 
multiple objectives by means of weighted sum, and subsequently solving the combined 
optimisation problem by means of pseudospectral transcription into a constrained multi-
phase Non-Linear Programming (NLP) problem [16]. Other methods such as Mixed 
Integer Linear Programming (MILP) can be implemented to overcome the 
computational complexity of the NLP problem. 
3.5 System State Error Analysis  
The lateral path is constructed in terms of segments (straight and turns) and is based on 
the required course change and the aircraft predicted ground speed during the turn. A 
turn is constructed based on the maximum ground speed during a course change and 
the turn radius is given by: 
    
   
      ( )
                                                      (3.51)  
where    is the maximum ground speed during the turn. The turn arc length is given by: 
                                                              (3.52)  
Given the   , the bank angle is calculated from: 
          (
   
      
)                                               (3.53)  
The NG-FMS computes turn altitude and speed based on the selected altitude by taking 
into account the predicted wind at that altitude. The bank angle is determined based 
on aircraft dynamics and airspace configurations. In order to construct the vertical 
profile, a number of energy balance equations are typically adopted leading to 
nominal climb/descent, fixed gradients climb/descent, intermediate speed changes 
and level flight configurations. The integration steps are constrained by the mission 
profile imposed altitude, speed and time restrictions as well as performance limitations 
such as speed and buffet limits, maximum altitude and thrust limits. The data that drives 
the energy balance equations come from the airframe/engine dependent thrust, fuel 
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flow, drag and air speed schedule models stored in the PERFDB. The vertical profile is 
obtained from the energy method given by: 
  
  
  
(   )  
   (   
  
 
 
   
  
)
                                                  (3.54)  
where    is the true air speed and    is the gross weight. Designing a lateral track 
control strategy, especially for UAS is very complex. A viable control strategy is based on 
the relation [17]: 
      ̇
        
  
      ̇
      
                                                      (3.55) 
where        and        are the current track position of the aircraft with respect to a TCP. 
The along-track and cross-track velocities are obtained from the airspeed and wind 
speed velocity vectors. The condition to satisfy the control strategy is given by: 
      = (               ̇ )-(             ̇ )                         (3.56) 
A number of controllers can be implemented to complete the GNC loop including those 
that have been employed with reliability for a long period (Proportional-Integral-
Derivative (PID) and others) as well as emerging artificial intelligence tools (neural 
network, fuzzy expert system, etc.). In order to study the effects of uncertainties on the 
generated 4DT, a detailed error analysis is performed. The errors might be due to 
database accuracy degradations, system modelling errors, atmospheric disturbances 
and subsystem errors. The system states are modified with the addition of the stochastic 
term,  ( ) and are represented by: 
 ̇( )   [ ( )  ( )  ( )                                             (3.57) 
In order to perform a sensitivity analysis, the sensitivity of a trajectory attribute, J, 
including consumption of fuel, noise, emissions, etc. is considered with respect to a 
model parameter, Δ and is given by: 
                                                             (3.58) 
The open loop sensitivity of J is given by: 
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                                          (3.59) 
The closed loop sensitivity of J is given by: 
  
     
 
   (     )    (  ) 
  
                                          (3.60) 
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The values of     and     are optimised based on the 4DT optimisation algorithm 
adopted in the NG-FMS. Each performance index provides a quantitative measure of 
the attainment of a specific objective and different objectives are typically conflicting.  
Thus, the optimisation in terms of two or more objectives typically leads to a number of 
possible solutions, which are still optimal in a mathematical sense (pareto-optimality). 
Therefore, a trade-off analysis based on specific performance weightings is required for 
the operational implementation of multi-objective 4DT optimisation techniques. In the 
aviation domain, single and bi-objective optimisation techniques have been exploited 
for decades, but they accounted only for flight time-related costs and fuel-related costs. 
These techniques have also been implemented in a number of current generation FMS 
in terms of the CI, which is a scalar value to balance the relative weighting of fuel and 
time costs. In the NG-FMS, the weightings are varied dynamically among the different 
flight phases of the flight. The uncertainties associated with the position, velocity and 
attitudes of the aircraft depend on the uncertainty of navigation data propagated 
through the ADM. Since the ADM equations are non-linear functions of the navigation 
variables, a suitable linearization shall be introduced and this can be conveniently 
performed by a second-order Taylor series expansion, wherein   signifies sine and   
signifies cosine of an angle: 
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where Tnorm is the axial thrust. The resulting uncertainties in aircraft position and 
kinematics are conveniently described by the associated uncertainty volumes. For 
cooperative and non-cooperative obstacle avoidance and safe-separation 
maintenance, the overall uncertainty volumes are obtained by combining the 
navigation error with the tracking error and then translating them to unified uncertainty 
volumes, which are discussed in the next chapter.  
3.6 CNS Performance   
The CNS+A concepts enable more accurate estimation of CNS performance and 
involve higher levels of automation. Modern avionics and ground-based systems for 
planning and near real-time execution of Four Dimensional Trajectory (4DT) 
functionalities, including multi-objective 4DT optimisation, negotiation and validation in 
the TBO/IBO context are currently under development. CNS+A systems with integrity 
monitoring and augmentation functionalities fulfilling RCP, RNP and RSP, and thus 
meeting the RTSP levels are envisaged. The automated systems allow the aircraft 
equipped with novel avionic systems to fly user-preferred optimal flight paths and thus 
they limit the intervention of the air traffic controllers to high-level and emergency 
decision making. Figure 3.15 illustrates the RTSP factors and the associated timeframes.  
Prevention (RNP, RCP and RSP)
Pilot, Controller, Sensors, Multi-sensor Data Fusion, NG-ACS, Pre-tactical 4DT Intent, 
Weather Information, ATFM and DAM
Tactical Intervention (RSP and RCP)
Pilot, Controller, Sensors, Multi-sensor Data Fusion,   
NG-ACS and Tactical 4DT Intent
Emergency Avoidance (RSP)
Controller, Pilot, Sensors and 
Multi-sensor Data Fusion
t = 0 s
 
Figure 3.15. RTSP elements and time frames. 
The emergency avoidance of natural and man-made obstacles involves the human 
pilot and controller along with data obtained from adopting multi-sensor data fusion 
algorithms. Tactical intervention also involves the NG-ACS and tactical 4DT intents. 
Prevention of collisions takes into account weather and airspace sector information in 
addition to tactical intervention and emergency avoidance tasks.Several architectures, 
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interfaces, communication protocols, data elements and message formats for operation 
of RPAS are defined in the NATO Standardisation Agreement (STANAG) 4586. Modelling 
the navigation, communication and surveillance errors as white Gaussian noise, the 
associated probability density functions are: 
     ( )  
 
√      
 
 
  
     
 
                                          (3.67) 
where      represents the standard deviation values resulting from errors in 
communication, navigation and surveillance data (                ) respectively. 
3.7 NG-FMS Case Studies 
To illustrate the capability of NG-FMS algorithms to generate and optimise 4DT intents, 
the typical tasks performed by the NG-FMS were simulated. Both manned and 
unmanned aircraft platforms were used for the case studies including Airbus A380 and 
AEROSONDETM UAS. 
3.7.1 Platforms 
The Airbus A380 is a double-deck, wide-body, four-engine, long-range jet airliner 
manufactured by Airbus. The A380’s belongs to the fly-by-wire jetliner family and has an 
advanced cockpit, including larger interactive displays, and an advanced flight 
management system with improved navigation modes. Figure 3.16 shows the dimensions 
of A380 while Table 3.2 provides the aircraft specifications. 
 
 
Figure 3.16. Airbus A380 [18]. 
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The Airbus A320 belongs to the single-aisle jetliner family, which is composed of the A318, 
A319, A320 and A321 and variants from Boeing and other aircraft manufacturers. The 
introduction of sharklets (2.4-meter-tall wing tip devices) provides operators with the 
flexibility of either adding an additional 100 NM range or increased payload capability 
of up to 450 kg. Figure 3.17 shows the dimensions of A320 while Table 3.3 provides the 
aircraft specifications. 
 
Figure 3.17. Airbus A320 [18]. 
Table 3.2. Airbus A380 specifications [18]. 
Specification Value 
Overall length  72.72 m 
Fuselage width 7.14 m 
Wing span (geometric)  79.75 m 
Range 15,200 km 
Max take-off weight 575 tonnes 
Max landing weight 394 tonnes 
Max fuel capacity 320,000 litres 
Cruise speed Mach 0.85 
 
Figure 3.18 and Table 3.4 show the specifications of AEROSONDETM UAS. Table 3.5 
provides the aerodynamic parameters used in the dynamics model of AEROSONDETM 
UAS. The AEROSONDETM is a small robotic aircraft, which provides a new capability for 
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improving the space / time resolution of observations of the ice/ocean surface. The 
AEROSONDETM has a wing span of 9 m and weighs approximately 15 kg. The small size of 
the AEROSONDETM allows it to be extremely fuel efficient so that flight durations can 
easily exceed 20 hours. Iridium satellite communications are vital to successfully 
exploiting the long range/long endurance capabilities of the AEROSONDETM aircraft 
(nearly 3000 km). It has an altitude range of between 100 and 7000 m. 
Table 3.3. Airbus A320 specifications [18]. 
Specification Value 
Overall length  37.57 m 
Fuselage width 3.95 m 
Wing span (geometric)  35.80 m (with sharklets) 
Range 6,100 km 
Max take-off weight 73.5 tonnes 
Max landing weight 64.5 tonnes 
Max fuel capacity 24,210 litres 
Cruise speed Mach 0.84 
 
Figure 3.18. AEROSONDETM UAS [19]. 
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Table 3.4. AEROSNDETM UAS specifications. 
Specification Value 
Features 
Auto launch and auto recover; Car Launch / Rail Launch 
flexibility; Multiple energy reduction landing system 
Endurance 10 hours with surveillance payload 
Wing span 3.6 metres 
Maximum Take-Off 
Weight (MTOW) 
17.5 kg with J-type engine and 25kg with K-type engine 
Cruise Speed 50-60 Knots 
Dash Speed 62-80 Knots at sea Level 
Ceiling 4500m 
Weight 7.5 – 10 pounds 
J-Type Engine Four-stroke 24cc. Electronic Fuel Injection (EFI) 
K-Type Engine Twin dual cylinder, four stroke, EFI 
Fuel 93 Premium Octane/100 low-lead aviation gas 
 
3.7.2 Long-haul Flight 
A simulation case was performed with an aircraft taking off at London Heathrow airport 
{N 51o 28’ 39”, W 0o 27’ 41”} and landing at Singapore Changi airport {N 01o 21’ 33.16”, 
E 103o 59’ 21.57”}. The aircraft parameters and aerodynamic data were extracted from 
the EUROCONTROL Base of Aircraft Data (BADA). Objectives such as fuel consumption, 
time and path constraints are considered via an appropriate set of performance 
weightings obtained as a result of the CDM process. Depending on the cost functions 
and gains selected (i.e., minimum time, fuel and other environmental costs such as 
gaseous emissions of CO2, NOx, etc.), there are different trajectory possibilities for all the 
flight segments. Figure 3.19 illustrates the different trajectories generated, each resulting 
from a different cost function on time and fuel minimisation. In this case, considering the 
climb phase separately, the maximum CO2 and NOx reductions are 281.7 kg and 1.5 kg 
respectively. The trajectory corresponding to minimum fuel burn provides 90 kg fuel 
savings when compared to the minimum time optimisation case.  
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Table 3.5. AEROSONDETM UAS ADM parameters and derivatives [19]. 
Zero angle of attack lift 
derivative 
    0.23 
Sideslip roll control 
derivative 
           
Lift angle of attack 
derivative 
   ̇      
Sideslip yaw control 
derivative 
          
Mach number 
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Figure 3.19. 4D trajectories. 
Simulation case studies were carried out to corroborate the validity of the NG-FMS 
algorithms to generate and optimise 4D trajectory intents. Intents were generated by the 
NG-FMS and their optimisations were accomplished with respect to primarily time and 
fuel costs. Noise Sensitive Areas (NSA) were considered  as path constraints in the climb 
phase (in the proximity of the airport) and weather cells were taken into account in the 
cruise phase. A non-rotating spherical Earth model was employed in the simulation case 
studies. Pseudospectral and weighted sum methods were adopted to carry out near 
real-time multi-objective deterministic 4DT optimisation. A typically loaded Airbus A380 
aircraft with MTOW of 400,000 kg was assumed to be flying the mission. The aircraft 
parameters and aerodynamic data were extracted from the EUROCONTROL’s BADA. 
The simulations were executed on a Windows 7 Professional workstation (64-bit OS) 
supported by an Intel Core i7-4510 CPU with clock speed 2.6 GHz and 8.0 GB RAM. The 
flight plan was designed for the aircraft to take-off from London Heathrow airport (ICAO 
code: EGLL) and  flying towards AMRAL waypoint, located in the United Kingdom and 
then climbing up to the planned cruise flight level 330 (33,000 feet). Two avoidance 
regions were introduced as path constraints in the simulation case study. Figure 3.20 
shows a 3D view of the 4D trajectory intents generated, each resulting from a different 
cost function for time and fuel minimisation. In order to account for environmental 
objectives, numerical data for time, fuel burn and associated emissions were analysed. 
The time, fuel burn and emissions (CO2 and NOx) change, as a result of trajectory 
variations (due to varying cost index). This indicates that for every kilogram of aviation 
fuel burned, 3.13 kg of CO2 and 0.014 kg of NOx (as the average of NOx emission below 
and above FL 330) are generated. 
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Figure 3.20. Climb Phase 4D Trajectory Intents. 
In the cruise phase, two weather cells were considered and the 4D trajectory intents 
were able to avoid those areas as illustrated in Figure 3.21. The results demonstrate that 
the optimisation algorithms are able to cope with avoidance volumes as part of the cost 
function (numerically and analytically). The trajectory intents were optimised with 
contrails and weather cells as path constraints, and are generated within 10 seconds in 
the implemented hardware platform.  
 
Figure 3.21. Cruise Phase 4D Trajectory Intents. 
In this case, the trajectory with minimum fuel burn consumes 700 kg fuel less than that of 
the trajectory for minimum time. The optimisation of the active 4D trajectory took 15 
seconds while the NSA avoidance trajectory required an additional 10 seconds for 
optimisation. Time taken in emergency scenarios such as the implementation of near 
real-time SA&CA functions are also well within the time frame for avoiding collisions. 
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During the descent and arrival phases, the aircraft proceeds from the top of descent 
point to Singapore Changi airport (ICAO code: WSSS). In the absence of suitable NG-
FMS autopilot loops, the trajectory affected by wind / turbulence does not exceed the 
RNP containment boundaries. However, the NG-FMS raises a CIF after detecting the 
potential RNP violation due to unforseen situations such as extreme turbulence, etc. This 
CIF triggers a new intent optimisation/negotiation loop with the 4-PNV system and thus 
prevents the production of a WIF. In the conditions described, the time required to 
generate the CIF was 5 seconds. To avoid a WIF event, an NG-FMS autopilot loop was 
performed based on the interactions with AFCS, allowing re-insertion into the original 
nominal trajectory immediately after a CIF event. The average difference in time (i.e. the 
difference between RTA and ETA) obtained for each segment was 9 seconds. The error 
tolerance adopted for this case was ±10 seconds resulting in an increase of the airspeed 
profile by 20 m/s.  
3.7.3 Medium-haul Flight   
An Airbus A320 aircraft with take-off weight of 75,000 kg is assumed to be flying the 
mission. The aircraft takes off from Melbourne Tullamarine airport in Australia (ICAO 
code: YMML) and proceeds towards Darwin airport (ICAO code: YPDN) with a planned 
cruise flight level 340 (34,000 feet). Depending on the cost functions and gains selected 
(i.e., minimum time, minimum fuel and other environmental costs such as gaseous 
emissions of CO2, NOX, etc.), there are different trajectory possibilities for all flight 
segments. Figure 3.22 illustrates the Google Earth image of the different trajectories 
generated, each resulting from different weightings of time and fuel optimisation criteria. 
For the climb phase, the CO2 and NOX reductions are approximately 251.7 kg and 1.5 kg 
respectively. The trajectory corresponding to minimum fuel burn provides 90 kg fuel 
savings when compared to the minimum time optimisation case (Figure 3.21). 
 
Figure 3.22. Simulated set of 4DT intents. 
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The introduction of position uncertainties on all the nominal parameters, allowed the 
transformation of the equations of motion into stochastic differential equations that were 
then treated with the Monte Carlo sampling technique and solved using the 
deterministic optimiser for 150 samples. A conservative value for the number of samples 
was first chosen to provide an estimate of the 4DT deviations from the RNP. Then the 
simulations were performed to provide a 95% confidence bound on the deviations from 
RNP for a given flight phase. The absolute lateral deviation of the 4D trajectories 
(affected by uncertainties), with respect to the reference 4D trajectory were calculated 
for all flight phases. Figure 3.23 shows the 4DT deviations in the climb phase. The 
adherence to the required CNS performances allows for assessment of any collision risks 
between multiple aircraft and thus supports implementation of effective separation 
maintenance and collision avoidance algorithms. 
 
Figure 3.23. 4D trajectory Deviations (RNP). 
Table 3.6 summarises the navigation performance obtained for climb, cruise and 
descent flight phases comparable to the RNP thresholds defined by ICAO. 
Table 3.6. Navigation system performance. 
Flight Phase 
Performance 
Obtained [NM] 
RNP Threshold [NM] 
Climb 1.8 2 
Cruise 3.2 4 
Descent 1.4 2 
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3.7.4 UAS  
To illustrate the capability of UAS NG-FMS to generate optimal 4D trajectories, a 
simulation case study is presented here [20]. The 4DT is not limited to a short sequence of 
3D waypoints with time stamps. Such a definition would assume that each flight leg will 
be straight (with a constant heading) or a short steady-flight turn. VTOL and UAS in 
particular routinely execute optimised trajectories that include manoeuvres and 
accelerated flight segments. Furthermore, hybrid configurations (tilt rotor, etc.) will 
require “transition segments” to convert between vertical and horizontal flight modes. 
The proposed solution can handle flight plans/trajectories that can contain vertical and 
accelerated manoeuvres, e.g., for helicopter emergency response (medical flight) and 
UAS surveillance applications. The adoption of a 6-DoF aircraft dynamics model, 
manoeuvring recognition algorithms and operational realisation of these manoeuvres 
support the applicability of these algorithms to an UTM system implementation 
perspective to handle VTOL, manoeuvring (e.g., surveillance), and multi-UAS operations 
[21, 22]. 
An aerial recognition mission involving a loitering phase is simulated. The employed 
platform is an old variant of the AEROSONDETM UAS. The departure point is St Leonards 
Airfield (YSLE, S38.166 E144.687), and the working area within which the recognition is 
performed is the AEROSONDE Testing Range, encompassed by Danger Area 
YMMM/D322A of the Melbourne Flight Information Region (FIR). After the recognition, the 
RPAS is required to land at the Point Cook Royal Australian Air Force Base (YMPC, 
S37.933, E144.753). The loitering was performed at the test range (S38.210 E144.860), at 
altitudes between 1000 and 1500 ft. Objectives such as fuel consumption, time and 
emissions, as well as constraints on the path and on the flight envelope are introduced in 
the trajectory optimization problem based on the information exchanged as a result of 
the 4DT negotiation process. The climb trajectory is depicted in Figure 3.24, while the 
descent trajectory is depicted in Figure 3.25.  
The NG-FMS generated the optimal climb and descent trajectories in 47 seconds, which 
fully supports strategic and tactical timeframes. In order to meet the CD&R requirements 
for emergency timeframe less than 50 seconds, computationally inexpensive trajectory 
optimisation algorithms such as differential geometry techniques can be employed. The 
trajectory corresponding to minimum fuel burn is characterized by a fuel saving of 130 g 
when compared to the minimum time case. 
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Figure 3.24. Results of the 4DT optimisation for climb phase. 
 
Figure 3.25. Results of the 4DT optimisation for descent phase. 
A stochastic analysis case study was performed to evaluate the potential impact of 
system uncertainties on the trajectory generation process. The introduction of 
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uncertainties on all nominal parameters, with ranges equal to the standard deviations 
allowed for the transformation of the equation of motion into stochastic differential 
equations as before, which are then treated with the Monte Carlo sampling technique 
and solved using the deterministic optimizer for 100 samples. In these simulations, real 
weather data obtained with the Global Forecast System (GFS), kindly made available by 
the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) of the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), was adopted. 
3.8 Negotiation and Validation Features  
As described in Section 3.1, the negotiation and validation of 4DT intents by the NG-
FMS/ATM system is dependent on a number of factors including weather updates, 
updated aircraft dynamics/ATM/AOC constraints, obstacle detection, Demand-
Capacity Balancing (DCB), sector occupancy, and airspace and time based 
restrictions. A conceptual representation of the air-to-ground and air-to-air negotiation 
processes is illustrated in Figure 3.26. 
3.8.1 Evaluation Process 
The negotiation and validation process between the NG-FMS and NG-ATM system was 
evaluated using laboratory activities by server client protocols (Figures 3.26 and 3.27).    
Next Generation Flight Management System
Human Machine 
Interface and 
Interaction
4D Intent 
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Air-to-ground 
Negotiation
Autopilot
Conflict Detection 
and Resolution
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Data Exchange
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Collision 
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Updates
Air-to-air 
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4D Intent Update
Other 
Traffic
States’ 
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Figure 3.26. NG-FMS air-to-ground and air-to-air negotiation loops. 
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Since individual, per-aircraft operational and environmental benefits are marginal, to 
achieve significant and sustained benefits, a large proportion of the fleet will have to 
adopt optimised 4D TBO/IBO techniques. The rates of adoption at which these benefits 
will become tangible are yet to be estimated. Some Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEM) are targeting both forward fit (software update on a FANS A+C+ aircraft) and 
retrofit opportunities (software upgrade in a FANS B+ aircraft). 
Scaling up 4DT operations in dense airspace introduces further considerations including: 
 Bandwidth and data link: Increased bandwidth will be required to support the 
increased amounts of data link traffic between NG-FMS and NG-ATM systems. 
New infrastructure (such as air-ground ACS) has to play a key role, but improved 
protocols with compression and reduced alphabets can also be adopted; 
 Maintenance of separation: As each NG-FMS negotiates a 4DT with the NG-ATM 
system, the NG-ATM system considers whether the requested trajectory would 
cause a loss of separation with other aircraft in the vicinity. As long as the look-
ahead times are moderate, computational performance issues on the 4-PNV side 
can be addressed by distributed parallel processing. Formal methods may be 
employed for verifying these distributed algorithms; 
 Resource loading: Several NG-FMS may request a similar 4DT, for example, to 
utilise favourable tailwinds or to avoid adverse weather. As successive requests 
are processed by the NG-ATM system, cumulative load on resources including 
routes and sectors increases to a point where capacity may be exceeded and 
DAM/DCB are required; 
 Interference with CD&R function: The 4DT negotiation and validation process 
must be implemented to minimise interference with the CD&R functions, 
especially during an emergency timeframe. A minimum guaranteed safety net 
must be provided that is not reduced because of negotiation of 4DT intents with 
the 4-PNV system. Hence, it is important to have a valid solution for the 4DT intent 
without compromising the safety net requirements. 
Other considerations include: 
 Self-separation: If a wide-scale roll-out of NG-FMS equipage can be achieved in 
less-dense airspace, then self-separation concepts may experience a revival 
when coupled with surveillance technologies such as ADS-B in; 
 Stability of metering and sequencing: The downstream impact of NG-FMS 
initiated 4DT changes may have to be considered if it impacts the sequence over 
scheduling points (meter fixes, terminal-area merge points, etc.). For example, an 
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arrival sequence may be frozen a certain time before landing or the flow of 
aircraft through a co-ordination point to an adjacent FIR may be subject to exit 
separation criteria. Until the NG-FMS system evolves to perform metering and 
sequencing, it may be prudent to create reduced automation zones around 
problematic areas of airspace. 
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Figure 3.27. NG-FMS and NG-ATM system negotiation and validation [21]. 
In order to be adopted for strategic online, tactical online and in some emergency 
contexts requiring the use of safety nets, i.e., with a reference time horizon of say 5 
minutes, it is assumed that the total duration of optimisation, negotiation and validation 
processes must remain under 180 seconds. Trajectories are checked for traffic conflicts 
and separation from hazardous phenomena. The validation algorithm assesses the 
lateral and vertical separation criteria and includes a simplified wake vortex modelling 
to assess the longitudinal separation. In line with the SESAR and NextGen concepts of 
operations, a near-real-time negotiation and validation process for dynamic rerouting 
was achieved using this framework [21]. 
3.9 Conclusions 
The system architecture, design and development of a Next Generation Flight 
Management Systems (NG-FMS) were presented. A detailed functional architecture of 
the NG-FMS suitable for both manned and unmanned aircraft platforms was described. 
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Suitable mathematical models were developed to implement the 4DT-O capability, 
addressing both the deterministic and stochastic trajectory optimisation problems. 
Pseudospectral and weighted sum methods were adopted to carry out near real-time 
multi-objective deterministic 4DT optimisation. Objectives such as fuel consumption, 
time, noise impact and contrails were considered via an appropriate set of 
performance weightings. Simulation cases involving Airbus commercial transport aircraft 
and an AEROSONDETM pusher prop (aviation gas fuelled) UAS were presented. These 
examples highlight how the NG-FMS is tailored to long-haul and short-haul transport with 
traditional ATM coordination, and it could be extended to an UTM system 
implementation to handle VTOL, manoeuvring (e.g., surveillance), and cooperative UAS 
operations. Investigation of the total system error boundaries was conducted to 
evaluate the effects of error propagation in the aircraft dynamics model. In addition, air-
to-ground 4DT negotiation algorithms were developed, aiming to attempt a trajectory 
validation process. In line with the SESAR and NextGen concepts of operations, a near 
real-time negotiation and validation process for dynamic rerouting was presented. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
SEPARATION ASSURANCE AND                
COLLISION AVOIDANCE FUNCTIONALITIES 
“If knowledge and foresight are too penetrating and deep, unify them with ease 
an  sincerity”. - Xun Kuang 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the unified approach to SA&CA. In this approach, real-time safety-
critical data fusion algorithms suitable for both cooperative and non-cooperative 
encounters are developed for a variety of safety-critical applications. The SA&CA 
functions are integrated in the NG-FMS and are based on mathematical algorithms that 
quantify in real-time the total avoidance volume in the airspace surrounding a target 
(static or dynamic). Building on these analytical models, data processing techniques 
allows the real-time transformation of navigation and tracking errors affecting the state 
measurements into unified range and bearing uncertainty descriptors. The investigation 
in later chapters focusses on representative scenarios for validating the automated 
separation maintenance and collision avoidance resolution functions in both non-
cooperative and cooperative scenarios.  
4.2 Unified Approach to SA&CA 
The aim of the unified approach is to determine the overall avoidance volume 
surrounding an obstacle or an intruder track. The approach provides an innovative 
analytical framework to combine real-time measurements (and associated 
uncertainties) of navigation states, platform dynamics and tracking observables to 
produce high-fidelity avoidance volumes suitable for integration in future avionics, ATM 
and defence decision support tools.  
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In this approach, both the navigation error of the host platform (manned/unmanned) 
and the tracking error of the intruder state information are combined in order to obtain 
the volume of airspace that needs to be avoided, providing safe separation assurance 
and collision avoidance. The underlying principle is to express the Separation Assurance 
and Collision Avoidance (SA&CA) sensor/system error in range and bearing uncertainty 
descriptors [1 - 3]. In order to estimate navigation and tracking errors, sensor error 
modelling is adopted. Vector analysis is applied to combine the navigation and tracking 
ellipsoids in real-time. The variation in the state vector,    is expressed as: 
 (   ( ))   [
   
  
]
 
                                                        (4.1) 
where p is the position of the host aircraft and t is the time of measurement. Let  ,   and 
  be the  range, azimuth (0° ≤   ≤ 360°) and elevation (0° ≤   ≤ 90°) obtained from any 
non-cooperative sensor or cooperative system. Let   ,    and    be the nominal range, 
azimuth and elevation values. Consider   ,    and    as standard deviations of the error 
in range, azimuth and elevation respectively. The error ellipsoids are given as [3]:  
(    )
 
   
 
(    )
 
   
  
(    )
 
   
                                                      (4.2) 
An illustration of navigation and tracking error ellipsoids is shown in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1. Navigation and tracking error ellipsoids. 
In order to develop a unified approach to cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA, 
the ellipsoids are subjected to two transforms: rotation, R and translation, T that is defined 
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as a projection along the Line-of-Sight (LoS) vector of the aircraft. The inverse 
transformation applied to one of the two ellipsoids with respect to another, L, is 
expressed as: 
                                                                                (4.3) 
The intruder position vector,   translated from host body frame to Earth Centred Earth 
Fixed (ECEF) reference frame with respect to   is given by: 
 ̃                                                                                   (4.4) 
The intruder position vector uncertainty in ECEF frame (  ̃) can be expressed as: 
  ̃                                                                             (4.5) 
where    is the error of the intruder position vector in the host body frame and    is the 
rotation (angular) error matrix. The rotation matrix in terms of azimuth and elevation 
angles is given by: 
  [
             
              
     
]                                                        (4.6) 
where c and s represent cosine and since of azimuth and elevation angles. Therefore 
the position vector after rotation is expressed as: 
[
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]                                                 (4.7) 
The angular error matrix is given by: 
    [
                                         
                                         
            
]                       (4.8) 
and the error in position measurement is expressed as: 
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]  
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]                                                  (4.9) 
In a static non-cooperative SA&CA case, the errors in range, azimuth and elevation are 
given by: 
                                                                      (4.10) 
                                                                   (4.11) 
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                                                                      (4.12) 
where   ,   ,    are the nominal range, azimuth and elevation measurements. { ,  } are 
the parameterisations, which support the transformation of the measurement errors to 
unified range and  bearing descriptors. The transformation of { ,  ,  } to {x, y, z} is                    
given by: 
                                                                       (4.13) 
                                                                        (4.14) 
                                                                         (4.15) 
The correlation between the SA&CA technology employed is analysed and thus 
uncorrelated, covariant and contravariant cases are obtained. Considering ADS-B 
measurements as an example, the dependences of errors in {x, y, z} on the correlation 
between the sensor measurements are given by: 
  
  (    
      
             )                                        (4.16) 
  
  (    
      
             )                                       (4.17) 
  
  (    
      
             )                                        (4.18) 
where {   ,         } is the position of the intruder obtained from ADS-B, {   ,         } is 
the position of the host aircraft obtained from ADS-B and {          ,           ,           } 
define the correlation between the sensor measurements. An example of the two 
combined navigation and tracking error ellipsoids assuming error in range only, and the 
resulting uncertainty volume for uncorrelated (Figure 4.2) and correlated (covariant and 
contravariant) sensor error measurements (3 out of a total of 27 possibilities) is illustrated 
in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.2. Uncertainty volume (uncorrelated errors). 
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Figure 4.3. Uncertainty volumes obtained from range only errors. 
The 27 possible combinations of navigation and tracking error ellipsoids are shown in 
Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4. Combination of navigation and tracking errors. 
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In the dynamic case, the ellipsoid is obtained based on a confidence region and is 
given by: 
                                                                           (4.19) 
                                                                          (4.20) 
                                                                          (4.21) 
The kinematic relationships are: 
  ⃗⃗⃗⃗                                                                            (4.22) 
  ⃗⃗⃗⃗                                                                            (4.23) 
  ⃗⃗  ⃗                                                                              (4.24) 
and these equations are governed according to the following laws of motion: 
      ⃗⃗⃗⃗    ⃗⃗⃗⃗                                                                       (4.25) 
     ⃗⃗⃗⃗    ⃗⃗⃗⃗                                                                       (4.26) 
     ⃗⃗  ⃗     ⃗⃗  ⃗                                                                       (4.27) 
where t represents the time epoch. The errors in {x, y, z} are given by: 
  
  (   
       
             )                                                (4.28) 
  
  (   
       
             )                                                (4.29) 
  
  (   
       
             )                                                (4.30) 
When an error exists in the measurement of elevation and azimuth angles, the resultant 
cone obtained at the estimated range is illustrated in Figure 4.5. In a time-varying case, 
the variation of avoidance volume due to errors in range and bearing measurements 
can be conveniently represented by this approach. An example of the uncertainty 
volume obtained at the estimated range due to tracking errors is shown in Figure 4.5.  
The inflation of the avoidance volume due to increase in the navigation and tracking 
errors is shown in Figure 4.6 and the uncertainty volume considering an increasing error in 
the azimuth angle measurement predicted at the collision time given by t = t (coll) is 
shown in Figure 4.7. Different uncertainty/avoidance volumes can be generated for 
each time epoch until the time at which a collision is predicted.  
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Figure 4.5. Uncertainty volume due to error in bearing measurements. 
 
Figure 4.6. Avoidance volumes at different time epochs. 
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Figure 4.7. Avoidance volumes at time of collision. 
In the CNS+A context, the general case is that of multiple aircraft performing either 
cooperative or non-cooperative surveillance [4]. In this scenario, potential conflicts are 
defined as close encounters in the 4D space-time domain. Close-encounters are 
typically evaluated as part of an intermediate step for pruning the full set of potential 
conflicts. Such 4D close-encounters are assumed to occur when the relative distance – 
i.e. the norm of the 3D relative position vector – between the nominal positions of a pair 
of aircraft at a certain time is below a specified threshold. For all identified close-
encounters, the uncertainty volume associated with the host and intruder platforms are 
determined. Due to bandwidth limitations affecting current communication systems, a 
compact and versatile parameterisation of the uncertainty volume necessary in order to 
extrapolate its actual shape and size at close encounter points, with minimal data-link 
and computational burden. Therefore, the combined navigation and tracking 
uncertainty volume is conveniently described using spherical harmonics and the 
associated parameters are communicated to the air and ground nodes of the network. 
The attractive properties of adopting spherical harmonics include the ease of using 
rotations, spherical averaging procedures and smooth surface representations on the 
sphere. Spherical harmonics are single-valued and smooth (i.e, infinitely differentiable) 
complex functions of the parameterisation variables (  and  ), which are indexed by 
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two integers, namely   and  . They consist of a complete set of orthonormal functions 
and hence form a vector space similar to unit basis vectors. 
Let  (   ) be defined to represent the smooth function on the obtained uncertainty 
volume, so the parameterisation of this spherical harmonic representation is given by [5]: 
 (   )  ∑ ∑     
 
    
 
      (   )                                       (4.31) 
The function  (   ) is limited to a number of N finite coefficients, and   and   represent 
the direction index.      is a factor and the function    (   ) is the spherical harmonic 
function. Such a parameterisation reduces the complexity and relaxes the input 
requirements of the algorithms required to compute and propagate the uncertainty 
volumes in the network.  Additionally, it enables suitable corrections (e.g., inflations) to 
be introduced in order to account for local weather conditions. As complete weather 
surveillance information is generally not available to onboard aircraft, ground-based 
systems can uplink the parameters defining the variations of the avoidance volumes due 
to weather states and forecasts. 
Let    denote the points on the surface of the volume. The components of    are    = x,   
   = y and    = z. Let the surface normal vector be denoted as  ̂  The normal vector is 
expressed as: 
 ̂   
  ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗   ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ 
|  ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗   ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ |
                                                                     (4.32) 
The differential surface area element,    which is an area of a patch of the surface at 
 (   ) is given by: 
                                                                             (4.33) 
   |  ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗      ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗|                                                                (4.34) 
The decomposition is expressed in terms of parameters A, B and C, and is given by: 
     ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗    ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗                                                                    (4.35) 
     ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗    ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗                                                                    (4.36) 
     ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗    ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗                                                                    (4.37) 
The parameters D, E and F are given by: 
      ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗   ̂                                                                   (4.38) 
   
 
 
 (  ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗   ̂     ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗   ̂  )                                                     (4.39) 
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      ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗   ̂                                                                    (4.40) 
The derivatives of the decomposition of the above parameters can be expressed as: 
   (  )
  
                                                                        (4.41) 
    (  )
   
                                                                      (4.42) 
and so forth. The parameters D, E and F involve vector products of the derivatives of the 
components of    and  ̂. The parameter S is expressed as: 
     [   
     
  (    )     (    )                                       (4.43) 
The function    (   ) are given by:  
   (   )  √
(    )(   ) 
  (   ) 
      ( )  
                                   (4.44) 
where     represents the Legendre functions. The Legendre polynomial function is given 
by: 
   ( )  
 
    
  (    ) 
   
                                           (4.45) 
Expanding      as       (  )          (  ), we have     and     defined as the 
spherical harmonic coefficients. The spherical harmonic coefficients are obtained as [5]: 
                                                                              (4.46)                                        
                                                                               (4.47) 
                                                                              (4.48) 
and for all other   and : 
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where     is the Kronecker delta and (a, b, c) represents the semi-major radius of the 
navigation or tracking error ellipsoid.     are the zonal coefficients (functions of latitude) 
while     and      are the tesseral coefficients (functions of longitudes).     are termed as 
expansion coefficients. When l=m, sectorial coefficients are obtained which are 
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functions of both latitudes and longitudes. The covariant and contravariant tensors are 
used to define the overall uncertainty volume when the errors are correlated.  When the 
errors are correlated tensors analysis is adopted to properly account for covariant or 
contravariant components. Six components are associated with a rank-2 symmetrical 
tensor    , which are three diagonal and three off-diagonal components usually 
occurring in pairs. The equation of an ellipsoid associated with the tensor is given by: 
                                                                             (4.50) 
where   is the radius vector having components    and   . Considering a three-
dimensional space, the covariance tensor for the error ellipsoid is given as: 
   [
       
       
     
]                                                            (4.51) 
for components (i, j, k) along (X, Y, Z) axes. The partial derivatives of an invariant function 
provide the components of a covariant vector. A contravariant vector is the same as a 
contravariant tensor of first order.  
A grid based volume can also be used with distinct faces and vertices that can easily be 
translated to spherical harmonic coefficients using the above analysis. The avoidance 
volume used for the parameterisation is shown in Figure 4.8. The real and complex 
functions obtained after parameterisation are shown in Figure 4.9 and 4.10 respectively. 
The expansion coefficients are always unique and are used directly as a feature vector 
for describing an avoidance volume. In this manner, a spectral decomposition of any 
function can be performed, given the function is square-integrable [6]. Lower 
frequencies are expressed by the lower   values; they describe the overall low-resolution 
shape. The higher values add finer details, given by the high frequencies.  
The complex-valued spherical harmonics, composed of real and imaginary parts, can 
be combined to give real valued functions. The resulting functions share the same 
orthonormal and completeness properties [6]. Real spherical harmonics are typically 
used for describing real surface functions. Surface harmonics are often defined as any 
combination of real spherical harmonics for fixed l.  A surface harmonic can be 
described as a harmonic function whose domain is a surface and is not restricted to any 
specific coordinate system. 
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Figure 4.8. Considered avoidance volume. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Real function after parameterisation. 
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Figure 4.10. Complex function after parameterisation. 
Therefore, the approach provides a compact and versatile parameterisation of the 
avoidance volume to extrapolate its actual shape and size at close encounter points 
with minimal data-link and computational burden [7]. 
4.3 Distinctiveness of an Unified Approach to SA&CA 
The unified method to cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA adds knowledge to 
the existing literature in the following aspects:  
 Real-time quantification of the total uncertainty volume in the airspace 
surrounding the intruder tracks. The uncertainty volumes are estimated based on 
the SA&CA sensor/system measurement errors, which are expressed as uniform 
range and bearing uncertainty descriptors;  
 Real-time transformation of host UAS navigation errors and intruder tracking errors 
affecting the state measurements to unified range and bearing uncertainty 
descriptors;  
 Detection and resolution of both cooperative and non-cooperative collision 
threats in various weather and daylight conditions; and also in case of adverse 
weather conditions; 
 Automated separation maintenance and collision avoidance resolution to 
support coordinated manned and unmanned aircraft operations; 
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 Real-time and close coordination of air, sea and ground operations as well as 
operation of multiple manned and unmanned aircraft in close proximity to each 
other; 
 Automatic selection of sensors/systems providing the most reliable SA&CA 
solution, providing robustness in all flight phases (further details provided in 
Chapter 5); 
 Generation of appropriate dynamic geo-fences, whose characteristics will be 
dictated by the obstacle classification and intruder dynamics, to allow 
computation of the optimal avoidance flight trajectories (further details provided 
in Chapter 8); 
 Supervisory control of manned aircraft and UAS addressing various levels of 
autonomous vehicle-vehicle and ground-vehicle collaborations (further details 
provided in Appendix C); 
 Robust trajectory optimisation allowing the identification of the safest and more 
efficient Three-Dimensional or Four-Dimensional (3D/4D) avoidance trajectory, 
considering relative dynamics between the host UAS and intruder platforms, 
airspace constraints, as well as meteorological and traffic conditions (further 
details are provided in Chapter 3 (Section 3.7.4) and Chapter 5 (Section 5.6); 
 Optimal and dynamic sharing of airspace resources between civil and military 
users, as well as enabling integrated civil-military Air Traffic Management and UAS 
Traffic Management (ATM/UTM) operations (further details are provided in 
Chapter 8 (Section 8.5.2); 
 Near real-time and off-line determination of the UAS safe-to-fly envelope based 
on the installed avionics sensors and on the own/intruder platform dynamics or, 
alternatively, identifying the sensors required for the UAS to safely fly a certain pre-
defined envelope supporting the development of the SA&CA system certification 
case and can provide a pathway to certification.  
As a result, it is expected that the SA&CA algorithms will allow: 
 operation of multiple manned and unmanned aircraft in close proximity to each 
other; 
 the remote pilot and/or operator to supervise and supplement the execution of 
various SA&CA tasks; 
 seamless integration of UAS into the existing ATM system and in the UTM context. 
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4.4 Implementation in NG-FMS 
In order to achieve an effective SA&CA mechanism, the tracking, decision-making and 
avoiding processes are classified as follows: 
 detection of obstacles and traffic (air and ground) based on information derived 
from multi-sensor data fusion algorithms; 
 tracking the detected obstacles and traffic including trajectory determination; 
 prioritising and declaring flags for conflicts based on a detection threshold (that is 
selected so as to maximise detection rate and minimise false alarms); 
 action determination, if there is a conflict; 
 determining the optimised evasive manoeuvre that needs to be executed; 
 execution of the optimal avoidance manoeuvre. 
Using the predicted states of other traffic, criticality analysis is performed to prioritize (i.e. 
to determine if a collision risk threshold is exceeded for all tracked intruders) and to 
determine the commands required for executing an avoidance action. If possibility of a 
collision exists, the SA&CA algorithms generate and optimise an avoidance trajectory 
according to a cost function that is based on minimum distance, fuel, time and closure 
rate criteria with the aid of differential geometry or pseudo-spectral optimisation 
techniques to generate a smooth and flyable trajectory [8 - 12]. Automatic separation 
assurance is defined as separation assurance being implemented by airborne 
equipment. The autonomous SA&CA functions embedded in the NG-FMS architecture is 
illustrated in Figure 4.11, and the software functional architecture is shown in Figure 4.12. 
CDTI is adopted for displaying all information, including caution and warning flags. The 
equipage for ASAF is summarized in Table 4.1. The surveillance data processing is 
illustrated in Figure 4.13. Conflict detection and resolution is the collection of the 
following components [13]: 
 Trajectory prediction, which estimates the flight mode of the intruder based on 
the information derived from cooperative/non-cooperative sensors and predicts 
the future trajectory of the intruder; 
 Conflict detection, which calculates the time to separation violation point and 
conflict probability within the look-ahead time, based on relative range, velocity, 
and altitude difference; 
 Conflict resolution, which uses all available information to resolve the conflicts; 
 Monitoring the avoidance manoeuvre, which verifies that conflicts are being 
resolved as planned. 
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Figure 4.11. NG-FMS architecture including SA&CA functions. 
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Figure 4.12. SA&CA software functional architecture. 
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Table 4.1. Summary of equipage. 
Functions Equipage 
Communication 
Voice communication, Controller Pilot Data Link Control (CPDLC), Line-
of-Sight (LoS) and Beyond Los (BloS) communication data links 
Navigation 
Navigation sensors including Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), 
Inertial Navigation System (INS), Vision-based Navigation (VBN) sensors 
and Aircraft Dynamics Model (ADM) as a virtual sensor                                          
providing 3-D/4-D navigation 
Surveillance 
Non-cooperative Sensors including  Forward Looking Sensors (FLS) 
Cooperative Systems including Traffic Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS), Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS), Airborne Collision 
Avoidance System (ACAS)                                                            
Decision-
Making 
Strategic, tactical and emergency flight planning and optimisation 
Intelligent conflict detection, resolution and avoidance 
Weather/terrain/contrails/noise sensitive areas avoidance 
Situational 
Awareness 
Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) and other displays 
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Figure 4.13. Surveillance data processing. 
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Figure 4.14. Interactions within the NG-FMS. 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, algorithms for the unified approach to SA&CA were presented. 
Uncertainty analysis was performed to obtain the overall avoidance volume associated 
with the intruder track using the presented unified approach. In this approach, both 
navigation error of the host platform and tracking error of intruders are combined in 
order to obtain the volume of airspace that needs to be considered for separation 
maintenance and collision avoidance. The fundamental principle in the unified 
approach is to express the SA&CA sensor/system measurement errors in range and 
bearing uncertainty descriptors. The implementation of the unified approach in the NG-
FMS was also described. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF                     
SA&CA FUNCTIONALITIES 
“The an of science has  earne  to be ieve in j stification  not by faith  b t by 
verification.” - Thomas Henry Huxley 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a performance analysis is carried out to investigate and explore the 
potential of the unified approach to cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA for 
manned and unmanned aircraft. Based on the identified state-of-the-art SA&CA 
technologies, a Boolean-Decision Logic (BDL) driven decision tree test bed system 
reference architecture is presented. Implementations involving Boolean logics are 
generally hard wired and cannot be reconfigured; this limits the scope of a unified 
framework in terms of automatic decision making capability. Therefore adaptive BDL, 
which are based on real-time monitoring of the surveillance sensors/systems 
performance are implemented to provide a framework for providing autonomy in UAS 
operations. A scheme for selecting the onboard sensors/systems is introduced, which is 
based on the performance achieved at any given point of time. Covariance matrices 
are used for estimating sensor and system performances. After identifying a Risk-of-
Collision (RoC), if the original trajectory of the host platform intersects the calculated 
avoidance volume, a caution integrity flag is issued. An avoidance trajectory is 
generated in real-time and the steering commands are provided to the flight control 
surfaces. 
5.2 Avoidance Volumes 
An avoidance volume is a virtual, ﬁxed, volume-based boundary in the airspace. The 
overall avoidance volume obtained from the unified approach to SA&CA described in 
Chapter 4 is a variable boundary projected along the velocity vector of the host aircraft. 
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The avoidance volume is a variable depending upon the real-time navigation 
measurements, tracking observables, relative dynamics between platforms, collision 
distance, time and manoeuvrability of the platform. The inclusion of navigation error of 
the host aircraft and the tracking errors of all other traffic in the airspace provides a 
practical buffer. It also maximises the ability to predict collisions and provides the host 
aircraft with adequate time to generate a re-optimised trajectory and execute the 
required commands. 
A buffer is also added taking into account the uncertainties in the aircraft states and the 
resulting uncertainties in the propagation of errors in the nominal trajectory. The previous 
research efforts on estimation of avoidance/uncertainty volume in the context of 
SA&CA were discussed earlier in Chapter 2 (Section 2.13). 
All the highlighted approaches have attempted to define an avoidance volume, which 
are specific in application; meaning given a scenario or specific sensor/system, these 
methods can provide information for automated SA or CA. The unified approach is an 
innovative technique allowing the quantification of total uncertainty volume in the 
airspace surrounding the intruder tracks in real-time for both cooperative and non-
cooperative scenarios. A thorough assessment and mitigation of the safety impact is 
typically required to expedite the path to certification, allowing operators (including 
UAS) to carry out an extended spectrum of autonomous and safety-critical tasks. The 
unified approach allows carrying out such assessment and supports the case for 
certification. Both near real-time and off-line determination of the safe-to-fly envelope is 
based on the installed avionics sensors as well as on the own/intruder platform 
dynamics. Alternatively, identifying the sensors required for the platform to safely fly a 
certain pre-defined envelope (in the presence of intruders with specified vehicle 
dynamics) can also determine the safety envelope. Further details on the certification 
framework are provided in the later sections of the chapter. 
5.3 SA&CA Test Bed Architecture 
Evaluation of non-cooperative sensor/cooperative systems and the associated data 
fusion algorithms is a key constituent of the SA&CA system design. A number of non-
cooperative sensors and cooperative systems can be employed for automated SA&CA. 
State-of-the-art SA&CA technologies are listed in Table 5.1 representing C for 
cooperative and NC for non-cooperative (both active and passive) sensors.  
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Table 5.1. SA&CA technologies. 
Sensor/System Type Information Trajectory 
Visual camera NC, Passive Azimuth, Elevation Extracted 
Thermal camera NC, Passive Azimuth, Elevation Extracted 
LIDAR NC, Active Range Extracted 
MMW Radar NC, Active Range, Bearing Extracted 
SAR NC, Active Range, Bearing Extracted 
Acoustic NC, Active Azimuth, Elevation Extracted 
ADS-B C 
Position, Altitude, 
Velocity and Identity 
State Vectors 
Provided 
TCAS I/II/IV/ 
ACAS I/II/III/X 
C Range, Altitude Extracted 
 
The non-cooperative sensors are employed to detect intruders or other obstacles in the 
platform’s Field-of-Regard (FoR) when cooperative systems are unavailable from the 
intruders. Optical, thermal, LIDAR, Millimetre Wave (MMW) radar and acoustic sensors 
are employed part of non-cooperative sensors. Based on the identified technologies, 
Boolean logics based decision tree architecture for the SA&CA system is illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. A typical example of prioritisation is selecting ADS-B data when both ADS-B 
and TCAS are present onboard the platform. A hierarchy of selecting and sorting the 
surveillance sensors/systems is defined based on their performance, achieved at any 
instant of time. Covariance matrices are used for estimating the performance of the 
SA&CA sensors and systems.  
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.6.1), the FAA TCAS program office research led to 
the introduction of ACAS X technology [1, 2]. Since ACAS X logic is based on a dynamic 
model of aircraft movement and a computer optimised lookup table of collision 
avoidance actions, it is different from the conventional TCAS approach. Maintenance of 
separation (maintaining a safe distance from other aircraft) without triggering collision 
avoidance of the other aircraft is achieved by ACAS X. In an implementation 
perspective, ACAS X is focused on the collision avoidance aspect (after the failure of 
self-separation), using Markov decision processes and dynamic programming. The same 
approach is also extended to self-separation.  
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The unified approach is different from the ACAS X/well-clear method in the approach 
towards computation of the 3D volume in the airspace to be avoided by the host 
aircraft [1 – 3]. Furthermore, ACAS-X cannot handle accelerated trajectories making it 
less suitable for implementing UTM algorithms for small UAS and hybrid platforms. The 
solution proposed is indeed more general than steady flight 4D sequences taking into 
account complex accelerated or manoeuvrings tasks. Furthermore, the proposed 
approach is neither limited by the onboard SA&CA technologies nor those installed on 
the intruders. Hence, it is a SA&CA technology independent solution. 
Supplementary  
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systems
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Figure 5.1. Reconfigurable UAS SA&CA test bed architecture. 
Depending upon the complexity of the decision-making process, various practical 
implementations are possible. These include the use of microcontrollers, Programmable 
Array Logic (PAL), Programmable Logic Array (PLA), Generic Array Logic (GAL) and Field 
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Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). The programmable logic devices are especially 
useful in prioritising the SA&CA sensor/system according to their performance. Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) are performed 
with respect to the identified state-of-the-art SA&CA technologies to determine the 
reliability of cooperative systems and non-cooperative sensors. A typical example of 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) performed on the reference architecture is illustrated in Figure 
5.2.  
Navigation and tracking performances are also improved, thanks to the robustness 
introduced into the system. The sensor/system, which provides the best estimate, is 
selected automatically. The presented approach thus provides autonomy and 
robustness in all flight phases, and supports all-weather and all-time operations. The 
method lays a foundation for the development of an airworthy SA&CA capability and a 
pathway for manned/unmanned aircraft coexistence in all classes of airspace. Instead 
of implementing hardwired decision logics (given by a pre-defined set of instructions), a 
dynamic reconfiguration of decision logics based on CNS systems integrity 
augmentation is adopted [4 - 9].  
SA&CA
Failure
Non-
Cooperative 
Sensor Failure
Vision 
based 
Sensor 
Failure
Cooperative 
System 
Failure
ATM 
System 
Failure
LIDAR 
Failure 
RADAR  
Failure
Communica
-tion Link 
Failure
ADS-B 
System 
Failure 
TCAS 
Failure
 
Figure 5.2. FTA for autonomous decision-making tasks. 
Sensors/systems providing the most reliable SA&CA solution are automatically selected, 
providing robustness in all flight phases and supporting all-weather operations. This is 
achieved by performing a top-down and then bottom-up approaches for determining 
the probability of failure associated with each sensor and/or system and ATM link. The 
probability of failure dictates the selection of each sensor and system for strategic, 
tactical and emergency scenarios. It is important to remember that there are often 
common causes of failures across fault tree components (one of the fundamental 
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assumptions inherent in fault trees are that the components are independent, which is 
very difficult to assure in an actual system). Hence, the common causes of failures across 
fault tree components (here within non-cooperative sensors, cooperative systems and 
ATM system) need to be analysed.  
Fault trees are very useful in deducing inferences about static models and situations. To 
introduce a temporal axis to hazard analysis, event trees are considered. Event tree 
analysis, which is a graphical approach, involves the assessment of the SA&CA for given 
sets of undesired initiating events. The initiating events are mapped against a temporal 
axis. For example, degradation or loss of GNSS data would impact the navigation and 
tracking errors (provided ADS-B is onboard the host and intruder aircraft). This impact 
can be modelled against time and the propagation effects can be studied. The effects 
also include the study of error propagation against time through the aircraft dynamics, 
SA&CA algorithms and NG-FMS components. 
The decision logics are based on identifying the primary cooperative system and non-
cooperative sensor. In the architecture defined above, the primary cooperative system 
is ADS-B and the key non-cooperative counterparts are vision-based sensors and 
LIDAR/MMW radar. Considering the ADS-B and TCAS example, representing ADS-B 
measurements as A, TCAS data as B and the output for cooperative scenario as O1, the 
expression for the Boolean logics implementation is derived as follows: 
O1 = A + (A ⊕ T)                                                     (5.1) 
O1 = A + (A T’+ T A’)                                                 (5.2) 
O1 = A (1 + T’) + T A’                                                 (5.3) 
O1 = A + T A’                                                       (5.4) 
Similarly, a Boolean logics decision tree is also employed for the non-cooperative case. 
Denoting data from visual camera as V, thermal camera as I, LIDAR as L, MMW radar as 
M, acoustic as A and the output for non-cooperative CA function as O2, the expression 
for the Boolean logics implementation is derived as follows: 
O2 = A · M · L · (V + (V ⊕ I))                                         (5.5) 
O2 = A · M · L · (V + (V I’+ I V’))                                       (5.6) 
O2 = A · M · L · (V + I V’)                                            (5.7) 
A combined decision tree is adopted for accommodating both non-cooperative 
sensors and cooperative system information.  This is described by the overall output O as: 
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O = (O1 ⊕ O2) + O2                                              (5.8) 
 
5.4 Sensor/System Error Modelling 
The error models of subsystems are set up respectively and the matrices of the state and 
measurement equations are fractional step discretisations.  
The position and tracking information are given by the following formulation. A TCP is 
typically defined as specific 4D points in the space-time domain at which an 
anticipated change in the aircraft’s velocity vector would cause a change in the 
nominal intent. The position of an aircraft is expressed as the 3-tuple,     ( )  ( )  ( )} 
and         Є ℝ and    .   and   are the lateral and longitudinal position of the aircraft 
and z provides the elevation. For any given two points, say    and   , the distances are 
given by: 
  (      )                                                       (5.9) 
             (√ , √    )                                        (5.10) 
and  
     (
      
 
)                 (
      
 
)                        (5.11) 
  (      )     (      )                                     (5.12) 
The above equations are the Haversine formulae for calculating the great circle 
distances between two points on an ellipsoid where   is the radius of the sphere. A TCP 
can be expressed as              . Given two TCPs namely,      and     , and       , 
then, the following constraints hold: 
                                                               (5.13) 
                                                               (5.14) 
                                                               (5.15) 
                                                               (5.16) 
where     and   are the control variables.   is the velocity and   is the heading. 
In dynamic cases, the elapsed time is important since imperfectly perceived velocity 
enlarges altitude uncertainty between observations, and measurements separated by 
known time intervals carry implicit velocity information. Weighting applied to the position 
measurements is influenced by three factors [10]:
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 A sensitivity matrix Hm whose (i, j) element is the partial derivative of the ith 
component of the mth measured data vector to the jth state variable. In this scalar 
measurement case Hm is a 1 × 2 matrix [1 0] for all values of m; 
 A covariance matrix Pm of error in state estimate at time tm (the ith diagonal 
element is the mean squared error in estimating the ith state); 
 A covariance matrix Rm of measurement errors at time tm (in this scalar 
measurement case, Rm is a 1 × 1 matrix—i.e., a scalar variance Rm). 
Some relevant definitions are: 
Variance of a variable is an estimate of the squared deviations of n measures of the 
variable from their mean value. For a sample data with n observations for a variable  , 
the variance is determined by the formula: 
Var ( ) = 
∑ (     ̅ )
  
   
   
                                                  (5.17) 
where  ̅ is the sample mean of  . 
For a sample data with n pairs of observations for two variables   and  , the covariance 
is given by: 
Cov ( ,  ) = 
∑ (     ) (    ̅) 
 
    
   
                                        (5.18) 
where  ̅ and  ̅ denote the sample means of   and  , respectively. Cov ( ,  ) > 0 
indicates the larger the value of  , the larger the value of Y and vice versa. Cov ( ,  ) < 
0 indicates the larger the value of  , the smaller the value of Y and vice versa. Therefore: 
Cov ( ,  ) = Cov (   )                                             (5.19) 
That is, covariance is symmetric in   and  . 
Covariance is estimated for two variables that have different units of measurement. By 
measuring covariance, it can be found out whether their units are increasing or 
decreasing. However, covariance cannot measure the degree to which the two 
variables move together.  
Pm changes with time (e.g., the effect of velocity error on position error), as well as with 
any changes in the real-time measurements. In this continuous–discrete approach, 
uncertainty is decremented at the discrete measurement events [10]: 
Pm(+) = Pm(-) - Wm Hm Pm(-)                                           (5.20) 
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and, between events, dynamic behaviour follows a continuous model of the form given 
by: 
 ̇ = AP +PAT + E                                                    (5.21) 
The system model for tracking the targets is defined as:  
                                                              (5.22) 
where   is the tracked object’s state vector,   is the constant state transition matrix and 
  is the system noise. In a two dimensional approach the state vector   can be defined 
as a 4 dimensional vector   (       ̇   ̇ ), where (     ) correspond to the position of 
the tracked object in the FoV expressed on the body frame and ( ̇   ̇ ) corresponds to 
the velocity of the object. The above equation becomes: 
(
  
  
 ̇ 
 ̇ 
)  (
     
     
    
    
)(
     
     
 ̇    
 ̇    
) 
(
 
 
      
      
  ̇    
  ̇    )
 
 
                      (5.23) 
The measurement model is given by:  
                                                              (5.24) 
and expressed in matrices as: 
(
   
   
)  (
    
    
)(
   
   
 ̇  
 ̇  
) (
    
    
)                              (5.25) 
where    is the measurement vector,   is the state observation vector and    is the 
measurement noise. If the measurement terms and system noise are statistically 
uncorrelated (White Gaussian Noise (WGN)), then covariance matrices are given by:  
  
(
 
 
   
          ̇     ̇ 
        
     ̇     ̇ 
  ̇     ̇     ̇ 
   ̇  ̇ 
  ̇     ̇     ̇  ̇   ̇ 
 
)
 
 
                                     (5.26) 
  (
   
      
        
 )                                                 (5.27) 
The diagonal elements of matrices   and   correspond to the variances of the state 
vector and measurement vector respectively. Optimal control and estimation theory is 
applied for predicting and updating the system states (e.g. EKF). 
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The values of the Kalman gain give certain weight in the algorithm to the predictions or 
the measurements. For large values of Kalman gain, the measurements have a 
significant impact on the filter output, whereas for smaller values, predictions are 
obtained considering a larger weight on the filter output. The Kalman filter is initialized if 
the threshold of the test statistic function is exceeded. The initial conditions of the 
Kalman Filter can be set up to [10, 11]:  
 ̂  (   
     
     )                                                  (5.28) 
where    
  and    
 
 correspond to the target position (   ) values obtained from the track-
before-detect stage. Typically, in other SA&CA algorithms, a large value is assigned to 
the covariance matrix of the system states (     ) due to the initial uncertainty [10, 11]. 
In the case of a 2D problem, such as the one analysed in this case, the uncertainty can 
be represented by an ellipse centred in  ̂ . It is observed that the axis of the uncertainty 
ellipse is given by    √     (     );    and    are the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of 
   respectively;    is a constant.  
Once the states are estimated, a future trajectory is predicted. The approach employed 
is based on an extension of the platform states, and on the output equation, which is 
given by:  
 ( )    ( )                                                     (5.29) 
where   [        and the matrix   locates the states in the vector   that belong to the 
object position: 
[
 
 
 
   (     )
   (     )
 
   (    | )]
 
 
 
  [
 ̂ (     )
 [ ̂ (     ) 
 
 [  [ ̂ (     )   
]                           (5.30) 
where    is defined as a future horizon up to where it is desired to predict the trajectory. 
 ̂ (     ) are the estimates of the track-to-track algorithm, that contains information for 
all the local estimations, at the next sample time. The left hand side of equation (5.30) is 
expressed as:  
 ̂  (    | )                                                     (5.31) 
so the index (    | ) groups the prediction from sample time (     ) to sample time 
(    | ). 
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The quality of the predicted trajectory is also important. It can be evaluated by assessing 
the quality of the measurements (or by pre-estimation), which is in turn reflected in the 
error on the predicted value. This error is given by:  
   (     )       (   )   ̂ (     )                             (5.32) 
where  (   ) is the modeled objected trajectory and  ̂ (     ) is the predicted 
optimal trajectory at sample time    . Taking this to the prediction horizon sample time 
    , the following error expression is obtained:  
   (     )  
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
               
          
               
          
      
    
      
 
                         
    
           
            
            ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   (5.33) 
where: 
         
               
                     
 
                           
                           (5.34) 
for all   {          } and the matrix        is the covariance matrix obtained from the 
track-to-track algorithm at sample    .  
The following characteristics are determined for the trajectory prediction process:  
 The obstacle centre of mass corresponding to the position estimates; 
 The geometric characteristic of a selected time invariant shape (typically an 
ellipsoid); 
 The orientation of the vehicle, which can be estimated with the track-before-
detect algorithm. It allows for heading estimation, as well as extension by the 
employment of the Kalman filter (when multiple sensors and/or systems 
measurements are supplied). 
The sensor range of the platform is defined with an ellipsoidal shape. This same principle 
is applied to the obstacle; however, the size of the ellipsoid is dependent on the 
minimum separation distance,   , established in accordance with the mission.   
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5.4.1 Test for Correlation 
The relationship between a measured and determined random variable is determined 
as follows. Let   ε  ℝ  be a n × 1 vector of jointly-distributed random variable with mean 
   and covariance matrix   ε  ℝ
   . Let   be a new random variable that is not 
measured but determined by a function, say   = f( ), where f(.) is a function of   in the 
 ℝ  space. If the function is differentiable, up a certain Taylor series approximation (say 
first/second order), then: 
      (  )     (   (  ))                                     (5.35) 
where   ( ) is the gradient vector evaluated at   . Then the random variable   has 
mean: 
      (  )                                                    (5.36) 
and variance: 
  
     (  )                                                 (5.37) 
If the random variables are uncorrelated, the variance can be simplified as: 
  
     (  )                                                 (5.38) 
where    is given by the diagonal matrix expressed as: 
           ([   
     
     
      
  )                            (5.39) 
The relationship between    and    is given by: 
  
     ∑ (
  ( )
   
)        
                                            (5.40) 
assuming that    are independent random variables and hence the covariance              
     
  = 0. 
Statistical methods that can be employed for measuring correlation include Pearson, 
Kendall rank and Spearman correlation techniques. The most commonly used statistic is 
the linear correlation coefficient,  , which is often referred to as the Pearson product 
moment correlation coefficient and is given by: 
    
   
√      
                                                        (5.41) 
where     is given by: 
      ∑(   ̅)(    ̅)                                             (5.42) 
      ∑(   ̅)
                                                    (5.43) 
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      ∑(   ̅)
                                                    (5.44) 
In this case,   measures the strength of the linear relationship between two variables. The 
magnitude of   indicates the strength, while the sign suggests the type of linear 
relationship. Both random variables should be normally distributed.  Other assumptions 
include linearity and homoscedasticity.  Linearity assumes a straight line relationship 
between each of the variables in the analysis and homoscedasticity assumes that data 
is normally distributed about the regression line. 
Kendall rank correlation is a non-parametric test that measures the strength of 
dependence between two variables.  If we consider two samples,   and  , where each 
sample size is  , we know that the total number of pairings is (   )  .  The following 
formula is used to calculate the value of Kendall rank correlation: 
   
      
 
 
   (   )
                                                         (5.45) 
where    is the number of concordant pairs and    is the number of discordant pairs. 
Spearman rank correlation is a non-parametric test and is used to measure the degree 
of association between two variables by not considering any assumptions about the 
distribution of the data. Is the appropriate correlation analysis when the variables are 
measured on a scale that is at least ordinal. The Spearman rank correlation is given by: 
      
  ∑  
 
  (    )
                                                    (5.46) 
where   is the Spearman rank correlation,    is the difference between the ranks of 
corresponding values (   and    ) and   is the number of value in each data set. 
For example, considering ADS-B and RADAR information, typically minimum ADS-B 
performance requirements are based on a comparison to current RADAR performance 
[12, 13]. Therefore, RADAR performance must first be characterised sufficiently for each 
operational environment. One of the most critical parameters used for comparison is 
surveillance accuracy (or typically termed as position uncertainty of the tracked object). 
In current RADAR systems, azimuth position uncertainty is usually plotted as a function of 
range from the radar, given a specific radar characteristic. 
In general, radar azimuth position uncertainty increases for a given target as the target 
moves away from the radar. Based on current operational procedures, for MSSR, two 
points are defined relative to supported separations. In general, 3 NM separations can 
be usually supported by MSSR for targets out to a maximum range of 60 NM from the 
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radar and beyond 60 NM, 5 NM separations must be used (to a maximum range of 200 
NM) (Figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.3. Error and radar ranges [13]. 
5.4.2 Covariant and Contravariant Components 
When the states of an aircraft do not get altered under coordinate transformations, then 
the relationship is invariant across time epochs. It is true that the velocity vector itself 
does not change when we switch coordinate systems. However, the components of the 
vector change. Essentially, the contravariant components of a vector are directed 
parallel to the coordinate axes, whereas the covariant components of a vector are 
directed normal (perpendicular) to constant coordinate surfaces. In the case of 
orthogonal Cartesian coordinates the axes are, by definition, normal to constant 
coordinate surfaces, so there is no distinction between contravariant and covariant 
components. 
5.4.3 Possible Cases 
A number of non-cooperative sensors and cooperative systems are employed for 
SA&CA. An analysis for correlation between the state-of-the-art SA&CA technologies is 
required to determine the relationship between the navigation error of the host platform 
and the tracking error of the tracked traffic.  
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Table 5.2. Correlation analysis. 
Sensor/System 1 
(Host platform) 
Sensor/System 2 
(Tracked traffic) 
Correlation 
Visual camera LIDAR 
Uncorrelated/           
Correlated * 
Thermal camera Radar 
Uncorrelated/           
Correlated * 
LIDAR ADS-B Uncorrelated 
ADS-B ADS-B Correlated 
ADS-B TCAS Uncorrelated 
TCAS LIDAR Uncorrelated 
ADS-B Acoustic Sensor Uncorrelated 
*Depends on the environment that the sensors/systems operate in. Thus, on a foggy/rain day 
(water droplets, scattering, etc.), both the camera and the LIDAR will be affected and 
hence reduce visual activity. 
When the host aircraft employs GNSS as the primary means of navigation and it employs 
ADS-B as the primary means of surveillance, then the errors are correlated.  In all other 
cases, the errors are uncorrelated. 
5.4.4 Effects of Data Size and Methodology 
The data size is a key attribute required to define the methodology to be adopted for 
implementing the unified approach to SA&CA. The larger the data size, the greater is 
the probability of determining the correlation factor and the nature of the correlation 
(covariant and contravariant) between the navigation error of the host aircraft and the 
tracking errors of the intruders. 
The general methodology that is adopted is provided below: 
 Determine the instantaneous position of the host aircraft; 
 Obtain the error in position of the host aircraft; 
 Construct the navigation error ellipsoid in 3D; 
 Detect all objects and initiate the tracking process; 
 Estimate/predict the trajectory of each tracked object; 
 Obtain the error ellipsoid of the tracking observables in 3D; 
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 Compute the avoidance volume w.r.t. each tracked object assuming that the 
errors are uncorrelated; 
 Assess the correlation between the navigation and tracking error according to 
the trends in the data obtained from the tracking sensors/systems; 
 Recompute the avoidance volume if the errors are correlated and assume that 
the relationship is covariant; 
 Assess the nature of the correlation between navigation and tracking errors; 
 Recompute the avoidance volume if the relationship is contravariant; 
 Perform an analysis for assessing the relative dynamics between the host platform 
and each tracked intruder; 
 Compute the avoidance volumes at successive time epochs according to the 
correlation, the relationship associated with correlation and relative dynamics 
between the two platforms; 
 Ensure separation assurance at all the time epochs; 
 Initiate the trajectory re-optimisation module as a resolution mechanism if a 
collision is detected (due to non-compliance of the separation assurance 
function). 
5.4.5 Radar and ADS-B Error Modelling 
For radar, the horizontal position accuracy is normally expressed in terms of range and 
azimuth. The overall errors are considered to have the following component errors: 
 Systematic biases; 
 Stochastic errors (usually expressed as a standard deviation). 
Another important term for radar is core accuracy, which is a starting point for 
examining radar accuracy, as compared to that of ADS-B data. Core accuracy is 
defined as the 95% limit of the error distribution in a certain (single direction) dimension 
with respect to the radar.   
In the cross-range direction, the error is calculated from the azimuth error multiplied by 
the reference range. For ADS-B, horizontal position accuracy is defined as the radius 
(ra) of a circle cantered on the target’s reported position such that the probability 
of the target’s actual position being inside the circle is 95%. T his radial error is the 
resultant of errors in two dimensions (x and y). Assuming that the error distributions in 
each dimension are independent Gaussian distributions with the same standard 
deviation (σ), the resultant radial error distribution will be Rayleigh and the 95% point 
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of this distribution will be 2.45σ. The required accuracy is derived from comparison with 
single dimension radar 95% accuracy.  
The above discussions can be easily extended to relative position and velocity 
determination between ownship and intruders. For example, in addition to computing 
GNSS position and velocity estimates for each aircraft and exchanging these estimates 
through some data link, GNSS observables can be exchanged.  
Expected sensor ranges might differ from one scenario to another. For example, most 
lightweight, low-power and low-cost UAS LIDAR systems tend to offer range of less than 1 
km. But the variation of detection range for a variety of obstacles can be estimated. 
Flight test results obtained for detection of wire obstacles of 5 mm in diameter, in dry 
weather (visibilities of 800 m, 1500 m and 2000 m) and incidence angles of 90 and 45 
indicated dictated the minimum LIDAR sensor performance requirements set for 
rotorcraft platforms [14]. 
In an operational scenario, these position and velocity reports are transmitted to the 
ground (ATM system) and other aircraft using ADS-B, and include parameters 
representing the accuracy and integrity performance of transmitted estimates. ADS-B 
does not exhibit the same uncertainty versus range characteristic as radar. ADS-B 
position uncertainty is primarily a function of the GNSS satellite geometry relative to the 
aircraft, and is not related to range from any ground-based system. The assumption 
takes into account the changes in satellite constellation for complex missions (military, 
loitering scenarios, etc.), where, with the passing of time, the satellite constellation 
coverage changes, even though the location does not. For this reason, ADS-B position 
uncertainty is assumed to be a constant for a given environment when being compared 
to radar performance. Hence in order to determine minimum performance requirements 
for ADS-B, a radar reference range must be determined for each environment to 
provide the appropriate comparison points between ADS-B and radar. One of the 
drawbacks of ADS-В on the 1090 ES base is that the interference/saturation issue. If there 
is a high density of air traffic, because the signals cannot be distinguished, it leads to 
signal layering. Therefore, it is estimated that the effective range of the ADS-B is typically 
50-70 km in zones with intensive air traffic. Hence the adoption of multiple SA&CA 
technologies is Important. At different ranges, the employment of a suite of non-
cooperative sensors or cooperative systems provides the required flexibility. 
Radar position errors can be thought of in terms of a 95% error composed from range 
and azimuth (cross-range) components. The radar cross-range error component 
increases with range from the radar, however, the range error component is constant 
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(Figure 5.4). The radar error distributions are Gaussian in a single dimension, but in two 
dimensions, the 95% radar position error area is an ellipse. At the range where the radar 
cross-range error approximately equals the radar range error, the 95% radar position error 
area becomes circular. The 95% ADS-B position error area is also circular when it is 
based on GNSS position performance. It is relatively easy to specify a target set of 
Range-of-Applicability (ROA) values that span each operational domain, i.e., 60 NM to 
200 NM radar ranges for En Route separation minima. However, the selection of a 
specific ROA value for the radar to ADS-B comparisons is much more problematic, since 
the most demanding environments for radar separation may not be those where radar 
performance is least capable, i.e., at maximum operational radar ranges. 
Reference 
Range from 
RADAR
Cross-Range Error
RADAR ADS-B – Case 1 ADS-B – Case 2
Error in Range > 
Error in Azimuth 
Error in Range  = 
Error in Cross-Range
Error in Azimuth > 
Error in Range
 
Figure 5.4. Error and reference ranges [13]. 
For ADS-B Case 1 in Figure 5.4, the reference range is the distance at which the radar 
range error equals the cross-range error. The ADS-B accuracy performance requirement 
is usually set such that the ADS-B position error area is approximately equal to that of 
radar at this point. However, the circular 95% ADS-B position error area cannot be 
identical to radar because the discrete ADS-B navigation accuracy categories do not 
exactly match the radar accuracy. The 95% ADS-B accuracy performance is constant 
throughout an airspace where a given navigation accuracy requirement is established. 
Therefore, the area bounding 95% of the radar positions is larger than that of ADS-B 
when the distance is greater than the ROA and smaller that of ADS-B when the distance 
is less than the ROA.  
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A summary of the state data, state data integrity, state data status timing, as well as 
Traffic ID specific requirements are provide in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. 
Table 5.3. Traffic application specific requirements summary [12, 13]. 
 
 
Requirement 
Category 
 
 
 
Requirement 
EVAcq/AIRB/TSAA SURF 
Traffic On 
ground 
When 
Ownship is 
On ground 
 
All Other 
Traffic 
 
Traffic On 
Ground 
Traffic Airborne 
Inside Surface 
Volume Outside 
Surface 
Volume 
Ownship 
on 
Ground 
Ownship 
Airborne 
 
 
 
State Data 
Horizontal Position 
Uncertainty (95%) 
< 0.1 NM 
(NACP ≥ 7) 
< 0.5 NM 
(NACP ≥ 5) 
< 30 m 
(NACP ≥ 
9) 
< 0.1 
NM 
(NACP ≥ 
7) 
< 0.3 NM 
(NACP ≥ 
6) 
< 0.5 NM 
(NACP ≥ 
5) 
Horizontal Velocity 
Uncertainty (95%) (1) 
< 10 m/s 
(NACV ≥ 1) 
< 3 m/s 
(NACV ≥ 
2) 
< 10 m/s 
(NACV ≥ 1) 
Vertical Position 
Uncertainty (95%) 
On Ground or Valid 
Pressure or Valid Geo 
(3 & 10 ) 
On Ground or Valid Pressure or Valid 
Geo (3 & 4) 
Vertical Velocity 
Uncertainty (95%) N/A N/A 
 
 
State Data 
Integrity 
Source Integrity Level N/A N/A 
Navigation Integrity 
Category N/A N/A 
System Design 
Assurance  1E-3 1E-3 
Validation of Traffic 
Position with TCAS 
Data 
N/A N/A 
 
State Data 
And Status 
Timing 
 
 
Maximum Total 
Latency  
5.5 s 5.5 s 
0.9 s 0.9 s 
1.1 s 1.1 s 
0.5 s 0.5 s 
2.5 s 2.5 s 
0.5 s 0.5 s 
Maximum Position 
Data Age until 
Dropped 
11 s 
(moving) 
25 s (static) 
25 s 
11 s 
(moving) 
25 s 
(static) 
11 s 15 s 25 s 
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For ADS-B Case 2 in Figure 5 .6 , the reference range is chosen beyond the distance at 
which the range and cross-range errors are equal. At this reference range, the radar 
cross- range error is greater than the constant range error. The ADS-B accuracy 
performance requirement is set such that the ADS-B position error area is approximately 
equal to the radar cross-range error, the major axis of the ellipse. The 95% ADS-B position 
error area is slightly larger than that of radar at this distance because the radar range 
error is less than its cross-range error. However, as the distance from the radar increases, 
the radar cross-range error continues to increase and the area bounding 95% of the 
radar positions becomes larger than the constant circular area set for ADS-B. The 
required ADS-B 95% accuracy is compared against the radar 95% accuracy without 
systematic biases (i.e., stochastic errors only). This ensures that the normal 95% accuracy, 
of  ADS-B is always as good as, or better than, radar accuracy at the chosen range of 
applicability and it also ensures that the ADS-B to ADS-B separation accuracy is always 
as good or better than the best-case radar to radar separation (i.e., both aircraft 
separated by the same RADAR).  Knowing the 95% point of a Gaussian distribution as 
1.96σ, the required ADS-B 95% accuracy radius (ra) is given by: 
                                                 ra  = (2.45/1.96)* 95% = 1.25*0.95                               (5.47) 
Table 5.4. Traffic ID specific requirements summary [12, 13]. 
 
 
Requirement 
Category 
 
 
 
Requirement 
EVAcq/AIRB/TSAA SURF 
Traffic On 
ground 
When 
Ownship is 
On ground 
 
All Other 
Traffic 
 
Traffic On 
Ground 
Traffic Airborne 
Inside Surface 
Volume Outside 
Surface 
Volume 
Ownship 
On 
ground 
Ownship 
Airborne 
 
 
 
 
Traffic ID 
 
 
Maximum Latency  
29 s 29 s 
1.0 s 1.0 s 
9.0 s 9.0 s 
0.5 s 0.5 s 
18 s 18 s 
0.5 s 0.5 s 
Maximum Data Age 
Until Drooped Until track termination Until track termination 
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5.5 Sensor/System Error Modelling 
The effect of sensor errors on the avoidance volumes is studied for all three cases of 
errors, including uncorrelated, covariant and contravariant errors. Different avoidance 
volumes are generated based on the time varying nature of the errors in navigation and 
tracking measurements. To illustrate the concept, considering     ,      and      as the 
errors in navigation measurements in  ,   and   and     ,      and      as the errors in 
tracking measurements in  ,   and  , the variation of avoidance volume is studied in the 
following section.  
5.5.1 Errors in Range 
The avoidance volume obtained at a given range varies according to the errors in 
navigation measurements and tracking observables. This variation is illustrated in Figures 
5.5 to 5.11 for uncorrelated, covariant and contravariant cases respectively. 
 
Figure 5.5. {    ,     ,     } = 3, 2, 4 and {    ,     ,     } = 8, 12, 3. 
 
Figure 5.6. {    ,     ,     } = 6, 2, 4 and {    ,     ,     } = 8, 12, 3. 
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Figure 5.7. {    ,     ,     } = 3, 8, 4 and {    ,     ,     } = 8, 12, 3. 
 
Figure 5.8. {    ,     ,     } = 3, 2, 6 and {    ,     ,     } = 8, 12, 3. 
 
 
Figure 5.9. {    ,     ,     } = 3, 2, 4 and {    ,     ,     } = 3, 12, 3. 
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Figure 5.10. {    ,     ,     } = 3, 2, 4 and {    ,     ,     } = 8, 5, 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11. {    ,     ,     } = 3, 2, 4 and {    ,     ,     } = 8, 12, 1. 
5.5.2 Errors in Bearing Measurements at a Given Range 
In a similar manner, the avoidance volume varies according to the errors in bearing 
measurements at a given range. This effect is illustrated in Figures 5.12 to 5.15.  
Figure 5.14 shows the avoidance volume obtained for the following conditions 
(covariant case): 
{    ,     ,     } = 30, 20, 40 and {    ,     ,     } = 30, 30, 20 
Errors in azimuth and elevation are 40 degrees and the correlation coefficient is 0.34. 
Figure 5.15 shows the avoidance volume obtained for the following conditions 
(contravariant case): 
{    ,     ,     } = 30, 20, 40 and {    ,     ,     } = 30, 30, 20 
Errors in azimuth and elevation are 40 degrees and the correlation coefficient is 0.34. 
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Figure 5.16 shows the avoidance volume obtained for the conditions as in Figure 5.14 but 
the correlation coefficient is 0.17. 
Figure 5.17 shows the avoidance volume obtained for the following conditions 
(covariant case): 
{    ,     ,     } = 30, 20, 40 and {    ,     ,     } = 30, 30, 20 
Errors in azimuth and elevation are 35 degrees and the correlation coefficient is 0.34. 
 
Figure 5.12. Covariant case. 
 
Figure 5.16 shows the avoidance volume obtained for the following conditions 
(covariant case): 
{    ,     ,     } = 30, 20, 40 and {    ,     ,     } = 30, 30, 20 
Errors in azimuth and elevation are 70 degrees and the correlation coefficient is 0.34. 
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Figure 5.13. Contravariant case. 
 
Figure 5.14. Effect of correlation coefficient. 
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Figure 5.15. Errors in azimuth/elevation measurements = 35 degrees. 
 
Figure 5.16. Errors in azimuth/elevation measurements = 35 degrees. 
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Figure 5.17 shows the avoidance volume obtained for the same conditions as for Figure 
5.16 but in this case, the error in tracking observables is 10 degrees. 
 
Figure 5.17. Errors in azimuth/elevation measurements = 10 degrees. 
5.5.3 Uncertainty in Velocity Measurements 
Uncertainty in the velocity measurements of the tracked object has an effect on the 
overall avoidance volume. The effect is intertwined with how relative dynamics between 
any two aerial platforms contribute to the uncertainties in measurements and to the 
definition of the SA&CA functionalities.  
Figure 5.18 shows the avoidance volume obtained for the following conditions 
(covariant case): 
{    ,     ,     } = 30, 20, 40 and {    ,     ,     } = 30, 30, 20 
Errors in azimuth and elevation are 40 degrees, the correlation coefficient is 0.34 and the 
uncertainty in velocity is 7 m/sec. 
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Figure 5.18. Uncertainty in velocity = 7 m/sec. 
Figure 5.19 shows the avoidance volume obtained for the same condition as in the 
above case but the uncertainty in velocity is 3 m/sec. This directly relates to the relative 
dynamics between two platforms, which is studied in detail in the next section. One of 
the key findings of this analysis is that when SA is ensured between two platforms or when 
there are no conflicts between their trajectory intents, then the avoidance volumes 
provide the separation minima to be followed in that particular scenario. This finding 
holds well provided there are no coupled environmental effects (wind shear, etc.) and is 
applicable to both manned and unmanned aircraft, as well as coordinated operations 
for all classes of airspace. 
5.5.1 Wind and Wake Turbulence 
Since many unmanned aircraft are very small in size, they are quite susceptible to 
turbulence-induced loss-of-control and trajectory excursions, which are important 
factors to consider in the implementation of SA&CA functionalities.  Wind effects can be 
conveniently included as an integral part of the aircraft dynamics model and affects the 
overall avoidance volume calculation. Automated means for forecasting turbulence 
levels in the atmosphere that effect unmanned aircraft, along with algorithms that 
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provide a turbulence hazard metric given the state of atmospheric turbulence are useful 
for this analysis.   
 
Figure 5.19. Uncertainty in velocity = 3 m/sec. 
The FAA has recently implemented new rules at a number of airports for keeping 
airplanes far enough apart so they are not affected by each other’s wake turbulence. 
This wake turbulence Re-Categorization (RECAT) more narrowly and accurately defines 
safe wake turbulence separation standards based on the performance characteristics 
of aircraft. Resulting from recent research in wake physics, this new system has six 
categories that are based on aircraft weight, approach speeds, wing characteristics 
and other special considerations. In a RECAT system, the required separation is modified 
(increased or decreased) depending on the pairings of leading and trailing aircraft. For 
unmanned aircraft, serious considerations must be taken to minimize the impact of wake 
turbulence on these light weight aircraft. It is envisioned that some of the possible 
impacts of hazardous wake encounters for UAS may include engine failure, temporary 
loss or total loss of aircraft command and control; resulting in loss of situational 
awareness by remote pilot and inability to respond to ATC instructions in a semi-
autonomous mode of operation. 
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In order to provide a rigorous approach to include wake turbulence in the SA&CA 
functionalities, each UAS (or perhaps groups of similar type) are to be evaluated for 
specific reactions (attitudes and altitude excursions) when encountering various wake 
strengths at a range of encounter geometries. Given the onboard guidance and 
attitude control logic and ability to return to normal controlled flight from wake 
encounter induced unusual attitudes, the overall avoidance volumes are defined taking 
into account the existing wake models to estimate the strength of wakes generated by 
UAS at different speeds and configurations [15 - 18]. 
5.6 Relative Dynamics between Platforms 
The geometric algorithms are defined based on definitions given in Figure 5.20.  
X
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Figure 5.20. Illustration of a conflict event. 
Whenever both the host aircraft and intruders are considered as points that move in a 
curved trajectory that can be expressed in a real space ℝ , then Frenet-Serret equations 
can be defined in order to express the relative motion [19]. Subsequently, a minimum 
separation distance    is defined. If the distance between the host aircraft and the 
moving intruder is or will be less than the separation distance at a specific time interval, 
then a conflict condition is established. 
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The algorithm for conflict resolution can be defined as follows, where a desired heading 
command  ̇  is given by: 
 ̇  (  
 
 
)
  
√     
    
  
                                              (5.48) 
where    is the heading error between the desired heading,  ̿     ̿, and the actual 
heading        is defined by: 
    ̿      ̿                                              (5.49) 
It can be observed that from the matching condition in both clockwise and 
anticlockwise resolutions, the velocity vector can be defined as:  
   
 
 
[
  
  
 ̂   ̂ ]                                              (5.50) 
where   is the heading. Also, a desired tangent vector to the circle of separation of 
radius      is defined as follows:  
  ̿  
 
 
[
  
  
 ̂   ̂ ]                                              (5.51) 
where the ratio,  
  
  
 , is valid with the assumption of constant velocity, providing  a unique 
solution. This ratio is obtained applying a cosine rule to the resolution geometry given by: 
  
  
         √                                          (5.52) 
The angle     is obtained graphically and determined for both resolution approaches 
(clockwise and anti-clockwise). In order to determine if a clockwise or anticlockwise 
solution will be performed, both desired vectors have to be considered (Figure 5.21).  
Then the criterion to determine the direction is to perform the rotation to the closest 
desired vector. In order to extend the solution to a 3D problem, a family of trajectories is 
generated around the heading axis and an optimal trajectory is selected by utilizing a 
proper cost function. The determination of whether an obstacle/intruder poses a collision 
threat (collision threat detection) is resolved using a collision threat model, which is a 
model that describes a situation that leads to a collision. 
The model and the subsequent required condition for collision occurrence are discussed 
in the following subsection. In order to describe a collision threat model for analysing the 
relative dynamics between platforms, the following scenario is considered. A host 
aircraft A and an intruder B are proceeding in a collision course as described in Figure 
5.22. 
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Figure 5.21. Obtained resolution.  
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Figure 5.22. Two objects in a collision course. 
Let point A be the position of host aircraft, A, and point B be that of the intruder, B. The 
position vectors of these aircraft are provided by  ⃑  and  ⃑  respectively. Here,  ⃑   is the 
vector of the position of object B relative to object A. The collision point  , with its 
corresponding position vectors  ⃑   and  ⃑  , is the location where objects A and B would 
collide if the planned trajectory of the host aircraft and predicted/estimated trajectory 
of other aircraft do not change. But since both objects have finite size, the collision 
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occurs earlier. To object A, the collision occurs as it reaches point   as shown in                  
Figure 5.23.  
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A
C
 
  
  
  
Avoidance
Volume
: Dynamic  Changes 
(expansion or contraction)
 
Figure 5.23. Collision scenario. 
The opposite but equivalent description is applicable to object B. During the course 
towards collision, the radial distance between the host aircraft and intruder is 
decreasing. Hence, a necessary condition for a collision to occur is given by: 
 |    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   |
  
                                                        (5.53) 
or 
|    ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗  |  |    ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗  |                                                        (5.54) 
Conditions can be described in relative perspective with respect to an observer in 
object A, or in object B. The moving object is object A and its velocity is described by its 
relative velocity to B. A volume given by       is defined around point B and this volume 
is a hazard to object A. The relative dynamics analysis allows for the expression of the 
rate of change of radial distance in terms of measured variables. 
 |    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   |
  
    ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ 
 
    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                                                      (5.55) 
 |    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   |
  
    ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ 
 
    ⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗                                                    (5.56) 
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Relative position and relative velocity are obtainable from direct measurement by on-
board range-and-direction sensors. The estimated time-to-collide (  ) is the time instance 
with respect to current condition when collision is estimated to occur and is given by: 
    
|    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   | (              )
|     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   |
                                              (5.57) 
The above condition is not sufficient for a collision to occur. For example, if trajectories of 
the host and intruder aircraft are parallel to each other, collision may not occur if the 
separating distance between trajectories exceed certain value, namely the sum of both 
object’s size radii. Therefore, another condition must be identified for describing the 
collision. It can be seen that the extension line of vector  ⃑  intrudes the avoidance 
volume, which means object A will collide with object B, provided the velocity vector of 
the host aircraft does not change in its direction.  
Angle     is defined as the angle of encounter, by which the host aircraft encounters 
the intruder aircraft. If the angle of encounter exceeds a certain predefined threshold 
value, a miss situation may occur instead of a collision. Such angle of encounter is called 
miss angle        , or       for short. By identifying these angles, the sufficient conditions 
for avoiding a collision are obtained and are given by: 
   ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ 
 
    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                                                         (5.58) 
or 
   ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ 
 
    ⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗                                                        (5.59) 
The other applicable conditions are given by: 
                                                              (5.60) 
or 
                                                              (5.61) 
The vectors for relative position and velocity are given by: 
   ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗     ⃗⃗  ⃗     ⃗⃗  ⃗                                                     (5.62) 
   ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗      ⃗⃗⃗⃗     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                                                     (5.63) 
   ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗        ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗        ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                                                  (5.64) 
where     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   and     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   are the radial and tangential components of the vector. The 
tangent angle is the angle of encounter    . The radial and tangential components are 
given by: 
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    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗    |    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   |              ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗                                        (5.65) 
    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗    |    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   |              ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗                                       (5.66) 
where: 
    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗   
   ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   
|    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   |
                                                      (5.67) 
    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗       
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗         
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗                                                (5.68) 
The decomposition is given by: 
         
   ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  
 
    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  
|    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   | |    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   |
                                             (5.69) 
     
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗             
   ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗        ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  
|    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   | |    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   |
                                         (5.70) 
The miss angle is expressed as: 
|       |          
  ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗   ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗
|    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   |
                                             (5.71) 
By introducing a clearance distance (        ) in       expression, the miss angle is 
modified as: 
|       |          
  ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗   ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗       ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗
|    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   |
                                        (5.72) 
and hence: 
|    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗       ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗    |
|    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗          ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗    |
 
  ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗   ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗       ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗
|    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   |
                                             (5.73) 
or 
|    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗       ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗    |
|    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗          ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗    |
 
  ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗   ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗       ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗
|    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   |
                                            (5.74) 
5.7 CNS Performance and Error Models 
The detection equipment for SA&CA involves a combination of non-cooperative sensors, 
including active/passive Forward-Looking Sensors (FLS) and acoustic sensors, as well as 
cooperative systems, including ADS-B and TCAS. Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
(GNSS), Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) and Vision Based Navigation (VBN) sensor 
measurements (and possible augmentation from aircraft dynamics model) are used for 
navigation. Appendix A provides a summary of multi-sensor data fusion techniques 
implemented for UAS integrated navigation systems. The navigation and surveillance 
sensors/systems are shown in Figure 5.24. The intruder state measurements are obtained 
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from cooperative and non-cooperative equipment and are supplied through the data 
bus for SA&CA. The tracks of the intruders are obtained by estimating its state 
information in real-time. The SA&CA system functionalities are based on algorithms that 
quantify in real-time the total uncertainty volume in the airspace surrounding the 
tracked object (presented in Chapter 4). Based on these analytical models, the 
implemented data processing techniques allow the real-time transformation of 
navigation and tracking errors affecting the state measurements to unified range and 
bearing uncertainty descriptors. Since these errors may be statistically independent (e.g., 
non-cooperative sensor) or dependent (e.g., ADS-B), the overall avoidance volume is 
calculated in real-time for each encounter. 
Navigation 
Sensors
Non-cooperative Sensors and 
Cooperative Systems
Intruder Tracks
Overall Avoidance Volume 
Safe Avoidance Trajectory
Airspace Management 
Integrity Flags
SA&CA
Algorithms
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Active FLS
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Figure 5.24. Navigation and surveillance sensors/systems. 
A conceptual representation of the overall avoidance volume obtained in relation to an 
identified collision threat and the avoidance trajectory generated by the NG-FMS is 
provided in Figure 5.25.  After identifying a RoC, if the original trajectory of the host 
platform intersects the calculated avoidance volume, a caution integrity flag is issued.  
An avoidance trajectory is generated in real-time and the steering commands are 
provided to the flight control surfaces. The SA&CA system has to sense and avoid air and 
ground obstacles of various characteristics (natural and man-made) including long and 
thin structures such as electrical cables and poles, as well as aerial obstacles such as 
other UAS and manned aircraft.  The role of CNS performance and the error model is 
shown in Figure 5.26. Two different models can be defined for determining the 
performance of a CNS system and the errors affecting the measurements. For example, 
PSR can be modelled using: 
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 the maximum range at which the system can determine a target of a specified 
size;  
 accuracy of target location measurement in terms of range and bearing; 
 ability to recognise the type of target, etc.  
Hence the performance model is different for each system. 
Overall Avoidance 
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Intruder Platform
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Avoidance Trajectory
Intruder Platform 
Trajectory
Host Platform
Initial Trajectory
 
Figure 5.25. Illustration of a collision detection & resolution mechanism. 
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Figure 5.26. Role of CNS performance and error models. 
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The divergence between the performance and error models are assessed and 
translated into metrics in time. Integrity is translated into time (timeframe to violation) 
and serves as an indicator for dynamic adaptation of airspace based on CNS system 
performance. Capacity changes in both space and time are dependent on the 
performance of CNS systems. Furthermore, in order to fulfil safety requirements for 
SA&CA system certification, integrity monitoring and augmentation algorithms will be 
implemented encompassing the entire CNS sensors/systems chain and the associated 
navigation and tracking loops.  
5.8 Avoidance Trajectory Optimisation 
In the context of conflict identification and resolution, trajectory optimization is 
characterised by the identification of the most suitable 3D/4D avoidance trajectory from 
the time of detection to the point where the aircraft re-joins the nominal trajectory, 
based on dynamics/airspace constraints, user preferences, intruder trajectory, as well as 
meteorological and traffic conditions. Hence, the adoption of computational algorithms 
required for trajectory optimisation in achieving SAA represents a substantial evolution 
from the conventional safe-steering methodologies adopted in current systems. 
Advanced multi-model and multi-objective 3D/4D trajectory optimisation algorithms are 
used in novel ground-based and airborne CNS+A systems as described in Chapter 3. 
Most computationally efficient trajectory optimisation algorithms adopted in the 
aerospace domain belong to the family of direct methods. These solution methods 
involve the transcription of the infinite-dimensional problem in a finite-dimensional Non-
Linear Programming (NLP) problem, hence following the approach summarised as 
“discretise then optimise”. Safety-critical applications of trajectory optimisation 
algorithms are actively investigated for airborne emergency decision support systems, 
also known as safety-nets. These safety-critical CNS+A applications impose real time 
requirements on the trajectory generation algorithm. Additionally, all generated 
trajectories must necessarily fulfil each and every set constraint, as the obstacle 
avoidance and the manoeuvring envelope are formulated as constraints. These 
requirements limit considerably the choice of solution methods and multi-objective 
optimality decision logics. In particular, a number of solution methods involve the 
intentional violation of constraints to promote convergence to optimality, such as the 
conventional implementation of collocation methods. Robust parallelised direct 
shooting solution methods with a posteriori decision logics were implemented for the 
generation of safe obstacle avoidance trajectories as part of the research on laser 
obstacle avoidance for manned and unmanned aircraft [20 - 23]. Direct shooting 
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methods, involving the transcription into finite-dimensional NLP problem, can be either 
performed by introducing a control parameterisation based on arbitrarily chosen 
analytical functions, as in transcription methods, or by adopting a generalised piecewise 
approximation of both control and state variables based on a polynomial sequence of 
arbitrary degree, as in collocation methods. In both cases the transcribed dynamical 
system is integrated along the time interval [      . The search of the optimal set of 
discretisation parameters is formulated as a NLP problem, which is solved 
computationally by exploiting efficient numerical NLP algorithms. In direct transcription 
methods, a basis of known linearly independent functions    ( ) with unknown 
coefficients     is adopted as the parameterisation in the general form: 
 ( )  ∑     ( )
 
                                                   (5.75) 
In direct shooting and multiple direct shooting, the parameterisation is performed on the 
controls  ( ) only, and the dynamic constraints are integrated with traditional numerical 
methods such as the Runge-Kutta family, while the Lagrange term in the cost function is 
approximated by a quadrature approximation. 
In multiple shooting, the analysed time interval is partitioned into      subintervals. The 
direct shooting method is then applied to each subinterval. Parallel implementations of 
direct shooting involve the simultaneous integration of a family of trajectories based on 
different control parametrisation profiles, taking advantage of increasingly common 
multi-thread/multi-core hardware architectures. The optimal solution is determined a 
posteriori, both in the case of single objective and multi objective implementations. The 
following set of differential algebraic equations for the aircraft dynamics are adopted: 
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                          (5.76) 
The state vector consists of the following variables: v is longitudinal velocity (scalar)  [m s-
1]; γ is flight path angle (scalar) [rad];   is track angle (scalar) [rad];   is geographic 
latitude [rad];   is geographic longitude [rad]; z is flight altitude [m];   is thrust angle of 
Ph.D. Thesis - Next Generation Flight Management Systems for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Operations                
- Automated Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance Functionalities  
216 
 
attack [rad] and m is aircraft mass [kg]; and the variables forming the control vector are:  
T is thrust force [N]; N is load factor[dimensionless] and μ is bank angle [rad]. Other 
variables and parameters include: D is aerodynamic drag [N]; vw is wind velocity, in its 
three scalar components [m s-1]; g is the gravitational acceleration [m s-2]; RE is radius of 
the Earth [m] and FF is fuel flow [kg s-1]. Adopting a multi-phase trajectory optimisation 
formulation, the selection of the optimal trajectory along the first phase (safe steering) is 
typically based on minimising a cost function of the form: 
               (  )      (  )      ∫ ( )                    (5.77) 
where  ( ) is the slant distance of the host platform along the avoidance trajectory from 
the avoidance volume associated with the obstacle,                  is the time at 
which the safe avoidance condition is successfully attained, TTT is the time-to-threat and 
AMT is the avoidance manoeuvre time,  ( ) is the host platform’s mass and 
{             } are the positive weightings attributed to time, distance, integral distance 
and fuel respectively. In time-critical avoidance applications (i.e., closing obstacles with 
high relative velocities) appropriate higher weightings are used for the time and 
distance cost elements. 
In terms of achieving separation maintenance, considering sector/runway capacity 
model, the time of separation between manned/ unmanned aircraft is given by: 
         [
      
  
  
 
  
     ] when                                  (5.78) 
         [
    
  
     ] when                                        (5.79) 
where      is the time of separation,    and    are the velocities of adjacent aircraft,      is 
the distance of separation,   is the required separation and   represents the order. 
5.9 SA&CA Certification Framework 
One of the fundamental limitations for certification authorities for SA&CA functions is the 
inability to evaluate whether the system performance achieves comparable or superior 
levels of collision detection and resolution to manned aircraft, along with separation 
maintenance upon replacing the on board pilot with a Ground Control Station (GCS) 
remote pilot. Appendix B provides a compilation of the certification standards, AMC, 
GM, and recommended practices for the three categories (two-pilot aircraft, single-pilot 
and UAS) encompassing the Operational (OP), Technical (TC), Safety (SAF), Human 
Factors (HF) as well as Test and Evaluation (TE)   aspects [24].  
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The material was sourced from national/international organizations such as the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) from Australia, 
the UK and New Zealand, the US Department of Defence (DOD) and the Institute for 
Defense Analyses (IDA). References are also made to standards from Aeronautical 
Radio Incorporated (ARINC), American Society of the International Association for 
Testing and Materials (ASTM), Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), 
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), and NATO Standardization Agreements 
(STANAGs) [25 - 28]. 
5.9.1 SA&CA Hardware and Software Selection in UAS 
This section provide The avionics hardware in small UAS is typically chosen to be in the 
PC/104 form factor or even a smaller configuration for achieving smaller size, ruggedness 
and modularity. The Size, Weight and Power (SWaP) requirements are carefully analysed 
for the hardware implementation. The Tailored Input/Output (TIO) software needs to be 
able to provide information exchange from/to ARINC-429, RS-232/422/485, USB and 
additional interfaces as required.  
The hardware design needs to ensure a straightforward path to compliance with RTCA 
DO-254 and other safety assessment standards for certification. The detailed hardware 
requirements, design information and traceability matrix is provided during the system 
development process. The SA&CA system is envisaged to be integrated into the existing 
avionics compartment (within NG-FMS) so as to minimally impact the existing payload 
capacity of the host aircraft. 
The navigation and tracking sensors are distributed between the avionics compartment 
and the airframe as appropriate (avoiding mechanical/electromechanical 
interferences and mitigating impacts on payload capacity).  A number of sensor 
configurations are investigated during the SAA system development phase. As an 
example, the FAA Field-of-Regard (FOR) recommendations are illustrated in                            
Figure 5.27 (a). Considering two non-cooperative sensors (visual camera and radar) for 
Collision Detection and Resolution (CD&R) tasks, the FOR obtained is depicted in Figure 
5.27 (b).  
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Figure 5.27. FAA FoR (a) and a possible sensors’ installation (b). 
This visual sensor equipped with a stabilised gimbal assembly provides an approximate 
FOV of 75º in azimuth and 20º in elevation. The fusion of optical sensors with other non-
cooperatives sensors increases the angular accuracy. In this case, radar is employed for 
extracting range measurements and provides a FOV of 40º in azimuth and 15º in 
elevation. This sensor arrangement allows the GCS operator to select the azimuth 
orientation of the FOV among three possible directions: aligned with the platform 
heading (normal flight envelope) or 20º left or right with respect the platform heading.  
The data fusion (software) techniques include a programmable core component and 
an Application Programming Interface (API) providing a set of commands, functions 
and protocols, catering to dedicated application functionalities.  
The NG-FMS hardware and software interface is depicted in Figure 5.28. The applications 
will be partitioned according to their criticality levels. The system software needs to be 
programmed in the avionics mission computer (a multi-core processor) and should 
provide a straightforward path to compliance with RTCA DO-178C and other software 
certification standards. 
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Figure 5.28. NG-FMS hardware and software interface. 
5.9.2 Approach to Certification 
The research on a certifiable SA&CA system is innovative in targeting successful 
certification by Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and other 
aviation safety certification organisations. The distinctive advantage that the proposed 
SAA system offers for achieving certification is the capability to determine the safe-to-fly 
UAS envelope based on the on board sensors and alternatively to identify the required 
sensors in order to achieve a certain predefined safety envelope. This two-way 
approach is represented in Figure 5.29. 
In particular, considering the nominal flight envelopes of a host aircraft and the intruder 
as well as the on board sensors, the SA&CA software determines the attainable safety 
envelope. Conversely, based on a predefined (required) safety envelope and on the 
intruder dynamics, the SA&CA functionalities embedded in the NG-FMS support the 
identification of sensors that are required to be integrated onto the aircraft. As part of an 
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incremental approach targeting certification, extensive simulation along with ground 
and flight test activities need to be accomplished.   
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Figure 5.29. Two-way approach to certification. 
The following elements are identified to be part of the SA&CA system development: 
 Human factor considerations and Human Factors Engineering (HFE) elements for 
the design of the SA&CA specific elements in the GCS remote pilot HMI2; 
 Inclusion of different non-cooperative sensor and cooperative systems 
equipment in the test bed system architecture; 
 System hardware and software assurance; 
 Test campaigns according to airspace characterisations; 
 Safety cases for operations in specific airspace category; 
 Low altitude flight testing in the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) context. 
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5.10 Conclusions 
The algorithms employed for determining the performance of sensors/systems and 
determining the avoidance trajectory   in the unified approach to cooperative and non-
cooperative SA&CA for manned and unmanned aircraft were described. Based on the 
identified state-of-the-art SA&CA technologies, a BDL driven decision tree test bed 
system reference architecture is presented. Implementations involving Boolean logics 
are generally hard wired and cannot be reconfigured and this limits the scope of unified 
framework in terms of automatic decision making capability. An architecture for 
selecting the sensors/systems was defined based on their performance achieved at any 
instant of time. Covariance matrices were used for estimating sensor and system 
performances. After identifying a RoC, if the original trajectory of the host platform 
intersects the calculated avoidance volume, a caution integrity flag is issued.  The 
algorithms used for avoidance trajectories (in near real-time) were also presented. The 
need for a certifiable SA&CA system and the implementation design drivers were also 
presented. The pathway to certification was described, with the unified approach 
emerging as an innovative method in targeting successful certification by CASA, FAA, 
CAA and other aviation regulatory bodies. By applying the unified approach and by 
considering the nominal flight envelopes of the host UAS and other traffic as well as the 
on board sensors, the approach determines the attainable safety envelope. Conversely, 
based on a predefined (required) safety envelope and dynamics of other traffic, the 
software is capable of identifying the sensors that are required to be integrated in the 
aircraft. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
GROUND OBSTACLES SA&CA                     
CASE STUDY 
“Invention consists in avoiding the constructing of useless contraptions and in 
constructing the useful combinations which are in infinite minority”. - Henri Poincare 
6.1 Introduction 
Based on the analytical models described in Chapter 4, data processing techniques 
allow the real-time transformation of navigation and tracking errors affecting the state 
measurements to unified range and bearing uncertainty descriptors. The investigation of 
this chapter focusses on validating the SA&CA algorithms for ground targets. An 
introduction to the available ground obstacle detection and avoidance technologies is 
presented, followed by a detailed case study on the LIDAR Obstacle Warning and 
Avoidance System (LOWAS) as one of the possible implementation technologies for the 
unified approach to SA&CA. 
6.2 Ground Obstacle Detection and Warning Systems  
The demand for reliable ground obstacle warning and avoidance capabilities to ensure 
safe low-level flight operations has led to the development of compact collision 
avoidance systems for a variety of fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Capabilities to prevent 
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) are primarily provided by the flight crew and the ATM 
system ensuring safe operation of the aircraft. Safety is ensured by using primary 
instrumentation onboard the aircraft, carefully adhering to the ATCo instructions and 
being aware of the overall situation [1]. Secondary on-board guard against CFIT is 
provided by employing terrain proximity detection and warning devices commonly 
known as Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS). 
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TAWS are developed to provide warnings for possible conflicts with terrain by taking into 
account inputs such as aircraft states, glideslope and databases (terrain, obstacles and 
airport). TAWS are generally classified into three types namely: 
 Class-A TAWS: This class of equipment is required for turbine-powered airplanes 
operated under part 121 (airline) and part 135 (charter) of 10 or more passenger 
seats [2]. The system includes a minimum of five basic functions including forward 
looking terrain avoidance, premature descent alert, attention alerts, terrain 
awareness display and indications of imminent contact with the ground. 
 TAWS Class-B: This class of equipment is required for turbine-powered airplanes 
operated under part 91 with six or more passenger seats and for turbine-powered 
airplanes operated under part 135 with six to nine passenger seats [2]. The system 
includes a minimum of four basic functions including forward looking terrain 
avoidance, premature descent alert, attention alerts and indications of imminent 
contact with the ground. 
 TAWS Class C: This class of equipment is targeted to be used in small general 
aviation airplanes that are not required to install Class B equipment, which 
includes minimum operational performance standards intended for piston-
powered and turbine-powered airplanes.  
Statistics show that there is a significant drop of accidents after the introduction of radio 
altimeter and Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS) in commercial turbo jet aircraft 
[1]. GPWS, also termed as Ground Collision Avoidance System (GCAS) in the military 
context, uses on-board sensors for estimating radio altitude, air data and attitude to 
assess the aircraft’s current state, compares it to known hazardous situations and 
generates timely and usable visual and aural warnings. GPWS produces warnings in five 
modes/states of undesirable aircraft behaviour including [1]: 
 Mode 1 - Excessive barometric sink rate with respect to terrain clearance; 
 Mode 2 - Excessive rate of terrain closure with respect to terrain clearance; 
 Mode 3 - Excessive altitude loss after take-off; 
 Mode 4 - Unsafe terrain clearance with respect to phase of flight, airspeed, 
and/or aircraft configuration; 
 Mode 5 - Excessive descent below the Instrument Landing System (ILS) glideslope 
angle. 
In GPWS, a level flight towards terrain can only be implied by detecting rising terrain 
under the aircraft. In case of flight towards steeply rising terrain, such an implementation 
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may not allow enough time for corrective actions by the flight crew [3]. The Predictive 
GCAS (PGCAS) and Enhanced GPWS (EGPWS) were developed later to incorporate 
current flight path status, aircraft performance and Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED). 
GPWS and EGPWS technologies were mandated for implementation following accidents 
at Dulles, US in 1974 and Cali, Columbia in 1995 respectively. In particular, the EGPWS 
was developed to address the shortcomings of GPWS including late/no warnings and 
improper pilot response. A database of known runway locations, a DTED and a 
computer for calculating a virtual terrain clearance floor are included in the EGPWS. 
Seven different modes are supported by the EGPWS, with modes 1 through 4 the original 
GPWS modes. The recent additions are the enhanced modes supported by terrain 
proximity display, terrain ahead detection, and terrain clearance floor features. The 
modes, respective causes and warnings issued by the EGPWS are provided in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1. EGPWS modes, causes and warnings. 
MODE and CAUSE WARNING 
Mode 1: 
Excessive descent rate and 
severe descent rate 
When the Rate of 
Descent (ROD)    
increases rapidly 
“sink rate, sink 
rate” 
“whoop, whoop, 
pull up, pull up” 
Mode 2: 
Excessive terrain closure 
rate 
When closure rate 
with the terrain 
increases 
“terrain, terrain” 
“whoop, whoop, 
pull up, pull up” 
Mode 3: 
Altitude loss after take-off 
or  go-around 
Loss of altitude after      
take-off or go-around 
phase 
“don’t sink” 
Mode 4: 
Unsafe terrain clearance 
when not in the landing 
configuration 
Too low condition 
“too low, terrain” 
“too low, gear” too low, flaps” 
Mode 5: 
Excessive deviation below 
an ILS glideslope 
Too low condition “Glideslope” 
Mode 6:                                        
Bank angle / altitude 
callouts 
Excessively steep bank 
angles 
“Bank Angle” 
Mode 7:                                               
Wind shear callouts 
Wind shear detection “Wind Shear” 
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In military aircraft, Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto GCAS) is being 
used after the development of this technology for nearly three decades. Auto GCAS has 
been successfully integrated into a number of military platforms including the F-16.  
Auto GCAS automatically assumes control of an aircraft when an imminent collision is 
detected (with the ground) and returns control back to the flight crew when the collision 
is averted. State-of-the-art Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) technology employing 
eye-safe laser sources, advanced electro-optics and mechanical beam-steering 
components delivers the highest angular resolution and accuracy performance in a 
wide range of operational conditions. LIDAR Obstacle Warning and Avoidance System 
(LOWAS) is thus becoming one of the most mature and successful solutions with several 
potential applications to manned and unmanned aircraft. The remaining sections of this 
chapter address specifically the employment of LOWAS as one of the possible 
implementation for achieving automated SA&CA of ground obstacles. 
6.3 UAS Obstacle Warning and Avoidance System 
Small-to-medium size UAS are particularly targeted for LOWAS applications since they 
are very frequently operated in proximity of the ground and the possibility of a collision is 
further aggravated by the very limited see-and-avoid capabilities of the remote pilot.  
A number of mission-and-safety critical tasks involve low-level flight activities beyond the 
relatively safe aerodrome perimeter. Low level and terrain-following operations are often 
challenged by a variety of natural and man-made obstacles. The significant number of 
obstacle strike accidents recorded is a major concern both for aircraft operators and for 
people on the ground [4, 5]. Reduced atmospheric visibility due to adverse weather 
conditions is frequently a contributing factor in such accidents, but the difficulty in 
identification of small-size obstacles such as wires has led to accidents and incidents 
even in clear sky conditions. Significant development activities are specifically 
addressing the integration of obstacle detection, warning and avoidance systems for 
granting separation maintenance and collision avoidance capabilities [6 - 12].  
Table 6.2 compares a number of sensor technologies for Obstacle Warning System 
(OWS) applications in small-to-medium size UAVs. Unfortunately, state-of-the-art RADAR is 
not capable of detecting small natural and man-made obstacles such as trees, power 
line cables, and poles.  
 
 
Ph.D. Thesis - Next Generation Flight Management Systems for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Operations                
- Automated Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance Functionalities  
229 
 
Table 6.2. Obstacle detection technologies. 
 
 
The outstanding angular resolution and accuracy characteristics of Light Detection and 
Ranging (LIDAR), as well as its good detection performance in a wide range of 
incidence angles and weather conditions provide an ideal solution for obstacle 
detection and avoidance [3]. Different types of lasers including Nd:YAG, semiconductor 
lasers such as GaAs and GaAlAs lasers have been employed for OWS [13]. Due to eye-
safety and adverse weather (fog) propagation concerns, further development with 1.54 
m (frequency-shifted Nd:YAG and Er:glass) solid state lasers and various semiconductor 
lasers has been substantially reduced, in favour of CO2 lasers [14, 15].    
6.4 Operational Requirements 
The operational requirements for a reliable and effective OWS include: 
 Capability to detect all types of hazardous obstacles, including topographic 
features, vegetation, buildings, poles/masts, towers, cables and transmission lines; 
 Operability in all-time and all-weather conditions, including low-light and 
darkness; 
REQUIREMENT MAGNETIC THERMAL 
MILLIMETRIC 
WAVE RADAR 
LIDAR 
Wire detection 
Only 
energized 
wires 
Only energized 
wires 
All wires preferably 
perpendicular to 
flight trajectory 
All wires 
Detection range Short Short As required As required 
Coverage Area Small As required As required As required 
Resolution and 
accuracy 
(obstacle type, 
position and distance) 
Insufficient 
Good for 
position and 
type, no ranging 
capabilities 
Medium Very high 
All-weather 
performance in low-
level flight 
Good Poor Very good Good* 
False alarm rate High Low Very low Very low 
Base technology 
status 
Mature Mature State-of-the-art 
State-of-
the-art 
* Laser energy is significantly attenuated by rain and blocked by clouds and fog. 
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 High minimum detection range, adequate for the platform airspeed 
performance; 
 Wide Field of View (FoV), adequate for the manoeuvring envelope limits of the 
platform; 
 High range and bearing resolutions; 
 Accurate and good probability of detection, since no real obstacle threat shall 
remain undetected; 
 Very low false alarm rate, to prevent spurious warnings that would increase the 
remote pilot’s workload and prompt unnecessary avoidance manoeuvres, which 
are potentially disruptive to the safety of the mission; 
 Satisfactory technological readiness levels. 
6.5 System Description 
The LOWAS is designed to detect obstacles placed in or nearby the aircraft trajectory, 
classify/prioritise the detected obstacles, and provide obstacle visual and aural warnings 
and information to the crew. The key components of the LOWAS are the Sensor Head 
Unit (SHU), the Processing Unit (PU), the Control Panel (CP) and the Display Unit (DU). The 
LIDAR beam scans periodically the area around the host platform’s longitudinal axis 
within a FoV of 40° in azimuth and 30° in elevation (Figure 6.1). 
15°
15°
20°
20°
 
Figure 6.1. LOWAS FOV. 
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In order to enhance coverage during turning manoeuvres at high yawing rates, the 
remote pilot may vary the azimuth orientation of the LOWAS FoV by 20° left/right with 
respect to the vertical axis. As conceptually depicted in Figure 6.2, during every 
complete FoV scan (4 Hz refresh frequency), the LIDAR beam generates a number of 
elliptical scan patterns across the FoV.  
 
Figure 6.2. LOWAS scan pattern for a slowly advancing platform. 
This scanning pattern is well suited to detect the most dangerous obstacles like wires as 
they produce several regularly spaced vertical lines. The electro-mechanical device 
that is adopted to produce the described scanning pattern is a swashing mirror. The 
architecture LOWAS tailored for UAS is shown in Figure 6.3 [16]. LOWAS display unit and 
warning generator are located in the cockpit of a manned aircraft, while in the case of 
an UAV, the interactions with the remote pilot involves LoS and BLoS communication 
links. Both LOS and BLOS communication links are necessary for providing voice and 
data link communications with the GCS and with the Next Generation Air Traffic 
Management (NG-ATM) system. Voice communications might include Automatic Voice 
Recognition (AVR) as well as Synthetic Voice Reply (SVR) systems [17]. Additionally, 
telemetry data need to be exchanged between the UAS and the GCS for aircraft 
control as well as for downlinking of both flight parameters and obstacle information 
(enabling vehicle tracking, mission control and mission profile updates). 
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Figure 6.3. LOWAS avionics integration architecture for UAS. 
6.6 Obstacle Detection and Classification Software  
The signal pre-processing steps involve an analogue optical-electrical conversion of the 
echo signal by an Avalanche Photodiode (APD), a signal pre-amplification by an 
Automatic Gain Control (AGC) and a comparison with an adjustable threshold in order 
to fine-tune sensitivity on the basis of the expected return signal power in relation with 
the time elapsed from the LIDAR pulse emission. The threshold level may also be tuned to 
take into account the background conditions. These features reduce the probability of 
false echo detection due to atmospheric back-scattering near the laser beam output 
and optimise the system sensitivity in all weather conditions. Subsequently, digital signal 
processing is performed in order to validate positive echo detections, determine the 
position of the detected obstacles and their geometrical characteristics. For this 
purpose, the LOWAS software architecture is organised in two sequential stages: Low 
Level Processing (LLP) and High Level Processing (HLP). Figure 6.4 represents the signal 
processing software architecture. 
The LLP is performed on the individual echoes in order to determine range, angular 
coordinates and characteristics of the obstacle portion generating them. The tracking 
data processing provides the tracks of intruders after pre-processing (excluding false 
alarms, etc.). 
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Figure 6.4. LOWAS signal processing software architecture. 
The HLP analyses the LLP output to identify groups of echoes, in order to reconstruct the 
shape and type of the obstacle. The LOWAS is capable of automatically classifying 
obstacles according to the following classes: 
 Wire: all thin obstacles like wires and cables (e.g., telecommunication/power lines 
and cableways); 
 Tree: vertical obstacles of reduced frontal dimensions (e.g., trees, poles and 
pylons); 
 Structure: extended obstacles (e.g., bridges, buildings and hills). 
The single echoes are processed as soon as they are acquired. The wire LLP algorithm 
processes only the echoes whose magnitude is weaker than pre-defined thresholds. 
Subsequently, the wire HLP algorithm is employed on the subset of acquired echoes in 
the current frame. Clusters are merged into a single obstacle by means of iterative 
image segmentation, specifically implemented to identify echoes characterised by a 
uniform range. A statistical algorithm subsequently validates the merged echoes by 
verifying if the obstacle is generated by real aligned echoes or by noise data. The 
processing algorithms for extended obstacles (trees and structures) are also divided in 
two different phases: echo analysis and segmentation. The echoes already classified as 
extended objects are processed by a dedicated validation algorithm, since many of 
these are not generated by obstacles (like, for example, the ground). A well-defined 
number of echoes, acquired in a short time range, have some geometrical 
characteristics. The segmentation algorithm is responsible of detecting, merging and 
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validating the clusters of echoes. The integration of high-resolution databases of fixed 
obstacles (power lines, buildings, etc.), when flying over a well characterised operational 
area into the LOWAS algorithms, can support reduction of the overall processing time 
and provide an accurate estimation of their position. The LOWAS performs automatic 
prioritisation of the detected obstacles based on the risk represented according to the 
relevant range, and provides timely visual and aural warnings to the flight crew, 
including information about the detected obstacles. The dedicated signal processing 
algorithms grant reliable detection performance, independent from the platform 
motion, allowing a reconstruction of the obstacle shape without using navigation data 
(stand-alone integration) in slow-moving platforms characterised by a typical flight 
envelope (rotorcraft and fixed-wing aircraft). The LOWAS can also be integrated with 
the onboard navigation and guidance system to grant equally efficient reliable 
detection in extreme flight envelopes of high-dynamics platforms [18, 19]. 
6.7 Mathematical Algorithms 
The microwave radar range equation also applies to laser systems and the power 
received by the detector is given by [4]: 
   
     
    
 
 
    
 
   
 
                                               (6.1) 
where    is the transmitter power,    is the transmitter antenna gain,   is the range [m],   
is the aperture diameter [m],      is the atmospheric transmittance and      is the system 
transmission factor. With laser systems, the transmitter antenna gain is substituted by the 
aperture gain, expressed by the ratio of the steradian solid angle of the transmitter 
beam width    to that of the solid angle of a sphere as given by: 
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In the far field, the transmitter beam width can also be expressed in terms of aperture 
illumination constant,    as: 
     
 
 
                                                          (6.3) 
Substituting for    and   in equation (6.1), we obtain: 
   
   
    
 
 
  
 
  
  
                                                 (6.4) 
An aperture operating at the eye-safe wavelengths has a far-field distance of 
approximately 20 km [5].  As a result, it is not unusual to operate in the near-field of the 
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optical systems and hence the range equation is modified to account for near-field 
operations.  This near-field effect modifies the beam width such that: 
  √(
   
 
)
 
  (
   
 
)
 
                                               (6.5) 
The range equation is dependent on the target area. The effective target cross-section 
is given by:   
  
  
 
                                                             (6.6) 
where   is the scattering solid angle of target [sr],   is the target reflectivity and    is the 
target area. Substituting   with the value associated with the standard scattering diffuse 
target (Lambertian target) having a solid angle of π steradians, we obtain: 
                                                                (6.7) 
The cross-sectional area of a laser beam transmitted by a circular aperture from a 
distance is given by: 
   
    
 
                                                         (6.8) 
Depending on the target-laser spot relative dimensions we may distinguish three 
different types of targets: extended, point and linear targets. In case of a point target 
(Fig. 6.5-a), the target cross-section is given by: 
                                                                (6.9) 
Hence the range equation is expressed as: 
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In case of a linear target such as a wire (Fig. 6.5-b), it can have a length larger than the 
illuminated area but a smaller width (d).  The target cross-section is given by: 
                                                             (6.11) 
Replacing with the beam width provided in equation (6.3), the range equation is 
expressed as: 
   
   
   
 
       
 
 
  
   
                                           (6.12) 
In case of an extended target such as a wire (Fig. 6.5-c), all incident radiation is involved 
in the reflection process. Thus, for an extended Lambertian target we have a target 
cross-section given by: 
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                                                (6.13) 
Therefore the range equation is expressed as: 
   
     
  
 
    
  
                                               (6.14) 
(a) (b) (c)
Point Target
Wire Target
d
R
Extended Target
 
Figure 6.5. Target sections. 
6.8 Formats and Functions 
The formats and functions are made adaptive and are a combination of the following:  
 Safety Line: selected when the airspeed is low;  
 Wires and pylon (vertical, linear obstacles e.g. poles and bare trees):  selected 
when the represented wire and pylon obstacles are detected within the OWS 
detection range; 
 All obstacles: selected when the represented synthetic obstacles are those 
detected within the OWS detection range and 
 OWS 3D (colour-coded LIDAR image): selected especially when a 
superimposition of Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) images is required for low-light 
and night time operations. 
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In addition to the formats and functions above, a combination of symbols are 
considered for enhancing the representation of detected obstacles and to complement 
the decision making process:  
 Distance from obstacle; 
 Isolated obstacles (e.g. buildings, groups of trees, etc.); 
 Integrity flags (cautions and warnings); 
 Flight vector; 
 Evade advice cue; 
 Plan Position Indicator (PPI) and  
 Terrain map. 
Three general levels of alerts are defined for the LOWAS (warning, caution and advisory). 
These alerts are provided to the pilot through aural and visual outputs as shown in Table 
6.3. Warning cues are provided as direct voice outputs, and presented in a warning 
panel, a Helmet-Mounted Sight/Display (HM S/D) and a Multi-Function Display (MFD). 
Cautions are supplied as tones and indicated in the warning panel, HM S/D and MFD 
while advisory alerts are presented only in the MFD. 
Table 6.3. LOWAS alerts. 
 Tone 
Direct 
Voice 
O/P 
Warning 
Panel 
HM  S/D MFD 
Warning cue      
Caution  -    
Advisory - - - -  
 
The warning cues are triggered when a detected obstacle is within the selected range 
or 10” from the impact point. The cautions are produced when the OWS is out of FOV or 
in case of a failure/degradation of the OWS functions.  
6.9 Simulation Case Study 
A conceptual representation of the overall avoidance volume obtained in relation to an 
identified collision threat and the avoidance trajectory generated by the SA&CA system 
is provided in Figure 6.6.  The ground obstacles of various characteristics (natural and 
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man-made) including long and thin structures such as electrical cables and poles are 
detected. After identifying collisons, if the original trajectory of the SA&CA system host 
platform intersects the calculated avoidance volume, a caution flag is issued. As a 
result, an avoidance trajectory is generated in real-time and steering commands are 
provided to flight control surfaces.  Realistic simulation scenarios were considered to 
evaluate the avoidance trajectory generation algorithm and assess its performance.   
Overall Avoidance 
Volume
Avoidance 
Trajectory
Power Line
Initial 
Trajectory
 
Figure 6.6. Obstacle avoidance scenario. 
The scenario considered is that of an AEROSONDETM UAV equipped with LOWAS flying 
towards a number of obstacles of different geometric characteristics as illustrated in 
Figure 6.7.  
 
Figure 6.7. Case study scenario. 
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The LOWAS equipped UAV is considered to be flying at an altitude z = 100 m Above-
Ground Level (AGL), at a relatively low speed (20 m/s) and approaching a power 
transmission line consisting of a tower and a number of wires of 10 mm diameter both in 
front of the UAV flight path and on the left side. The altitude of the lowest wire is 80 m 
AGL and the altitude of the highest wire is 120 m AGL; the wires are separated by about 
6.5 m vertically and 5 m laterally. The transmission lines lie approximately 100 m in front 
and 40 m each to the side of the UAV. The original horizontal flight trajectory would lead 
to a collision with the power transmission line. After a successful detection of all wires, the 
algorithm calculates the distances to each of them. As previously described the 
algorithm then recognises that the calculated distances are all comparable with the 
UAV size and therefore combines all wires in a single avoidance volume. The building 
behind the transmission line is 155 m high, 50 m in length and 50 m in width and the NG-
FMS generates an additional avoidance volume for this structure. Since wire targets are 
assumed to extend laterally, the trajectory characterised by the greater distance (and 
hence optimal in this case) is the one entailing a straight climb manoeuvre. The re-join 
trajectory is computed using pseudospectral optimisation techniques described in [20 - 
22] and in Chapter 4. The computed avoidance volumes (one for the power line and 
one for the building) and the optimised avoidance trajectory are depicted in Figure 6.8. 
 
Figure 6.8. Results of the avoidance trajectory generation algorithm. 
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The UAV also avoids the extended target (building) by generating a smooth optimised 
trajectory from the safe manoeuvring point. These simulations were executed on a 
Windows 7 Professional workstation (64-bit OS) supported by an Intel Core i7-4510 CPU 
with clock speed 2.6 GHz and 8.0 GB RAM. The execution time for uncertainty volume 
determination and avoidance trajectory optimisation algorithms was in the order of 1.4 
sec. Such an implementation makes it possible to perform the real-time separation 
maintenance and collision avoidance task. 
6.10 Conclusions 
The LOWAS system was proposed as one of the core non-cooperative sensors in an 
integrated SA&CA architecture for small-to-medium size UAS. The system architecture, 
mathematical models and simulation case studies performed to develop a novel Laser 
Obstacle Warning and Avoidance System (LOWAS) were presented. The algorithms for 
computing the avoidance volumes associated with obstacles and for the generation of 
optimal avoidance trajectories were presented along with a representative simulation 
case study. Tailored display formats developed for the UAV remote pilot station were 
presented including Safety Line (SL), Wires & Poles (W&P), all obstacles and Integrated 
LOWAS/FLS (ILF) formats. The demonstrated detection, warning and avoidance 
performance, determination of overall uncertainty volumes and avoidance trajectory 
generation algorithms ensure a safe avoidance of all potentially conflicting obstacles. 
Subsequently, a comprehensive simulation case study of the avoidance trajectory 
generation algorithms is accomplished using the AEROSONDETM UAV as a test platform. It 
is concluded that the ground obstacle detection and trajectory optimization algorithms 
ensure a safe avoidance of all classes of obstacles (i.e., wire, extended and point 
objects) in a wide range of weather and geometric conditions, providing a pathway for 
possible integration of this technology into future NG-FMS architectures.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
AERIAL OBSTACLES SA&CA                            
CASE STUDY 
“The  reater the obstac e  the more glory in overcoming it”. - Molière 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented a dedicated analysis and simulated case study on the 
application of a unified approach to SA&CA for detecting and avoiding ground targets. 
This chapter presents the algorithms employed in a simulated case study involving non-
cooperative sensors, cooperative systems and combinations thereof.  Later sections 
address in more details the simulated case studies performed for evaluating the SA&CA 
functionalities.   
7.2 Non-Cooperative SA&CA – FLS 
Gimballed visual and thermal cameras are used for determining position and velocity 
estimates of the intruders. To obtain all-weather operation, thermal imaging is used in 
conjunction with visual imaging. Assuming the camera provides an approximate FOV of 
70º with a resolution of 2.0 MP, the fusion of optical sensors with other non-cooperative 
sensors increases the angular accuracy. LIDAR scaled versions are used for extracting 
range measurements, and they provide a good FOV both in azimuth and in elevation. It 
allows the operator to select the azimuth orientation of the FOV among three possible 
directions: aligned with the platform heading (normal flight envelope) or turning left/right 
with respect the platform heading. This option provides an optimized coverage for 
turning manoeuvres at high angular speed. For stabilised obstacle detection, after 
image acquisition, the noise caused by the platform motion is removed. Bottom-hat 
morphology is performed to detect negative contrast features that correspond to the 
threats. Low-level tracking is achieved by utilising a number of filtering methods, one 
being the ad-hoc Viterbi filtering method by employing a bank of filters [1].  
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Let   
 (   ) be the filter output at time step,   of pixel (   ) for the filter bank branch  , and 
  (   ) be the greyscale level of pixel (   )   in which the ad-hoc Viterbi filter steps, for 
            and all  , are carried out. The statistical test criterion for evaluation to 
determine the actual presence of a collision threat is given by: 
                  [  (   )                                            (7.1) 
where    is the comparison parameter. An illustration of the acquired, stabilised and 
tracked visual image is shown in Figure 7.1 and 7.2. 
   
Figure 7.1. Acquired and stabilised visual image. 
 
Figure 7.2. Tracked object. 
An example of an acquired thermal image [2], which is subjected to segmentation and 
tracking is illustrated in Figure 7.3.  
A low-cost navigation and guidance system is adopted for position estimates, which 
includes GNSS, along with various categories of inertial and VBN sensors. When the set 
threshold is exceeded and the detection is continuous, high level tracking detection is 
performed by using an extended or unscented Kalman filter.  
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Figure 7.3. Acquired thermal image and tracked object. 
The predicted state,   ̂( ) at time   is given by:  
  ̂( )  
[
 
 
 
  ( )
  ( )
  ( )
  ( )]
 
 
 
 [
    
    
    
    
]
[
 
 
 
  (   )
  (   )
  (   )
  (   )]
 
 
 
     
[
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  ]
 
 
 
 
[
  
  
]   ( )           (7.2)       
where    ( ) is the position in the   and   cardinal directions respectively as a function of 
time,  .    ( ) is the velocity in the   and   direction respectively,    ( ) is the 
acceleration and  ( ) is the prediction Gaussian noise. The Kalman Filter equations are: 
 ̂ (   )   ̂ (     )    ( )[  ( )   ( )  (     )                   (7.3) 
  (   )    (     )    ( )  ( )  
 ( )                              (7.4) 
where: 
  ( )    (     )  
 ( )  
  ( )                                   (7.5) 
  ( )  [  ( )  (     )  
 ( )    ( )]                              (7.6) 
where   ( ) represents the design matrix and   ( ) is the measurement noise covariance 
matrix and   is the sample time. A higher-level tracking algorithm is employed to 
combine the estimates instead of combining the observations from different sensors. The 
track fusion algorithm is defined as the weighted average variance of all the tracks and 
is given by: 
 ̂ (   )    (   )  ∑   
  (   )  ̂ 
 
   (   )                          (7.7) 
  (   )  [∑   
  (   )    ]
  
                                     (7.8) 
Once the tracks are fused and the states are estimated, the imminent trajectory is 
predicted. The errors in predicted trajectory can be derived from the quality of the 
measurements, reflected in the prediction error, which are expressed as: 
Ph.D. Thesis - Next Generation Flight Management Systems for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Operations                
- Automated Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance Functionalities  
246 
 
   (     )     [ (   )   ̂ (     )                             (7.9) 
where  (   ) is the exhibited (modelled) trajectory and  ̂ (     ) is the predicted 
optimal trajectory at sample time    .  
For trajectory prediction, the obstacle centre of mass, the target orientation and the 
geometric shape of the uncertainty volume are determined. Once the trajectory is 
predicted, the Risk-of-Collision (RoC) is determined by calculating the probability of a 
NMAC event for the predicted trajectory over the time horizon by employing Monte 
Carlo approximations given by: 
 (    (    ))  
 
   
∑ (          |  (  )|    )
   
                         (7.10)      
where     is the number of samples,    is defined as a future horizon up to where it is 
desired to predict the trajectory,    is the minimum distance required to avoid the 
obstacle and    is the time horizon defined for collision. The accuracy of the 
approximation is entirely based on the number of samples.  
7.3 Cooperative SA&CA – ADS-B 
In a cooperative traffic scenario, the ADS-B system is used to obtain the state of the 
intruders. The future position of the intruders is projected based on the estimate of the 
current state vector and the flight profile. The ADS-B measurement model adopted for 
intruder position and velocity estimates in    and   is given by: 
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Assuming that the velocity components,   ( ),   ̇( ),   ( ) and   ̇( ) are affected only 
by Gaussian noise with zero mean, the standard deviation is defined by the covariance 
matrix given by: 
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                                 (7.12)       
where  [   represents the mean. Using the data fusion model described in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.8), the state vector of the intruders is determined and this is propagated to 
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predict the future trajectories using a probabilistic model. After computing the mixing 
probability, the combination of the state estimate is given by: 
 ̂ (   )  ∑   ̂
 (   )      ( )                                      (7.13) 
where   ( ) is the mode probability update. For conflict detection, the resultant 
covariance matrix,   after transformation is defined as: 
                                                               (7.14) 
where S is the diagonal covariance matrix and R represents the transformation matrix 
between the heading aligned frame to that of the host aircraft coordinate frame. The 
probability of conflict is defined as the volume below the surface of the probability 
density function,  (     ) representing the conflict zone. The conflict probability,    is 
expressed as: 
   ∫ ∫ ∫  (     )
  
  
       
       
        
       
       
                      (7.15) 
where        represents the conflict separation distance and         and     
correspond to the rows of the conflict boundary matrix. The state elements transmitted 
are the latitude and longitude, barometric altitude, geometric altitude, and velocity. 
The error messages reported are Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACp), the 
Navigation Accuracy Category for Velocity (NACv), Navigation Integrity Category 
(NIC), Source Integrity Level (SIL), and SDA. ADS-B is also subject to several additional 
sources of error namely latency error, resolution error, and Message Success Rate (MSR) 
error.  The NACp, NACv, NIC, SIL, SDA, latency error, resolution error, and MSR error 
provide a basis from which to derive an error characterization to model ADS-B. Given 
the NACp and NACv, the horizontal position and velocity can be modelled as a 
Rayleigh random process. From the Rayleigh process, the 95% bound on both the 
position and velocity error can be used to derive the variance for a Gauss-Markov 
process with zero-mean Gaussian noise for the North and East position and velocity. 
Based on values of NACp=303.8 ft and NACv=19.4 kn, the horizontal North and East 
position error can be modelled as a zero- mean Gaussian distribution with a standard 
deviation of 124 ft, and the North and East velocity can be modelled as a zero-mean 
Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation of 8 km. The error in the ADS-B reported 
vertical velocity varies with increasing vertical rate. For vertical rates between ±500 
ft/min, the vertical rate tolerance is ±46 ft/min [3, 4].   
Given the assumption that these tolerances are 95% bounds (this assumption holds good 
for the assessment of horizontal position and the associated uncertainty), it is estimated 
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that the standard deviation of the climb rate is 27.96 ft/min for vertical rates of                     
±500 ft/min. Additionally the vertical rate error is eﬀected by the resolution of the ADS-B 
message encoding which is 64 ft/min. Based on the received NACp, then the 
surveillance applications could determine whether the accuracy of transmitted 
geometric position is suitable for the intended purpose [3, 4]. The navigation uncertainty 
categories for different NACp are summarised in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1. Navigation uncertainty categories [3, 4].  
NACp 95% Horizontal Accuracy Bounds Use 
0 EPU >18.52 km  
1 EPU<18.52 km RNP-10 accuracy 
2 EPU<7.408 km RNP-4 accuracy 
3 EPU<3.704 km RNP-2 accuracy 
4 EPU<1852 m RNP-1 accuracy 
5 EPU<926 m RNP-0.5 accuracy 
6 EPU<555.6 m RNP-0.3 accuracy 
7 EPU<185.2 m RNP-0.1 accuracy 
8 EPU<92.6  m GPS(with SA on) 
9 EPU<30 m GPS(with SA off) 
10 EPU<10 m WAAS 
11 EPU<3 m LAAS 
 
Table 7.2 provides the relationship between NACv and the horizontal figure of merit for 
velocity. 
Table 7.2. Navigation uncertainty categories - velocity. 
NACv Horizontal Velocity Error (95%) 
0 Unknown or >10 m/s 
1 <10 m/s 
2 <3 m/s 
3 <1 m/s 
4 <0.3 m/s 
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The Estimated Position Uncertainty (EPU) is a 95% accuracy bound of horizontal position. 
The ADS-B equipment extracts EPU from the accuracy reports provided by the 
navigation module. When using GNSS, EPU is also called the Horizontal Figure of Merit 
(HFOM). Similar to NACp, NACv is derived from 95% accuracy figure of merit for velocity. 
The EKF is employed to derive the accurate state vector of the intruder aircraft from the 
raw ADS-B measurements.  
7.4 Simulation Case Studies 
Simulation case studies were performed to test the SA&CA algorithms for aerial objects.  
7.4.1 Tracking and Detection Performance 
Tracking for the aerial objects was accomplished using Kalman filter and Track-to-Track 
algorithms. The covariance matrix of process noise   and measurement noise R are 
given by: 
  
[
 
 
 
 
         
         
         
         
         
         ]
 
 
 
 
                               (7.16) 
  [
       
       
       
]                                        (7.17) 
The initial state covariance    is defined as:  
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The initial conditions of the tracked object are assumed to be the following:  
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ( )
  ( )
  ( )
  ( )
  ( )
  ( ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 ]
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   (7.19) 
Given a sampling rate of 0.1 sec and the total time to be 100, the filtering results are 
presented below. The position in X, Y and Z are shown in Figures 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 
respectively. The 3D trajectory of the tracked object is shown in Figure 7.7. 
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Figure 7.4. Measured and estimated X position. 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Measured and estimated Y position. 
 
Based on the illustrated results and the given initial conditions, the Kalman filter algorithm 
is able to track the generated random trajectory of a point (target centroid) in the 3D 
plane.   
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Figure 7.6. Measured and estimated Z position. 
 
The measurement vector with a measurement noise shown in Equations 7.16 – 7.19 were 
used in this analysis and the resultant Mean Square Error (MSE) in X, Y and Z were 
obtained as shown in Figure 7.8. It is observed that the results obtained with the selected 
extended Kalman filter give a good performance with only one measurement. Based on 
the test bed architecture illustrated in Chapter 5, the accuracy of the measurement 
vector (tracking observable) can be increased by having more than one source (e.g. 
multiple tracking sensors/systems). 
 
 
Figure 7.7. Acquired thermal image and tracked object. 
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Figure 7.8. MSE in X, Y and Z. 
Given the host aircraft’s current position is [-50000, 0, 3000] m and the velocity is                  
[200, 0, 0] m/s and also given an intruder in the airspace flies from an initial tracked 
position [-500, 45000, 3000] m with constant speed [0, -200, 0] m/s, the conflict probability 
is analysed for a range of covariance values. Given the position covariance for both 
aircraft is diag([1000*1000, 1000*1000, 15*15]) and the velocity covariance aircraft is 
diag([25, 25, 9]), the conflict probability results are summarised below. 
The trajectory intents of the host aircraft and the intruder are shown in Figure 7.9.  
 
Figure 7.9. MSE in X, Y and Z. 
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After tracking the intruder using ADS-B reports for several seconds, the state vector 
estimation derived from the extended Kalman filter starts converging to the true value. 
Based on the last updated output from the extended Kalman filter, the conflict 
detection module calculates the probability of conflict within the look ahead window, 
which is set to 300 sec. A conflict alert is issued if the probability of conflict is greater than 
the detection threshold (here the threshold used in 0.7). To arrive at the threshold value, 
ac comparison of conflict detection threshold, probability of false alert and probability 
of detection was performed. When the threshold is 0.7, the probability of detection is 
0.9855 and probability of false alert is 0.18%. Based on this analysis, the It was concluded 
that a good balance between false alerts and miss alerts can be derived if the 
detection threshold is set to be 0.7. Therefore 0.7 is used as the conflict detection 
threshold in this thesis. From the perspective of consequence, miss alert is worse than 
false alert. It is essential to keep miss alert probability as low as possible. The conflict span 
generated by the conflict detection module is from 171 to 241 s as seen from Figure 7.10. 
Given the required separation minima, the real separation between the host aircraft 
and other traffic does not meet the required performance from 172 to 237 s as seen from 
Figure 7.11. 
 
Figure 7.10. Conflict probability. 
The overall avoidance volume is generated taking into account the real-time position 
measurements, tracking observable and relative dynamics between the two platforms 
and is shown in Figure 7.12. 
 
Figure 7.11. Real and required separation. 
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Figure 7.12. Avoidance volume at time of conflict. 
 
The following case study considers a scenario in which objects are tracked using non-
cooperative sensors (using forward-looking sensors). At the beginning of the simulation, 
both unmanned aircraft are placed far enough from each other that one is at the 
outside of the avoidance volume before being allowed to move freely according to the 
given initial velocities.  
The given initial velocities are chosen so that both unmanned aircraft immediately move 
into a collision course with each other. The collision threat situation is indicated by the 
estimated time-to-collide and its value decreases over time and hence reduces the 
collision risk. The estimated and true tracks of the intruder are shown in Figure 7.13. 
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Figure 7.13. Conflict scenario. 
The real as well as measured values of range, azimuth and elevation are shown in Figure 
7.14. 
 
Figure 7.14. Range and bearing data. 
The covariance of the measured range is 1000 m and the bearing covariance is      . 
The look-ahead window is 300 seconds. The correspondent real and required separation 
is shown in Figure 7.15. 
It can be seen that the distance is less than the required horizontal separation, which is 
5NM and occurs from 37 to 94 s. The overall avoidance volume generated, taking into 
account the real-time position measurements, tracking observable and relative 
dynamics between the two platforms, for this case is shown in Figure 7.16. 
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Figure 7.15. Real and required separation. 
 
Figure 7.16. Range and bearing data. 
Further simulation case studies were performed using manned and unmanned aircraft 
platforms (AEROSONDETM UAS and Airbus A320 aircraft) for evaluating the 
computational complexity of the SA&CA functionalities. The simulations were executed 
on a Windows 7 Professional workstation (64-bit OS) supported by an Intel Core i7-4510 
CPU with clock speed 2.6 GHz and 8.0 GB RAM. The execution time for uncertainty 
volume determination and avoidance trajectory optimisation algorithms was in the 
order of 8 sec. Such an implementation may make it possible to perform real-time 
separation maintenance tasks, as well as avoidance of any identified collisions 
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(emergency timeframes). Since the proposed algorithms are employed in a safety-
critical application, it is important to explore the Worst Case Execution Time (WCET). A 
pure measurement-based method may not be sufficient in most SA&CA applications. 
But, given that the unified approach to SA&CA algorithms implemented in the NG-FMS 
are deterministic by design, a measurement-based method can provide an estimate of 
the WCET. The difficulties include the worst initial environment and overestimation of the 
WCET. The most demanding cases require more than 8 sec for a complete execution of 
the software code, but, at the same time, the WCET also depends on the number of 
processors, parallel computation elements and architecture design (32-bit, 64-bit, etc.) 
Both cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA cases were considered for simulation 
activities with the AEROSONDETM UAS acting as the host platform. The host unmanned 
platform was equipped with SAA functions to carry out cooperative and non-
cooperative conflict resolution and collision avoidance tasks. In the first case, it is 
assumed that no cooperative systems are on board the intruder. The uncertainty volume 
is generated in near real-time after evaluating the risk of collision at the collision point. 
An avoidance trajectory is generated (based on the platform dynamics) to maintain the 
required separation and to prevent any mid-air collisions at all of the predicted time 
epochs (Figure 7.17). 
 
Figure 7.17. Avoidance of other traffic by host aircraft platform. 
The avoidance trajectory is initiated by the SA&CA system when the probability of 
collision exceeded the required threshold value. Time and fuel were used in the cost 
functional; the aircraft dynamic model was used as a dynamic constraint, and the 
elevation criteria as path constraints for differential geometry or pseudospectral 
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trajectory optimisation algorithms. Three distinct points associated with the avoidance 
algorithms include: 
 Break-off Point: Corresponding to the point where the host UAV initiates the 
avoidance trajectory (commanded by the SA&CA system). The cost function 
criteria adopted in this case is minimum time; 
 Safe Maneuvering Point:  Corresponding to the point where the host UAV can 
maneuver safely (any maneuver within its operational flight envelope) as it has 
approximately 0 ROC.  From this point onwards the SA&CA cost function criteria 
switches to minimum time and minimum fuel to get back on the original (desired) 
track; 
 Re-join Point:  Corresponding to the point where the host UAV re-joins the original 
(desired) track. 
After the obstacles are detected and tracked, an avoidance trajectory is generated 
and the corresponding action commands are executed. As a result, the intruder is 
evaded and the trajectory of the host aircraft is restored to its original intended path 
after performing the avoidance manoeuvres.  
7.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the algorithms used for intruder detection and avoidance were 
described. Simulation case studies on the application of a unified approach to 
Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance (SA&CA) for detecting and avoiding 
aerial targets were presented. The generation of an avoidance volume, when in the 
presence of non-cooperative sensors (forward-looking sensors) as well as cooperative 
systems such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) was 
demonstrated. Simulation case studies were also presented for the analysis of relative 
dynamics between platforms. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
POTENTIAL UAS TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT 
APPLICATIONS 
“Everythin   however co p icate  - breaking waves, migrating birds, and tropical 
forests - is made of atoms and obeys the equations of quantum physics. But even if 
those equations could be solved, they wouldn't offer the enlightenment that 
scientists seek. Each science has its own a tono o s concepts an   aws”.                          
- Martin Rees 
8.1 Introduction  
The integration of UAS is targeted by the UTM system to ensure safety and operation 
efficiency of the airspace. Some lessons learnt from low-altitude uncontrolled airspace 
operations of helicopters, gliders and general aviation aircraft are used in UTM system 
implementation. Uncertainties in navigation and tracking error measurements 
associated with each manned/unmanned platform (as seen by all other conflicting 
platforms) are required to be combined statistically to generate avoidance volumes for 
manual as well as autonomous operations. The unified approach to SA&CA provides the 
framework to generate uncertainty volumes at discrete time intervals as a function of 
traffic relative dynamics and thus supports the generation of dynamic geo-fences and 
UTM system implementation. Preliminary case studies are performed for evaluating the 
feasibility and potential of applying the unified approach to SA&CA in an urban 
environment.  
8.2 UTM System in the CNS+A Framework 
A brief introduction on UTM system implementation preliminaries was presented in 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.9).  
Opportunities exist for UTM research and technology in several key areas including [1-7]: 
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 safe and efficient airspace operations including Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLoS) 
autonomous operations; 
 tracking and locating every cooperative and non-cooperative UAS using a 
variety of techniques including cellular, satellite and automatic dependent 
surveillance technologies; 
 SA&CA techniques for implementing an efficient TDA loop for avoiding any aerial 
and ground targets including small wires, poles, etc.;  
 command, control and communications, including coordinated manned and 
unmanned aircraft operations; 
 first/last 50 feet supported by sensors, hardware and software (algorithms) for 
autonomous operations; 
 security considerations including providing effective countermeasures against 
cyber-physical attacks. 
In the CNS+A framework, the general case is that of multiple manned/unmanned 
aircraft performing either cooperative or non-cooperative surveillance.  Research is on-
going on a regional as well as global scale for demonstrating the feasibility of the UTM 
concept [1, 2]. The UTM system provides remote pilots the information needed to 
maintain separation from other aircraft by reserving areas for specific routes, with 
consideration of restricted airspace and adverse weather conditions. The UTM concept 
is illustrated in Figure 8.1, highlighting CDM between UAS operation centres and UTM 
stakeholders.  
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Figure 8.1. UTM system concept. 
Strategic separation coordination and some tactical separation management are 
considered as part of UTM in addition to contingency management, surface operation 
management and capacity-demand balancing. In the long term, UTM research is 
envisaged to integrate in particular, the functionalities for trajectory prediction and 
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negotiation, conflict detection and resolution, separation/spacing monitoring and 
optimisation for mixed manned/unmanned aircraft traffic both within individual 
controlled airspace sectors and across multiple sectors belonging to a FIR, also 
considering the inbound/outbound flows from adjacent FIRs. Additionally, UTM supports 
functions associated with airspace design and management, geo-fencing, congestion 
management, authenticated operations and weather predictions. As a significant 
portion of the UAS fleet is specifically employed on an opportunity-basis with little to no 
advance planning, one of the key challenges that need to be addressed is the access 
of this opportunistic UAS traffic to controlled airspaces and the subsequent implications 
on design and development of future traffic management systems.  
Typically, all flight geographies are composed of: independent conformance 
geography and protected geography. For an already accepted operation, if a new 
constraint (weather cell, security threat, ATM defined constraint, etc.) that intersects that 
operation’s protected geography enters the UTM system, an alert will be generated by 
the UTM system and delivered to the concerned UAS operator/remote pilot. It is 
envisioned that the definition of the protected geography will be driven by a function of 
available data within the UTM system. Those data and the function would be available 
to all stakeholders, to improve understanding and collaboration within UTM. The UTM 
system concept can be extended to contain a number of UTM systems as shown in 
Figure 8.2. As an example, three UTM nodes are defined and three surveillance nodes A, 
B and C catering to the different UTM nodes. The surveillance nodes can provide 
services to more than UTM node as shown in Figure 8.2. The UTM nodes are constructed 
using regular polygons, which do not intersect with one another. Since UAS operations is 
possible across a number of UTM nodes, soft and hard handoffs can be employed 
based on the surveillance technology involved. All UAS platforms (different 
configurations and types) can be catered to using this approach.   
8.3 Multi-UTM System  
Surveillance nodes consist of non-cooperative sensors (radar, camera, etc.) and 
cooperative systems (ADS-B, TCAS, etc.). These surveillance nodes are generally 
geographically decoupled from the UTM nodes. The UTM nodes consist of data 
management entities (local and global gateways). UTM nodes may or may not require 
coverage by surveillance nodes (i.e. depending on applications, risk, performance, 
etc.). However it is assumed that if a UTM node region does need surveillance, it is fully 
encompassed by one or more surveillance node volumes.  
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From Figure 8.2, it can be seen that the coverage of UTM node 1 is split by surveillance 
nodes A and B. The UTM node 2 is covered by the surveillance node B. The concept of a 
hand-off is applicable when a RPAS passes from one surveillance node to another. 
Surveillance nodes can also be categorised as: 
 manned aircraft only (mostly cooperative),  
 unmanned aircraft only (mostly non-cooperative),, 
 cooperative manned and unmanned aircraft only,  
 cooperative manned aircraft and non-cooperative unmanned aircraft only, 
 cooperative/non-cooperative (mixed equipage) manned and unmanned 
aircraft. 
This methodology, driven by the unified approach to SA&CA, can be in turn be used to 
develop and manage key parameters of DAM, which include traffic density per unit 
volume, sector boundary optimisation, and required CNS services. The dynamic 
reconfiguration of airspace is performed by varying the lateral shape (different volumes 
obtained from the unified approach) of the control sectors, and new vertices/faces are 
added based on the employed SA&CA algorithms.  
UTM Node 1
UTM Node 3
UTM Node 2
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Surveillance 
Node C
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Figure 8.2. UTM and surveillance nodes. 
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8.4 Pathways to Implementation  
One of our traditional conceptions of warfare and UAS operations has been severely 
disrupted over the last few years, in a sense that the operational space has shifted from 
the field to the urban environment. This shift is driving a fundamental change in the 
operation of UAS in a variety of civil and military applications, with concomitant 
implications for technology development. The systems and assets required to support 
open field campaigns are qualitatively different from that needed for Military Operations 
in Urban Terrain (MOUT). Surveillance and reconnaissance operations in cities and towns 
are a particular topic of interest. The urban environment is sufficiently different that the 
utility of conventional sensing and communication platforms is rendered problematic. In 
virtually all cases, the principal rationale for these vehicles is to help establish and 
enhance sensing and communication networks in a network-centric environment [8]. 
8.4.1 Multi-Platform Scenario 
The urban space is a dynamic environment. Small buildings arise in a matter of weeks, 
and large buildings in months. Parked or abandoned vehicles and obstacles can be 
perfectly effective blockades, and require a reactive, close-in mode of sensing. In fact, 
geometrically, the urban space is of an entirely different scale than the traditional kind 
of aircraft operations. While in free-space environments the focus has been on formation 
flight and collective trajectory generation and tracking, urban environments impose 
different challenges and offer different opportunities. In some situations, UAS can assist 
one another, by serving as nodes or repeaters in a communications network, as 
lookouts, decoys, or as slaved remote sensors. In even tighter models of collaboration, 
multiple vehicles can be used to multi-laterate on a target signal; i.e., take signal 
strength and/or directional measurements that can later be combined to geolocate the 
target with more precision than any single vehicle-borne sensor possibly could [9]. 
Figure 8.3 shows one of the various possible scenarios of multi-platform operations in an 
urban environment. In this scenario, three airspace sectors are considered. The 
uncertainties in navigation and tracking associated with each manned/unmanned 
platform (as seen by all other conflicting platforms) are combined to generate 
avoidance volumes surrounding each aircraft. The avoidance volumes are computed 
at discrete time intervals as a function of traffic relative dynamics. The host and other 
traffic may be equipped with non-cooperative sensors, cooperative systems or 
combinations thereof. Figure 8.3 also  shows a conceptual representation of the variable 
avoidance volume associated with aircraft 4, obtained by combining (in a statistical 
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sense) the navigation and tracking errors related to cooperative and non-cooperative 
SA&CA observations by all other aircraft at sequential time epochs as well as a function 
of relative dynamics.  
The more recent advances in Communication, Navigation, Surveillance, ATM and 
Avionics (CNS+A) technologies are progressively supporting the introduction of dynamic 
DCB strategies. The new CNS+A technologies greatly increase the flexibility of routes and 
airspace configurations, which are both of great use for DCB. The novel CNS+A systems 
for TBO/IBO are conceived to meet the ambitious CNS performance requirements and 
expected to support an increase in traffic density without compromising flight safety. 
These include the Next Generation Flight Management System (NG-FMS), Next 
Generation ATM (NG-ATM) and UTM systems, supported by high-throughput, secure and 
reliable data links. The capacity can be therefore expressed as a function of the CNS 
performance as follows. The capacity factor of airspace sector   due to Communication 
Performance (CP) alone can be expressed as a factor of the minimum CP guaranteed 
by all traffic j concurrently in the sector. An example, in terms of Communication 
Integrity (CI) is given by [10]: 
                                                                   (8.1) 
Similar expressions hold true for Navigation Integrity (NI) and Surveillance Integrity (SI): 
                                                                   (8.2) 
                                                                    (8.3) 
After obtaining all the avoidance volumes in airspace sector 3, the largest of the four 
avoidance volumes is selected as a reference to perform DCB. In addition to the CNS 
systems both onboard and on the ground that dictate the adherence RTSP, the SA&CA 
functionalities provide a methodology to perform DCB. 
As shown in Chapter 5, given any two aircraft in the same or adjacent airspace sectors, 
the condition before collision are such that the radial distance between the host aircraft 
and intruder is decreasing. This is a necessary condition for a collision. Considering the 
scenario presented in Figure 8.3, the necessary conditions between the host aircraft (H) 
and the other four intruder (I) platforms are given by: 
 ||    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗||
  
                                                           (8.4) 
and 
||    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ||  ||    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ||                                                     (8.5) 
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Figure 8.3. Multi-platform scenario. 
where   = 1 to 4 representing the number of intruders. Conditions can be described in 
relative perspective with respect to an observer in the host aircraft or in any of the four 
intruder platforms.  An overall avoidance volume, given by   ⃗⃗  ⃗     ⃗⃗⃗⃗  is defined for each 
intruder. The relative dynamics analysis allows expressing the rate of change of radial 
distance in terms of measured variables. 
 ||    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗||
  
     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  
 
     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗                                                  (8.6) 
 ||    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗||
  
     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  
 
     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗                                                  (8.7) 
Relative position and relative velocity are obtainable from direct measurements by 
onboard non-cooperative sensors or cooperatives systems. The estimated time-to-collide 
(  ) is the time instance with respect to current condition when collision is estimated to 
occur, and is given by: 
    
||    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗|| (  ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗        ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗)
||     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗||
                                             (8.8) 
The above condition is not sufficient for a collision to occur. For example, if trajectories of 
the host aircraft and an intruder are parallel to each other, collision may not occur if the 
separating distance between trajectories exceed certain value, namely the sum of both 
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object’s size radii. Therefore, another condition must be identified that will make a 
sufficient condition for the collision condition. By identifying the angle of miss and angle 
of encounter, the sufficient conditions for avoiding a collision are obtained.  
    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  
 
     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗                                                        (8.9) 
or 
    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  
 
     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗                                                      (8.10) 
The vectors for relative position and velocity are given by: 
    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗      ⃗⃗⃗⃗      ⃗⃗  ⃗                                                   (8.11) 
    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗       ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                                                    (8.12) 
    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗        ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗        ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗                                              (8.13) 
where      ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ and      ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ are the radial and tangential components of the vector. The 
tangent angle is the angle of encounter,  . The radial and tangential components are 
given by: 
     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗   ||    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗||                 
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                                        (8.14) 
     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗   ||    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗||                 
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                                         (8.15) 
where: 
     
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   
    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ 
||    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗||
                                                  (8.16) 
     
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗        
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗         
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                                              (8.17) 
8.4.2 TMA Environment 
In terms of granting the required levels of operational safety when considering the 
integration of unmanned traffic in an airspace characterised with dense air traffic, the 
emphasis is on CNS+A equipment that can meet strict performance requirements while 
also supporting enhanced ATM functionalities. These systems will enable the UTM 
paradigm to support flow management functions. In particular, in order to grant the 
required surveillance performance and SA&CA capabilities for unrestricted access to 
controlled airspace, UAS surveillance equipment involve a combination of non-
cooperative sensors, as well as cooperative systems. In order to overcome the limitations 
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in current ACAS, the FAA has funded research on the Next Generation Airborne Collision 
Avoidance System - ACAS X.  
Some of the key limitations in current ACAS include inadequate/improper coordination 
with ATM and/or air traffic flow management systems, lack of terrain/ground and 
obstacle awareness, primarily range-based presentation of traffic and unsuitability to 
include UAS in the framework. Therefore, taking advantage of recent advances in 
computational techniques and keeping pace with planned future operational 
concepts, Voice/data/network radio communication system and satellite 
communication systems data links act as the backbone for LoS and BLoS 
communications between air-to-air, air-to-ground and ground-to-ground systems. As an 
example, a deconfliction scenario in the context of an arrival point merge in the TMA is 
illustrated in Figure 8.4.  
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Figure 8.4. Deconfliction scenario in the TMA [11]. 
In this scenario, the predicted trajectory of an unmanned aircraft (traffic A) is conflicting 
with another unmanned aircraft (traffic B), a commercial airliner (traffic C) and a 
general aviation aircraft (traffic D) at three distinct points. Traffic A is equipped with both 
non-cooperative sensors/cooperative systems for SA&CA and traffic B has on-board 
non-cooperative sensors only. Traffic C is equipped with cooperative traffic collision 
detection and avoidance systems (e.g., based on ADS-B), whereas the general aviation 
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aircraft (traffic D) features a non-cooperative collision avoidance system (e.g., machine-
vision/radar based). Based on the traffic data exchanged or sensed, traffic A’s NG-FMS 
generates three distinct avoidance volumes. In this example, the volumes associated 
with traffics B and C are merged into a combined volume (avoidance volume 1) when 
the algorithm detects they are overlapping. A similar process is repeated for all four 
aircraft in the TMA (in this case, the TMA control service defines a sequencing approach 
based on first-come first-served and/or best-equipped best-served) and the resulting 
path constraints are fed to the 4DT planner and optimiser modules of the NG-FMS in 
order to generate four conflict-free trajectory solutions. These intents are then sent to the 
NG-ATM system. Alternatively, implementing a fully automated approach, the 
uncertainties in navigation and tracking associated with each manned/unmanned 
platform (as seen by all other conflicting platforms) are combined to generate 
avoidance volumes surrounding each aircraft in the TMA. The uncertainty volumes are 
computed at discrete time intervals as a function of traffic relative dynamics.  
Figure 8.5 shows a conceptual representation of the variable avoidance volume 
associated with traffic A obtained by combining (in a statistical sense) the navigation 
and tracking errors related to cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA observations by 
all other aircraft at sequential time epochs.  
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Figure 8.5. Fully autonomous deconfliction scenario in the TMA [11]. 
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In this case, the NG-FMS exchange real-time avoidance information updates, compute 
the optimal 4DT to be executed by each platform and communicate these intents to 
the NG-ATM system. The concept of automated SA&CA operations for this scenario 
provide the following characteristics [12]: 
 Airspace building blocks may or may not be necessary; 
 Automated SA&CA; 
 All aircraft are capable of automated SA&CA; or fewer unequipped aircraft and 
more aircraft with automated SA&CA functionalities; 
 Addresses complexity management; 
 Arrival intents begin at top of descent, departure corridors end at top of climb, 
overflight corridors may connect wind optimal user preferred routes; 
 Intents are dynamic, based on DCB and weather conditions; 
 Controller primarily manages air traffic flow, or else controller manages flows as 
well as conflicts between aircraft with mixed equipage. 
8.5 Simulation Case Studies  
The case studies performed for evaluating the feasibility and potential of applying the 
unified approach to SA&CA in the UTM context are presented in this section. The case 
studies are performed in realistic scenarios such as urban environments. Different urban 
environments were simulated with realistic models obtained from SketchUpTM as shown in 
Figure 8.6.  
 
Figure 8.6. Simulated urban environment. 
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After conceptualising the required scenario of the urban model, the file with the 
Stereolithography File (STL) extension was exported to a MATLAB environment. The STL file 
segregates the environment to a number of objects characterised by faces and vertices 
of a 3D surface geometry.  The surface of each object is composed of a number of 
oriented facets, each of them consisting of a unit normal vector to the facet and a set 
of three points listed in counter clockwise order representing the vertices of the facet. 
This representation is suitable for performing computations in a MATLAB environment. The 
STL standard includes two data formats including ASCII and binary. The ASCII code 
format was selected to support an easier implementation in MATLAB. The AEROSONDETM 
was used as the UAS platform. The modelled environment and the UAV geometry 
imported into the MATLABTM environment are shown in Figure 8.7.  
 
Figure 8.7. Simulated urban environment in MATLABTM. 
After importing the STL file in MATLAB, all of the objects were meshed and appropriate 
geo-fences were constructed for trajectory planning and real-time optimisation. As an 
example, the vertices of ten selected objects from the scenario are shown in Figure 8.8. 
 
Figure 8.8. Vertices of imported objects. 
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The overall simulation environment is shown in Figure 8.9 and the AEROSONDETM UAS is 
also highlighted. The top view (2D) of the simulation environment after importing into 
MATLAB is shown in Figure 8.10. 
 
Figure 8.9. Simulated urban environment in MATLABTM (3D). 
 
Figure 8.10. Simulated urban environment in MATLABTM (2D). 
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In an UTM system, by definition, geofences can be both static and dynamic. Important 
landmarks such as main government headquarters are often designed to be enclosed 
by a static geofence while dynamic geofences are constructed around moving objects 
and vary depending upon the available situational awareness. However, in the unified 
approach to SA&CA, all geofences are considered to be dynamic, taking into 
consideration the errors in navigation measurements of the host platform and tracking 
measurements of other objects (static and dynamic), thus improving safety and 
efficiency of manned and unmanned aircraft operations but increasing computational 
overhead and cost.  
Real-time trajectory optimisation takes into account the current FoV, a history database 
of all detected objects and the geofences to be avoided at that point of time. The UAV 
with the current FoV is shown in Figure 8.11. 
 
Figure 8.11. UAV and the current FoV. 
The next subsequent step involves the selection of the optimal trajectory from the 
generated set of safe trajectories, which is then provided in the form of steering 
commands to the aircraft guidance subsystem of the NG-FMS. The implemented 
decision logics are based on minimisation of the following cost function as discussed 
earlier in Chapter 5: 
                ( )  ∫[        ( )]                               (8.19) 
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where, given     as the time-to-threat and    as the avoidance manoeuvre time,       is 
the time at which the safe avoidance condition is successfully attained, defined as: 
                                                                              (8.20) 
    [
  
 
  ] is specific fuel consumption,  ( ) is thrust profile and the coefficients           
are the weights attributed to time, fuel and distance respectively. The term dm (t) 
corresponds to the minimum distance from the dynamic geo-fence, which is given by: 
  ( )     [√( ( )     ( ))  ( ( )     ( ))  ( ( )     ( )) ]             (8.21) 
where    ,     and     are the coordinates of the bounding surfaces of the dynamic 
geo-fence. The optimised trajectory generated in the given urban scenario at the 
current epoch is shown in Figure 8.12. 
 
Figure 8.12. Optimised trajectory of the unmanned aircraft. 
8.5.1 Geofences  
Simulation case studies for UAS SA&CA in an UTM context demonstrated the functional 
capability of the NG-FMS to generate dynamic geo-fences satisfying the operational 
requirements of typical tactical online tasks (in the order of 84 seconds) as well as 
emergency scenarios (in the order of less than 10 seconds). Further Simulation case 
studies were performed to assess the NG-FMS algorithms ability to generate geo-fences 
and optimised trajectories. Figure 8.13 shows avoidance trajectory generation indicating 
geo-fences. In this case, a ground obstacle is detected by a non-cooperative sensor 
and a geo-fence is constructed around the detected obstacle. The obstacles can be 
categorized into point, lateral (e.g., wires) and extended structure targets. These 
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simulations were executed on a Windows 7 Professional workstation (64-bit OS), 
supported by an Intel Core i7-4510 central processing unit with clock speed 2.6 GHz and 
8.0 GB RAM. The total execution time for uncertainty volume determination, as well as 
avoidance trajectory optimisation algorithms was in the order of 1.4 sec, supporting real-
time implementation of the developed algorithms. Figure 8.13 shows the generation of 
an appropriate geofence for a number thin wires detected in the current FoV of the 
UAV.  
 
Figure 8.13. Avoidance of a ground obstacle geofence. 
In the case of moving targets, a suite of non-cooperative sensors and cooperative 
systems can be employed to detect and re-optimise the trajectory (Figure 8.14).  
If there is a possibility of a collision that is determined after evaluating the Risk-of-Collision 
(RoC), an uncertainty volume is computed according to the models described earlier in 
Chapter 4 (Section 4.2). Therefore, trajectory re-optimisation routines are performed to 
obtain a safe avoidance of all the detected collisions. The algorithms thus support the 
generation of appropriate dynamic geo-fences, whose characteristics are dictated by 
the obstacle classification and intruder dynamics, to allow computation of the optimal 
avoidance flight trajectories. 
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Figure 8.14. Avoidance of an aerial obstacle geofence. 
8.5.2 Multi-Platform Coordination Scenario  
A simulation case study for UAS SA&CA in a multi-platform coordination scenario was 
performed. In this scenario, it is assumed that the host aircraft is equipped with NG-FMS 
and both cooperative (ADS-B) and non-cooperative (FLS) means of intruder detection 
are present. Intruder 1 is not equipped with either a cooperative system or a non-
cooperative sensor. Intruders 2 and 3 are equipped with ADS-B. Intruder 4 employs a NG-
FMS with SA&CA algorithms. The airspace sectors are similar to the scenario described in 
Figure 8.3, with the host aircraft occupying an airspace sector and all other intruders 
occupying another airspace sector. The scenario is shown in Figure 8.15. 
 
Figure 8.15. Multi-platform coordination sceanario. 
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The uncertainties in navigation and tracking associated with each platform (as seen by 
all other conflicting platforms) are combined to generate avoidance volumes 
surrounding each aircraft. The avoidance volumes are computed at discrete time 
intervals as a function of traffic relative dynamics. Figures 8.16 to 8.18 show the horizontal 
and vertical resolution obtained between the host platform and the three intruders, 
which do not have a direct head-on collision probability. After obtaining all the 
avoidance volumes in the given airspace sectors, the largest of the four avoidance 
volumes are selected as a reference to perform DCB (intruder 4 in this case). 
 
Figure 8.16. Horizontal and vertical resolution – intruder 1. 
 
Figure 8.17. Horizontal and vertical resolution – intruder 2. 
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Figure 8.18. Horizontal and vertical resolution – intruder 3. 
The avoidance volume generated with respect to intruder 4 dominates the DCB of 
airspace sector 3, along with the CNS performances available in the CNS+A network of 
that sector. With respect to intruder 4, since the generated avoidance trajectory 
deviates from the planned trajectory, a re-join trajectory command was performed to 
ensure that the generated intent leads back to the original trajectory.  The avoidance 
trajectories were generated with respect to the cost function defined earlier. In the third 
case, both host and intruder platforms are assumed to have on board ADS-B systems.  
The host unmanned platform computes an avoidance trajectory as per the rules of 
flight, while the other aircraft performs a step descend phase to avoid the mid-air 
collision. After the overall avoidance volume is computed, the avoidance trajectory and 
a subsequent re-join trajectory are generated by the NG-FMS as shown in Figure 8.19. 
 
Figure 8.19. Re-optimised host platform trajectory. 
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8.6 Conclusions  
The UTM system was introduced, which comprises the various elements required to 
support and execute UAS operations in low-altitude airspace. Specifically, the 
integration of small-size UAS into the airspace is targeted in the UTM system to ensure 
safety and operation efficiency. Some lessons learnt from low-altitude uncontrolled 
airspace operations of helicopters, gliders and general aviation aircraft are valuable in 
the UTM system implementation. Uncertainties in navigation and tracking associated to 
each manned/unmanned platform (as seen by all other conflicting platforms) were 
combined to generate avoidance volumes in all phases of flight (including low-altitude 
operations). The uncertainty volumes were computed at discrete time intervals as a 
function of traffic relative dynamics and thus support generation of dynamic geo-fences 
and multi UTM system implementation. Case studies were performed for evaluating the 
feasibility and potential of applying the unified approach to SA&CA in an urban 
environment.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND                                              
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
“Great  rea s of  reat  rea ers are a ways transcen e ”. – A.P.J. Abdul Kalam 
9.1 Conclusions 
The key design features of NG-FMS suitable for manned and unmanned aircraft 
operations were presented. In particular, the novel mathematical models required for 
the implementation of advanced SA&CA functionalities were developed. One of the 
key research contributions was the formulation of a unified methodology to support 
cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA tasks, addressing the technical and 
regulatory challenges of manned and unmanned aircraft coexistence in all classes of 
airspace. The following section outlines the original contributions of this research project.  
The conclusions of this research project are further elaborated in terms of achieved 
research objectives in Section 9.4. 
9.1.1 Summary of Original Contributions  
This research investigated the introduction of NG-FMS algorithms for planning and near 
real-time execution of 4DT functionalities in the TBO/IBO context as well as in the UTM 
framework. The key emphasis was on the development of a unified approach to SA&CA 
by considering navigation and tracking errors affecting the aircraft state vector and 
translating them to unified range and bearing uncertainty descriptors, which apply both 
to cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. The main original contributions are 
summarised below: 
 System architectures of the novel FMS for manned and unmanned aircraft 
operations; 
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 Adaptation of mathematical models for NG-FMS to provide 4DT optimisation and 
air-to-ground trajectory negotiation/validation to support TBO/IBO; 
 Development of analytical models that describe a unified approach to 
cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA providing the following key benefits: 
- An approach to combine the uncertainties in navigation and tracking 
measurements to generate overall avoidance volumes; 
- Avoidance volume determination at discrete time intervals as a function 
of relative dynamics (host platform and other traffic); 
- Real-time transformation of host aircraft navigation error and target 
tracking error affecting the state measurements to unified range and 
bearing uncertainty descriptors; 
- Detection and resolution of both cooperative and non-cooperative 
collision threats in various weather and daylight conditions; and also in 
case of adverse weather conditions; 
- Automatic selection of sensors/systems providing the most reliable SA&CA 
solution, providing robustness in all flight phases; 
- A compact and versatile parameterisation of the avoidance volume to 
extrapolate its actual shape and size at close encounter points with 
minimal data-link and computational burden; 
- Robust trajectory optimisation allowing the identification of the safest and 
more efficient Three-Dimensional or Four-Dimensional (3D/4D) avoidance 
trajectory, considering relative dynamics between the host aircraft and 
other traffic, airspace constraints, as well as meteorological and traffic 
conditions; 
- Generation of appropriate dynamic geo-fences, whose characteristics 
are dictated by the obstacle classification and dynamics of other 
platforms (including ground obstacles), to allow computation of the 
optimal avoidance flight trajectories; 
- Pathways to certifying SA&CA functions for both manned and unmanned 
aircraft (both near real-time and off-line determination of the host aircraft 
safe-to-fly envelope); 
- Effective utilisation of airspace resources; 
- Easier integration of automated SA&CA functionalities in airborne avionics 
(NG-FMS) and other ATM/UTM decision support tools. 
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 Recommendations for modifications and improvements in current flight 
management system functionalities (software modules).  
9.1.2 Achieved Research Objectives  
In this research, advanced Next Generation Flight Management System (NG-FMS) 
algorithms were developed for SA&CA. Specifically, a unified approach to SA&CA was 
developed for non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios. The conclusions of this thesis 
are provided below in terms of achieved research objectives: 
 Perform a detailed review of FMS and SA&CA algorithms. 
In most state-of-the-art aircraft, automated navigation and flight guidance 
functions are provided by a FMS, which supports the generation of safe and 
efficient trajectories. The hardware components of modern FMS include the MCDU 
and a dedicated processor. GNC and TDA loops that support automated 
navigation, guidance, maintenance of separation and collision avoidance tasks 
were identified. SA&CA functionalities and algorithms implemented in manned 
and unmanned aircraft were summarised. 
 Define the system level functional architecture of the NG-FMS suitable for manned 
and unmanned aircraft. 
The NG-FMS performs all the traditional FMS tasks including navigation, guidance, 
trajectory predictions, and provides auto-throttle controls for engines. Additionally, 
the NG-FMS communicates with a ground-based 4-PNV system, which is part of a 
CDM network also including AOC and ANSP. The NG-FMS software includes the 
multi-objective and multi-model 4DT optimisation algorithms for strategic, tactical 
and emergency scenarios. The avoidance of a conflict/collision involves the 
human pilot and/or remote pilot with data obtained from multi-sensor tracking and 
data fusion algorithms. The key NG-FMS software modules were also identified.   
 Develop/adapt suitable NG-FMS models and algorithms for on board planning and 
optimisation of 4D trajectories to support TBO/IBO in the CNS+A context. 
Suitable NG-FMS models and algorithms were developed for TBO/IBO as well as UAS 
operations. The trajectory planning/optimisation module of the NG-FMS performs 
4DT planning and optimisation functions for pre-tactical, tactical and emergency 
timeframes. The 4DT optimiser includes the models pool and the constraints pool. A 
number of performance criteria and cost functions are used for optimisation, 
including minimisation of fuel consumption, flight time, operative cost, noise impact, 
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emissions and contrails. The databases include navigation, performance, magnetic 
deviation and environmental databases. The NG-FMS also incorporates the 
cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA software modules. The trajectory 
monitoring module performs state estimation, calculating the deviations between 
the active 4DT intents and the estimated/predicted aircraft states.  
 Perform simulation case studies to test the validity of the NG-FMS models and 
algorithms for safe and efficient operations and to support environmental 
sustainability of aviation. 
Detailed simulation case studies were performed on manned (Airbus A380) and 
unmanned (AEROSONDETM) aircraft. A number of 4DT intents were generated for 
different flight phases. From the results of these simulation activities, the following 
conclusions are drawn: 
- Simulation case studies demonstrated the functional capability of the NG-
FMS to generate cost-effective and environmentally-friendly trajectory 
profiles satisfying the operational requirements of typical tactical online tasks 
(in the order of 72 seconds) as well as emergency scenarios (in the order of 8 
seconds). 
 Recommendations for modifications and additional functionalities in current flight 
management system/software based on adaptation of novel algorithms and results 
obtained during modelling and simulation activities.  
Suitable NG-FMS models and algorithms were developed for TBO/IBO as well as UAS 
operations. In addition to the traditional databases including navigation, 
performance and magnetic deviation, new databases including demographic 
distribution, digital terrain elevation and environmental cost criteria databases can 
be integrated. The SA&CA algorithms become an integral part of the NG-FMS 
providing more automated functionalities. Errors affecting the CNS+A systems can 
be taken into account in evaluating the CNS performances (RCP, RNP, RSP and 
RTSP). The NG-FMS can also use a set of predefined Caution and Warning Integrity 
Flags (CIF/WIF) threshold parameters to trigger the generation of both caution and 
warning flags associated with CNS performance degradations.  
 Develop a unified approach to cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA for 
manned and unmanned aircraft operations. 
Although there are a number of stand-alone SA&CA algorithms in literature, they 
are specific to the scenarios considered (air/ground/cooperative/non-
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cooperative). A unified solution to the SA&CA is required, which also provides a 
solid mathematical framework to support a clear pathway to certification. Safety-
critical data fusion algorithms suitable for both cooperative and non-cooperative 
encounters were developed for a variety of safety-critical applications. The SA&CA 
functions are integrated in the NG-FMS and based on mathematical algorithms 
that quantify in real-time the total avoidance volume in the airspace surrounding a 
target (static or dynamic). Data processing techniques allows the real-time 
transformation of navigation and tracking errors affecting the state measurements 
to unified range and bearing uncertainty descriptors. 
 Perform an analysis for investigating and exploring the potential of unified approach 
to cooperative and non-cooperative SA&CA for manned and unmanned aircraft. 
The detection equipment involve a combination of non-cooperative sensors, 
including active/passive FLS and acoustic sensors, as well as cooperative systems, 
including ADS-B and TCAS. GNSS, IMU and VBN sensor measurements (and possible 
augmentation from ADM) are used for navigation computation. Based on the 
identified state-of-the-art technologies, a typical BDL based decision tree test bed 
system reference architecture was presented. Implementations involving Boolean 
logics are generally hard wired and cannot be reconfigured, and this limits the 
scope of unified framework in terms of automatic decision making capability. 
Therefore adaptive BDL, which are based on real-time monitoring of the 
surveillance sensors/systems performance were implemented to provide a 
framework for providing autonomy in UAS operations. Sensor/system selection was 
defined as being based on their performance achieved at any instant of time. 
Covariance matrices were used for estimating sensor and system performances. 
After identifying the RoC, if the original trajectory of the host platform intersects the 
calculated avoidance volume, a caution integrity flag is issued.  An avoidance 
trajectory is generated in real-time and the steering commands are provided to 
the flight control surfaces. 
 Evaluate analytical models for tracking and SA&CA, high-integrity software modules 
to improve safety and efficiency of air navigation and guidance services by 
providing automated separation maintenance and collision avoidance functions.    
Tracking and avoidance algorithms customisation was described in the context of 
the unified approach to SA&CA for non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios. 
The employment of non-cooperative sensors (e.g. forward looking sensors) and 
cooperative systems (e.g. ADS-B) in detecting other traffic/obstacles were 
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described. Simulation case studies of the detection and avoidance trajectory 
generation algorithms are accomplished using the AEROSONDETM UAV as a test 
platform. It is concluded that obstacle detection and trajectory optimization 
algorithms ensure a safe avoidance of all classes of obstacles (i.e., wire, extended 
and point objects) and intruders in a wide range of weather and geometric 
conditions, providing a pathway for integration of this technology into NG-FMS 
architectures.   
 Perform an investigation to explore the potential of the unified approach to SA&CA 
to enhance the performance of UAS and coordinated (manned/unmanned) 
operations in the CNS/ATM and UTM context. 
The UTM System is comprised of all of the elements required to support and execute 
UAS operations in the low-altitude airspace. Specifically the integration of small size 
UAS is targeted in the UTM system to ensure safety and operation efficiency. Some 
lessons learnt from low-altitude uncontrolled airspace operations of helicopters, 
gliders and general aviation aircraft can also be helpful. Uncertainties in navigation 
and tracking associated with each manned/unmanned platform (as seen by all 
other conflicting platforms) are combined to generate avoidance volumes in all 
phases of flight (including low-altitude UAS operations). The uncertainty volumes 
are computed at discrete time intervals as a function of traffic relative dynamics, 
thus supporting the generation of dynamic geo-fences and multi UTM system 
implementation. 
 Define a pathway to certifying SA&CA for manned and unmanned aircraft 
operations. 
One of the fundamental limitations for certification authorities in fully certifying 
SA&CA functions is the inability to evaluate whether the system performance 
achieves comparable or superior levels of collision detection and resolution, and 
separation maintenance upon replacing the on board pilot with a remote pilot. 
The need for a certifiable SA&CA system and the implementation design drivers 
were presented. The pathway to certification was described, with the unified 
approach emerging as an innovative method in targeting successful certification 
by aviation regulatory bodies. By considering the nominal flight envelopes of the 
host UAS and other traffic as well as the on board sensors, the approach 
determines the attainable safety envelope. Conversely, based on a predefined 
(required) safety envelope and dynamics of other traffic, the software is capable 
of identifying the sensors that are required to be integrated in the aircraft. 
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9.2 Future Directions 
The following key areas are identified for performing further research and development 
activities on the NG-FMS and on the unified approach to SA&CA.   
 Evaluate the computational efficiency benefits of computing the avoidance 
volumes using tensor analysis; 
 Investigate the potential of introducing CNS integrity monitoring and 
augmentation strategies to enhance the performance of NG-FMS for manned 
and unmanned aircraft. Evolutions of the NG-FMS architectures have to be 
explored by introducing suitable integrity monitoring and augmentation 
functionalities dedicated for 4DT planning, negotiation, validation and update for 
all flight phases.  
 Further evaluate the 4DT intents generated by the NG-FMS algorithms with current 
flight data for paths flown by long-haul and medium-haul flights; in order to 
baseline the presented algorithms against current ATM operations. Evaluate 
further VTOL and hybrid platform operations by evaluating manoeuvring 
trajectories when compared to general steady flight 4D sequences. 
 Further evaluate the effectiveness of advanced SA&CA functions to enhance the 
performance of NG-ADL by introducing the required input and output 
parameters for computing the data bandwidth and throughput requirements. 
Furthermore, the assessment of the spherical harmonics decomposition would 
enable an easier exchange of information for computing the overall avoidance 
volumes and geo-fences; 
 Assess further the synergies between NG-FMS and NG-ATM algorithms by 
implementing advanced real-time negotiation and validation functions; 
 Further investigate the potential of SA&CA algorithms to support the UTM 
framework for operations involving mixed equipage; 
 Extend the unified approach of the SA&CA concept to real-time and close 
coordination of air, sea and ground operations; 
 Investigate the potential of implementing NG-FMS for supervisory control of 
manned aircraft and swarming UAS, addressing various levels of autonomous 
vehicle-vehicle and ground-vehicle collaborations; 
 Investigate the next generation policies and practices required to achieve the 
most efficient, safe, and inclusive air transportation system possible; 
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 Analyse the unified approach to the SA&CA framework for optimal and dynamic 
sharing of airspace resources between civil and military users, as well as enabling 
integrated civil-military ATM and UTM operations; 
 Explore the potential of NG-FMS to support interoperability among air and ground 
systems (at signal-in-space, system and HMI2 levels) and to assess the required 
levels of security for safer, protected and more reliable operations supported by 
various cyber-physical systems in a networked environment; 
 Further investigate the effects of wind and wake turbulence on real-time 
navigation measurements, tracking observables and relative dynamics (and 
associated uncertainties), and the impacts on uncertainty volume generation (for 
automated SA&CA) in multi-platform networked operations; 
 Validate the presented simulation case studies using actual flight test data 
(employing a host platform and a number of intruders) by assessing real-time 
measurements and associated uncertainties affecting navigation states (of the 
host aircraft platform), tracking observables (of the static or moving object) and 
relative platform dynamics. Provide benchmarking standards for the 
performance of the presented algorithms against current FMS and ATM 
procedures/SA&CA techniques in practice; 
 Capture statistical measures of the SA&CA algorithms’ performance by 
performing a large number of Monte Carlo simulations and by examining the 
boundary cases; 
 Investigate the potential of the unified approach for Intelligent and                       
Cyber-Physical Transport Systems (ICTS) applications by providing automated 
SA&CA functions for air, sea and ground transport as well as coordinated 
operations that will: 
- support an autonomous ground/sea traffic management concept of 
operations and real-time coordinated operations for multiple autonomous, 
semi-autonomous and non-autonomous platforms; 
- investigate the synergies between the unified approach to aircraft SA&CA 
and the methodology used in autonomous cars, specifically looking at the 
literature on LIDAR data processing and sensor error characterisation; 
- assist an autonomous onboard SA&CA system and centralised traffic 
management system to coordinate autonomous and semi-autonomously 
driven (by humans) vehicles and to establish proper intersection 
management, route diversion and communication management. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
UAS INTEGRATED NAVIGATION SYSTEMS 
“I a  we   convince  that 'Aeria  Navi ation' wi   for  a ost pro inent feat re                   
in the progress of civilisation”. - Sir George Cayley 
A.1 Introduction 
The main objective of integrated navigation systems is to develop a high performance, 
low-cost and low-weight/volume Navigation and Guidance System (NGS) capable of 
providing the required level of navigation performance in all flight phases. The NGS 
provides the best estimate of PVA measurements and supports the computation of the 
host aircraft navigation error in order to compute the overall avoidance volume given 
by the unified approach to SA&CA. 
A.2 Multi-sensor Data Fusion Techniques 
Low-cost avionics sensors (based on satellite, inertial and vision-based techniques) are 
employed to provide an accurate and continuous knowledge of the aircraft navigation 
states. In addition to these compact and inexpensive sensors, an ADM can be adopted 
as a virtual sensor (i.e. knowledge-based module) to augment the state vector by 
computing the aircraft trajectory and attitude motion [1 - 3]. Both 3-DoF and 6-DoF ADM 
can be employed in the virtual sensor design. This appendix provides a summary of multi-
sensor data fusion techniques implemented and also discusses the performance 
improvements obtained by the introduction of various integration architectures. The 
concentration is primarily on 6-DoF ADM implementations, pre-filtering of the ADM virtual 
sensor measurements to reduce the overall position and attitude error budget, as well as 
a considerable extension of the ADM data validity time (i.e., errors below the RNP 
thresholds). A key novel aspect of this approach is the employment of ADM 
augmentation to compensate for the shortcomings of VBN and MEMS-IMU sensors in 
high-dynamics attitude determination tasks. To obtain the best estimates of PVA, 
different sensor combinations are analysed and a BDL is implemented for sensor 
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selection before the centralised data fusion is accomplished. Various options are 
investigated for data fusion, including a traditional EKF, a more advanced UKF and a 
particle filter. The MSDF process is illustrated in Figure A.1.  
PILOT INTERFACE -
 Navigation and guidance mode switch  
Sensor Processing and Data Sorting
Position, Velocity and Attitude (PVA) 
Best Estimates
Sensor Layer
Multi-Sensor Data Fusion Techniques
MEMS - Inertial 
Measurement 
Unit
Global 
Navigation 
Satellite System
Vision-Based 
Sensor
Aircraft 
Dynamics 
Model
VIGA (Degraded 
Mode of EVIGA)
VIG (Degraded 
Mode of VIGA)
EVIGA
Extended 
Kalman Filter
Unscented 
Kalman Filter
 
Figure A.1. Multi-sensor data fusion process. 
A novel hybrid controller employing fuzzy logic and Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) 
techniques was implemented to provide effective stabilization and control of pitch and 
roll angles [3].  Position and velocity measurements are obtained from GNSS while PVA 
estimates are obtained from MEMS-based IMU and VBN sensors. Additionally, attitude 
data is also obtained from ADM. Data provided by these sensors is combined using an 
EKF/UKF. The measurements from VBN sensors, GNSS and MEMS-IMU are combined to 
form the VBN/IMU/GNSS (VIG) NGS integrated architecture. By taking into account the 
measurements also obtained from ADM, the VBN-IMU-GNSS-ADM (VIGA) NGS is 
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implemented. EKF is adopted in both VIG and VIGA systems. In the enhanced 
architecture (EVIGA), the EKF is replaced by an UKF. Additionally, an UKF is also used to 
process the ADM dynamics. The mathematical models developed for combining the 
sensor information are described below. The state vector consists of the roll angle, pitch 
angle and body rates of the aircraft. In order to apply the EKF techniques, the system is 
described in state space notation by a set of first-order non-linear differential equations: 
 ̇   (   )                                                          (A.1) 
where   ℝ  denotes the system state vector,  ( ) is the process function of the states 
and   ℝ  represents a zero mean random process. The matrix of the process noise 
  ℝ    is given by: 
   (   )                                                        (A.2) 
The measurement equation is considered to be a non-linear function of the measured 
states and is given by: 
   (   )                                                          (A.3) 
where  ( ) is the observation function,   ℝ  is a zero mean random process described 
by the matrix of measurement noise   ℝ   : 
   (   )                                                         (A.4) 
It is possible to rewrite the non-linear equation of measurements for systems with discrete-
time measurements as: 
    (     )                                                       (A.5) 
As the measurement equations are non-linear, it is necessary to linearise them by a first-
order approach to obtain the dynamic matrix of the system,   and the measurement 
matrix,  . These matrices are related to the non-linear equations and are expressed as: 
   
  ( )
  
|
   ̂
                                                     (A.6) 
   
  ( )
  
|
   ̂
                                                     (A.7) 
where  ̂ represents the mean value. The fundamental matrix is approximated by the 
Taylor series expansion as follows: 
         
    
 
  
 
    
 
  
                                        (A.8) 
where    is the sampling time and   is the identity matrix. The Taylor series are often 
approximated as:  
                                                               (A.9) 
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In the case of a linear system, the matrices:  ,   and   are linear. In EKF implementation, 
these matrices are non-linear. The set of EKF equations for each time step are given by: 
 ̂ 
    ( ̂   
 )                                                    (A.10) 
  
        
   
                                                (A.11) 
     
   (   
     )                                         (A.12) 
 ̂ 
   ̂ 
    (     ( ̂ 
 ))                                       (A.13) 
  
  (     )  
                                               (A.14) 
where   is the time step: 1, 2,   n;    is the updated state covariance and    is the filter 
gain. Although the EKF provides a key advantage of linearisation of all non-linear models 
(i.e., process and measurement models), it can be demanding to tune the filter 
parameters and often provides unreliable estimates if the system non-linearities are 
severe. Furthermore, the accuracy of propagated mean and covariance is limited to 
first order due to truncations performed in the linearisation process. 
Most of these EKF deficiencies are overcome by implementing an Unscented Kalman 
Filter (UKF). The UKF is a recursive estimator used for calculating the statistics of a random 
variable propagated through a non-linear system model [4 - 6]. Sigma-point Kalman 
Filters (SPKFs), such as the UKF, provide derivative-free higher-order approximations by 
fitting a Gaussian distribution rather than approximating an arbitrary nonlinear function 
as the EKF does [7, 8]. Furthermore, an UKF is implemented to increase the accuracy of 
the NGS, in addition to pre-processing the ADM measurements. It is assumed that the 
equations of motion for the aircraft are disturbed by uncorrelated zero-mean Gaussian 
noise. The UKF performance is compared with error perturbations in the system model’s 
PVA measurements. The UKF weights and scaling parameters are given by:  
  
( )  
 
   
                                                     (A.15) 
  
( )    
( )  (      )                                       (A.16) 
  
( )    
( )  
 
 (   )
;                                             (A.17) 
  
(   )    
(   )  
 
 (   )
;                                        (A.18) 
    (   )                                                  (A.19) 
  √(   )                                                    (A.20) 
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where   is the secondary scaling parameter and is normally set to  .  ,  , and   are the 
scaling parameters.   is the mean and the constant   is used to incorperate prior 
knowledge of the state distribution  . For Gaussian distributions,     is optimal and      
represents a set of scalar weights [9, 10].   determines the spread of the sigma points 
around the state mean  ̂ and is set between 0 and 1. The covariance matrix is given by 
 . The unscented transformation process is precisely captured in the UKF state-estimation 
algorithm described in the following set of equations. The noise is considered additive 
and the unscented transformation is non-augmented. The UKF process is initialized by 
using the expected mean, covariance and state vector values (i.e., PVA): 
 ̂   [                                                         (A.21) 
where the initial state vector estimate is  ̂  and    is the initial state vector of the ADM: 
    [(    ̂ )(    ̂ )
                                        (A.22) 
where    is the initial state covariance matrix. The process model of the UKF is based 
upon a set of sigma points where the random vector   is approximated by      
symmetric sigma points. The sigma points,    are selected based on the mean and 
covariance of   , and are obtained as follows: 
     [ ̂       ̂     √        ̂     √    ]                      (A.23) 
where P computes the diagonal values of the state covariance matrix and results in a 
lower triangular matrix of the state covariance matrix.   is the control parameter of the 
dispersion distance from the mean estimate in the computation of     , the sigma point 
matrix.  After the sigma points are calculated, a time update for each time step   is 
performed and is given by:  
    
   [      ]                                                 (A.24) 
 ̂ 
  ∑   
( )
    
   
                                                (A.25) 
   
  ∑   
( )[    
   ̂ 
 ][    
   ̂ 
 ]
 
   
  
                           (A.26) 
    [ ̂ 
       ̂ 
   √   
       ̂ 
   √  
 ]                              (A.27) 
 ̂     [    ]                                                  (A.28) 
 ̂ 
  ∑   
( )    
  
                                               (A.29) 
In the measurement update equations listed above,    represents the unobserved state 
of the system. The process noise covariance matrix is represented by   ,   in   
( )
 is the 
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covariance and  in  
( )
 is the mean and   is the state size. The UKF is also used to pre-
process the ADM data in order to increase the ADM validity time. The UKF process model 
equations are expressed as: 
    ∑   
( )[      ̂ 
 ][      ̂ 
 ]
   
                                 (A.30) 
                                                             (A.31) 
     ∑   
( )[      ̂ 
 ][      ̂ 
 ]
   
                               (A.32)   
          
                                                      (A.33) 
 ̂   ̂ 
    (    ̂ 
 )                                            (A.34) 
       
         
                                               (A.35) 
where   is the Kalman gain. 
A.3 Integrated Multi-sensor Data Fusion Architectures 
Three different multi-sensor integrated navigation system architectures are defined, 
including the EKF based VIG/VIGA and the UKF based EVIGA system [2]. The VIG 
architecture uses VBN at 20 Hz and GPS at 1 Hz to augment the MEMS-IMU running at 
100 Hz. The VIGA architecture includes the ADM (computations performed at 100 Hz) to 
provide attitude channel augmentation. The outputs of the navigation system were fed 
to a hybrid Fuzzy-logic/PID controller designed for the AEROSONDE UAS and capable of 
operating with stand-alone VBN, as well as data from other sensors. The implemented 
NGS architectures with their associated sensors are listed in Table A.1. 
Table A.1. Integrated NGS systems. 
NGS System 
Navigation System 
Filter 
GNSS IMU VBN ADM 
VIG system     EKF 
VIGA system     EKF 
EVIGA system     UKF 
 
The VIG architecture is illustrated in Figure A.2. The INS provides measurements from 
gyroscopes and accelerometers, which are then provided to a navigation processor. 
Pseudorange measurements from GNSS are processed by the EKF/UKF to obtain position 
and velocity data. In the VIG system, the INS position and velocity provided by the 
navigation processor are compared with GNSS position and velocity measurements and 
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supplied to the EKF. A similar process is also applied to the INS and VBN attitude angles, 
whose differences are incorporated in the EKF measurement vector. The EKF provides 
estimates of the PVA errors, which are then removed from the sensor measurements to 
obtain the corrected PVA states. The corrected PVA and estimates of accelerometer 
and gyroscope biases are also used to update the INS raw measurements. 
The VIGA architecture is illustrated in Figure A.2. As before, the INS position and velocity 
provided by the navigation processor are compared to the GNSS data to form the 
measurement input to the EKF. Additionally, in this case, the attitude data provided by 
the ADM and the INS are compared to feed the EKF at 100 Hz, and the attitude data 
provided by the VBN and MEMS-IMU sensors are compared at 20 Hz and input to the 
EKF. As in the VIG architecture, the EKF provides estimations of PVA errors, which are 
removed from the INS measurements to obtain the corrected PVA states. The attitude 
best estimate is compared with the INS attitude to obtain the corrected attitude. During 
the landing phase, the attitude best estimate is compared with the VBS attitude to 
obtain the corrected attitude. In the EVIGA architecture, EKF is replaced by an UKF 
(Figure A.3). Additionally, an UKF is also used to process the ADM navigation solution. The 
ADM operates differently to that of the VIGA system, running in parallel to the centralised 
UKF, and acts as a separate subsystem. The filtering of the ADM virtual sensor 
measurements aids in achieving reduction of the overall position and attitude error 
budget, and most importantly, results in considerable reduction in the ADM re-
initialisation time. PVA measurements are obtained as state vectors from both the 
centralised UKF and ADM/UKF. These measurements are then fed into an error analysis 
module in which the measurement values of the two UKFs are compared. In this 
research, MEMS-INS errors are modeled as White Noise (WN) or Gauss-Markov (GM) 
processes. Simulation of the VIG, VIGA and EVIGA navigation modes shows that all 
integration schemes achieve horizontal/vertical position accuracies in line with CAT-I 
(100% of the approach flight time) and CAT-II (98.4% of the approach flight time) 
requirements. In all other flight phases, the VIGA system exhibits improvements in 
position, velocity and attitude data with respect to the VIG system. The EVIGA system 
shows the best performance in attitude data accuracy in addition to achieving an 
increased ADM validity time (validity time of 126 sec before exceeding CAT I vertical 
and horizontal error limits) [2]. 
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A.4 Conclusions 
The design of a low-cost and low-weight/volume integrated NGS suitable for supporting 
the computation of navigation error required for the unified approach to SA&CA was 
described. Various sensors were considered for the design of the NGS. GNSS and MEMS-
IMUs, with augmentation from ADM and VBN sensors, were selected for integration. 
Three different low-cost and low-weight/volume integrated NGS architectures were 
introduced. They are an EKF based VBN-IMU-GNSS-ADM (VIGA) integrated system and 
an UKF based (EVIGA) system. While the VIGA system used unfiltered ADM data, the 
EVIGA system employed an UKF for pre-filtering the ADM attitude solution to increase the 
ADM validity time. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
CERTIFICATION STANDARDS AND 
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 
B.1 Requirements 
Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3 provide a compilation of the certification standards, AMC, GM 
and recommended practices encompassing the Operational (OP), Technical (TC), 
Safety (SAF), Human Factors (HF) as well as Test and Evaluation (TE) aspects.  
Table B.1. Operational requirements. 
Requirements Two-pilot aircraft General Aviation single-pilot 
aircraft 
UAS                                                                     
(Civil | Military) 
 
Operational 
 
FAR Parts 25 and 121 
 
FAR 25.1523 and 
Appendix D 
(minimum flight crew) 
 
FAA AC 120-100 
(aviation fatigue) 
 
EASA AMC/GM to 
Annex IV – Part-CAT, 
Subpart D (IDE) 
 
ICAO Air Operator 
Certification and 
Surveillance 
Handbook 
 
ICAO Manual of 
Procedures for 
Operations 
Inspection, 
Certification and 
Continued 
Surveillance (8335 
AN/879) 
 
 
EASA Annex VIII, Part-SPO, 
Subparts B and C (OP, POL) 
 
EASA AMC & GM  to Annex III 
AMC2 ORO.FC.115 (CRM 
training for SPO) 
 
ICAO Annex 1 Section 2.1.3 
(class and type ratings) 
 
FAA-H-8083-9A: Sect. 9-11 to 
9-17 (Aviation Instructor’s 
Handbook: SRM), FAR Part 23 
and FAA AC 91-73B 
(procedures during taxi 
operations) 
 
EASA AMC1 
FCL.720.A(b)(2)(i) (flight crew 
experience requirements and 
prerequisites) 
 
(AU) CASA EX43/11 (Cessna 
exemption) 
 
(NZL) CAA AC 91-11 (single-
pilot IFR) 
 
ICAO Manual on RPAS (10019 
AN/507) Ch. 4 (certification 
and airworthiness), 6 
(operator responsibilities), 9 
(operations), 14 (integration 
into ATM), 15 (aerodromes) 
 
EASA A-NPA 2015-10 Ch. 3 
(specificities of unmanned 
aircraft), 4 (road map) 
 
JARUS D.02 – FCL 
Recommendation 
 
RTCA DO-304 Ch. 1 and 2 
(operational and functional 
requirements); Appendix D 
(operational functions) 
 
(AU) CASA AC 101-1 (design 
specification, maintenance 
and training) 
 
(AU) CASA DP 1529US 
(airworthiness framework) 
 
(UK) CAP 722, Sect. 5 
(operations) 
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Table B.2. Technical and safety requirements. 
Requirements Two-pilot aircraft General Aviation single-pilot 
aircraft 
UAS                                                                     
(Civil | Military) 
Technical FAR 25.671 to 25.703 
(control systems) 
 
FAR 25.1301 to 
25.1337 (equipment 
and installation) 
 
FAA AR-06/2 (flight 
data integrity for 
ground-based 
systems) 
 
RTCA DO-236 (RNP for 
RNAV) 
 
RTCA DO-238 (data 
link systems) 
 
RTCA DO-289 (MASPS 
for surveillance) 
 
RTCA DO-361 (flight 
deck interval 
management) 
 
SAE ARP-4109/9A 
(FMS) 
 
ICAO Manual on RCP 
(9869 AN/462) 
 
ICAO Performance-
based (PBN) Manual 
(9613 AN/937) 
 
ICAO Surveillance 
Manual (9224) 
FAR 23.143 to 23.157 
(controllability and 
manoeuvrability) 
 
FAR 23 subpart F (equipment) 
 
ICAO Manual on RPAS (10019 
AN/507) Ch. 10 to 13 
 
JARUS D.04 – Required C2 
Performance 
 
FAA UAS Roadmap, Appendix C 
(goals, metrics and target dates) 
 
RTCA DO-304, Ch. 3 (standards 
assessment); Appendix G 
(functional allocation) 
 
(UK) CAP 722, Sect. 3, Ch. 1 
(detect and avoid), 3 
(autonomy) 
 
STANAG 4586 Appendix B1 (data 
link interface); Appendix B2 (C2 
interface) 
 
DOD 11-S-3613 Ch. 4 to 7 (UAS 
roadmap) 
Safety FAR 25.1309 
(equipment, systems 
and installations) 
 
FAA AC 25.1309-1A 
(System design and 
analysis) 
 
SAE ARP-4754A 
(systems 
development and 
design) 
 
SAE ARP-4761 (safety 
assessment for 
systems) 
FAR 23.1309 (equipment, 
systems and installation) 
 
 
JARUS AMC RPAS.1309 (safety 
assessment of RPAS) 
 
EUROCAE ER-010 (system safety 
objectives and assessment 
criteria) 
 
(UK) CAP 722, Sect. 4, Ch. 4 
(safety assessment) 
 
ICAO Manual on RPAS (10019 
AN/507) Ch. 7 
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Table B.3. Human factors and T&E requirements. 
Requirements Two-pilot aircraft General Aviation single-pilot 
aircraft 
UAS                                                                     
(Civil | Military) 
 
Human 
Factors 
 
FAA-STD-004 (human 
factors program)  
 
FAA TC-13/44 (flight 
deck controls and 
displays) 
 
FAA AC 25.1302-1 
(design and methods of 
compliance for systems 
and equipment) 
 
ARINC 837 (cabin HMI) 
 
ICAO Human Factors 
Training Manual (9683 
AN/950) Part 2 
 
(UK) CAP 737 (flight 
crew human factors) 
 
FAA TC-14/42 (portable 
weather applications) 
 
(AU) CAAP 5.59-1(0) 
(single-pilot human factors)  
 
(UK) CAP 722, Sect. 3, Ch. 2 
(human factors in UAS 
operations) 
 
RTCA DO-344, Vol. 2, Appendix D 
(control station human factors 
considerations) 
 
STANAG 4586 Appendix B3 (HMI) 
 
DOD 11-S-3613 Ch. 10 (manned-
unmanned teaming) 
 
T&E 
 
RTCA DO-178C 
(software) 
 
RTCA DO-278, Ch. 6 
(CNS/ATM software 
integrity) 
 
RTCA DO-297, Ch. 5 
(integrated modular 
avionics) 
 
RTCA DO-335, Ch. 9 
(automatic flight 
guidance/control) 
 
RTCA DO-356 (security) 
 
ASTM F3153-15 
(verification of avionics 
systems) 
 
FAA TC-16/4 
(verification of adaptive 
systems) and FAA AC 
20-157 (reliability 
assessment plan) 
 
FAA AC-25-7C (flight 
test) (AU) CASA AC 21-
47(0) (flight test safety)  
(AU) CASA AC 60-3(0) 
(flight simulators for 
validation) 
 
 
Flight Standardization 
Board Report: Embraer 
EMB-500, EMB-505  
 
Flight Standardization 
Board Report: Cessna 
Citation 525C  
 
IDA Paper 3821 (operational test 
and evaluation: lessons learnt) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
ELEMENTS OF HUMAN MACHINE                
INTERFACE & INTERACTIONS 
“A tho  h h  ans to ay re ain ore capab e than machines for many tasks, by 
2030 machine capabilities will have increased to the point that humans will have 
become the weakest component in a wide array of systems and processes. Humans 
and machines will need to become far more closely coupled, through improved 
human- achine interfaces an  by  irect a   entation of h  an perfor ance”. - 
Werner J.A. Dahm  
C.1 Introduction 
This appendix provides a summary of some key elements of HMI2 for NG-FMS. In 
particular, the formats and functions required for supporting automated SA&CA 
functionalities are presented. Some elements of the adaptive HMI2 system that 
dynamically assists pilots and operators based on real-time detection of their 
physiological and cognitive states are described. With an appropriate system 
implementation, pilot error can be avoided and enhanced synergies can be attained 
between humans and machines, improving the total system performance. Moreover, 
the implementation of suitable decision logics (based on the estimated cognitive states 
of the pilot or remote pilot) allows a continuous and optimal reconfiguration of the 
automation levels. 
C.2 Human Machine Interface and Interactions 
HMI2 systems are essential for providing inputs as well as receiving information from 
avionics systems. The key focus is on the interfaces required for the exchange of 
information between the NG-FMS and the displays for pilot (manned aircraft) and 
remote pilot (unmanned aircraft). Generally, Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) 
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displays are employed, which are the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and Navigation and 
Tactical Display (NTD). EFIS displays enable continuous monitoring of flight information as 
well as the required and parameters. Additionally, they also allow the pilots to 
implement corrective measures if required (e.g. avoidance of ground obstacles). The 
PFD provides information on thrust and control commands generated by the NG-FMS. 
Track of flight plan, instantaneous position, Distance-To-Destination (DTD) based 
waypoints for all flight phases, sectorisation of flight plan into segments, sections and 
integral steps are displayed on the NTD. Other relevant information including navigation 
aids, airports, altitude/speed/time constraints and wind information are also displayed 
on the NTD.  In order to support time based operations, the key parameters for                        
4-Dimensional Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO) have to be identified and included in 
the trajectory prediction component of the current FMS. Furthermore, functions and 
formats that support full 4D information, and human factors consideration for evaluation 
of the 4D trajectory information have to be analysed considering mixed equipage. 
Novel forms of HMI2 are required for the NG-FMS in order to enable time based 
operations. Furthermore, recent research activities have been performed to identify the 
specific requirements for single-pilot and UAS operations. Specifically, the HMI2 drivers for 
effective sharing of information between NG-FMS and NG-ATM/GCS will vary 
significantly from the manned version, wherein the control shifts from a pilot to a remote 
pilot perspective. As pointed out in STAGNAG 4586, there is a need of greater levels of 
interoperability and therefore a significant evolution of the HMI2 design is required [1, 2]. 
The new formats and functions development activities focus on: 
 4D trajectory navigation and guidance; 
 Next generation communications including LoS and BLOS data links; 
 Vehicle configuration data including telemetry data (specifically for UAS); 
 Automated SA&CA for non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios; 
 Monitoring of integrity by the generation of predictive (caution) and reactive 
(warning) flags; 
 Monitoring of CNS+A performance metrics including RCP, RNP, RSP and RTSP. 
The current state-of-the-art small-to-medium range commercial aircraft employ a two 
person flight comprised of a Pilot Flying (PF) and a Pilot Non-Flying (PNF). In such flight 
deck configurations, the flight tasks are distributed between the PF and PNF. The PF takes 
the direct responsibility of directing the aircraft in line with the approved flight plan and 
continuously monitors the flight path for any deviations. On the other hand, the roles of 
the PNF as ‘pilot monitoring' are primarily focussed on monitoring the position of aircraft, 
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controlling and monitoring radio transmissions, assisting the PF in high workload situations, 
cross monitoring the actions of PF and taking over flight tasks in case of incapacitation of 
PF. Based on the role allocations, the presence of a PNF is beneficial. In particular, the 
PNF reduces the PF’s workload, however, an additional workload, associated with team 
management, is introduced. According to statistics obtained between the years 2002 - 
2011, 37% of all fatal accidents were caused by a failure in Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) [3]. Another widely recognised advantage is that the PNF reduces 
the probability of inadvertent errors made by PF. Nevertheless, several limitations such as 
memory and attention problems affect the monitoring and corrective role of the PNF. In 
order to avoid these errors, modern commercial aircraft are equipped with electronic 
checklist functionalities that enable efficient cross-checking of PNF tasks.  
Under current regulations, all large commercial aircraft are required to be flown by a 
flight crew, consisting of not less than two pilots (FAR 14 CFR 121.385) [4]. However, 
authorities also specify that all aircraft must be capable of being operated by a single 
pilot from either seat, which means the current flight deck design is natively ready for 
single pilot and UAS operations. Another constraint specifically for regional aircraft is that 
they must be able to operate not only in big aerodromes but also from smaller airports 
that might have fewer navigation and landing aids to support automated landings. In all 
cases, CRM is an essential operational policy for two pilots to fly a commercial aircraft.  
In the existing design, the aircraft is directed by a NG-FMS that coordinates with the 
autopilot during most flight phases. Throughout the past few years, aircraft designers 
have created a variety of modes for achieving an extensive range of functionalities. For 
example, Airbus A320 has nine auto throttle modes, ten VNAV modes and seven LNAV 
modes. However, such a large number of modes have emerged as a factor of confusion 
for the pilot, leading to additional risks during the flight. In order to minimise hazards, 
researchers and industries have committed to simplify the most complicated and 
confusing systems. Commercial airliners, especially regional airliners, are the core users of 
small and medium range commercial aircraft.  
In the TBo/UTM context, SA&CA is handled in a distributed system, where the 
pilot/remote pilot is designated with some of the conventional ATCo’s responsibilities in 
order to achieve increased capacity-demand balancing. Eurocontrol has identified 
three levels of delegation for achieving SA&CA. They are: limited, where the ATCo 
performs conflict detection and resolution tasks while the pilot executes the ATCo’s 
decision; extended, where the ATCo performs conflict detection, and delegates the 
conflict resolution to be executed by the pilot; full, where the ATCo delegates full 
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responsibility to the pilot for detection and resolution of any conflicts as well as execution 
of avoidance trajectory manoeuvre [5]. The concept of distributed control acts to 
provide higher levels of delegation for SA/CA tasks, since highly centralised ATM systems 
limit the air traffic density within a specified sector.  
In addition to delegation of tasks between ATCo and pilots, the responsibility for SA&CA 
can also be delegated between the human operator and the automation system [6]. A 
highly distributed system relies on the pilot/controller as well as human-automation 
integration, and hence requires high levels of integrity for each component of the 
system. To address human-machine teaming in the CNS+A context, three human factor 
concepts are discussed. These are: situational awareness, trusted autonomy and 
ergonomics.  
Situational awareness has featured prominently in aviation-related human factors 
research over the past few decades [7, 8]. A loss of situational awareness has been a 
major cause of aircraft accidents and incidents. Increased levels of automation in the 
flight deck have provided opportunities for increased situational awareness, by reducing 
the need for constant vigilance over low level flight tasks. The pilot can therefore expend 
the cognitive resources on higher level tasks. A typical example is the automated 
navigation and guidance services provided by state-of-the-art FMS. However, higher 
levels of automation can also lead to a loss of situational awareness due to automation 
complacency, which is detrimental to the overall system performance. Additionally, the 
lack of low-level vigilance might impede the pilot’s response to emergencies such as loss 
of self-separation.  
Trusted autonomy plays an increasingly important role in systems with high levels of 
delegation including ATCo-pilot/pilot-co-pilot/system-pilot interactions. As an example, 
radio phraseology and crew resource management provides a framework for building 
trust through proper communication and decision making protocols. With higher levels 
of automation, human-machine teaming becomes a key issue, and automation trust is 
required for optimal performance. Over- or lack-of trust results in non-optimal human-
machine teaming scenarios [9]. In lack-of trust situations, the pilot allocates excessive 
vigilance for automation-monitoring or outright rejects the automation commands. 
When conflicting instructions are provided, the pilot executes the commands from the 
agent (person or system) in whom or which a greater level of trust is allocated to. Over- 
or lack of trust might result in making an incorrect decision.  
In line with ergonomics theory, the functional design of systems can be described as to 
complement the human operator’s work or cognitive processes. SA&CA technologies 
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shall factor in these considerations when designing the feedback mechanisms such as 
advisories, warnings and resolutions. Appropriate feedback shall be prioritized in terms of 
overall urgency, and shall be sufficient to draw the pilot’s attention without leading to 
any distraction of the current task. The identification and resolution of the conflict shall 
be timely, i.e. sufficient time for the pilot to react, and easily comprehensible, i.e. not 
requiring a high cognitive effort to process. Feedback may consist of visual, aural or 
haptic cues. Visual feedback is the primary information channel for the pilot, and is 
constantly being refined based on the functions of the flight crew. Synthetic vision can 
enhance the pilot’s situational awareness via integration into a PFD [10]. Terrain data 
stored in the system is fused with navigational data, surveillance data and flight data 
[11]. The location of the next waypoint in the ND shows up in the PFD as series of 
indicator rings. The optimal route, represented as a magenta line in the ND, shows up as 
a ‘tunnel-in-the-sky’ in the PFD, along with the optimal pitch, bank angle and airspeed. 
Nearby aircraft communicate their position and attitude to the NG-FMS via the ADS-B 
system and are displayed in the ND as well as the pilot’s FoV in the PFD. Auditory 
feedback takes the form of a standard message, or a warning siren. Ergonomic design 
of this feedback channel requires tailoring the frequency and volume of the sound to 
achieve its desired effect. Haptic interfaces provide feedback through the pilot’s sense 
of touch. It can be integrated into control devices, like the yoke and rudder, with force 
displacement gradients during separation loss to provide warnings against incorrect 
manoeuvres. 
C.3 Formats and Functions for Automatic SA&CA 
The employment of distinct alerting and display for warnings (and cautions) about time-
critical external conditions, such as collision with other traffic, terrain, turbulent weather 
areas, wind shear and wake vortices has two main issues both in unmanned and 
manned aviation. These issues include lack of information in tactical and emergency 
scenarios and lack of information flow among the various alerting systems. The formats 
and functions for automatic SA&CA can be supported by the existing list derived from 
TCAS implementations [12 - 14]. By the extensive use of a combination of non-
cooperative sensors and cooperative systems, the effective range of conflict detection 
can be extended to 100 NM or more (typically by the employment of ADS technology). 
ADS-B messages contain a more extensive and accurate set of information including 3D 
position, ground and vertical speed, track information and Identification of other traffic 
(by call signs). The CDTI, which was introduced in manned aviation for the display of 3D 
position relative to the own ship can be modified to include the information obtained 
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after the TDA processes. The symbology for an integrated CDTI display for automated 
SA&CA is summarised in Table C.1. 
The CDTI functions with a primary purpose of attention cueing and with a secondary 
purpose as a tactical guidance display. Additional information about other traffic, 
including call signs, can be added by the pilot/remote pilot and also can be configured 
to be decluttered using adaptive forms of HMI2. 
Table C.1. Symbology of CDTI display. 
Symbology Information 
 
Own aircraft 
+10
-10
 
Other traffic that might lead to a conflict. 1000 feet 
above and descending with 10 feet per second. The 
predicted conflict will not happen in 3 minutes. 
-10
+20
 
Other traffic leading to a conflict. 2000 feet below and 
climbing with 10 feet per second.                                             
The predicted conflict will happen within 3 minutes. 
+30
QF12
 
Non-conflict other traffic within look ahead time. 3000 
feet above and level.                                                                  
Call sign of the aircraft is Qantas aircraft flight QF12. 
 
Figure C.1 shows the CDTI display tailored for SA&CA. The target data is obtained after 
the TDA process involving information from all available non-cooperative sensors and 
cooperative systems. In this example, two other aircraft are detected in the surrounding 
airspace and shown in the display. Additionally the state information of each detected 
aircraft is also provided in the display. The white circles indicate the distance in hundreds 
of metres (NM can be used specifically for manned aircraft and helicopters). From Figure 
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B.1, the relative geometry and movement is shown clearly. This is crucial to help the 
pilot/remote pilot to build a 3D situational awareness picture and react accurately (as 
well in a timely fashion) against any threat.  
 
Figure C.1. CDTI display showing other traffic. 
Furthermore, conflict resolution information and the re-optimised trajectory can be 
added to the PFD (Figure C.2). The resolution display shows red and green bands on the 
heading, velocity and vertical velocity scale as displayed in Figure C.3. The red band 
indicates the region to be avoided, for which the detected conflicts were not resolved 
(failure to do so leads to a collision). The green band presents the possible resolution 
provided by the conflict resolution mechanism after a re-optimised trajectory is 
generated for eliminating any collisions in the re-planned path. The green band 
indicates that the probability of conflict is decreased under a certain threshold dictated 
by the risk of collision. In practice, aural annunciations are inhibited below 1500 feet 
Above-Ground Level (AGL). The SA&CA conflict aural warning and resolution 
annunciation are integrated with other aural alerts. The preference for aural alerts 
depends on the phase of flight. During take-off and landing flight phases, the wind shear 
detection system as well as Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) and ground 
Obstacle Warning (and avoidance) System (OWS) are given higher priority over other 
alerts. Therefore the SA&CA aural conflict (aural warning and resolution annunciation) is 
activated when a wind shear or GPWS or OWS alert is active. In addition, the separation 
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assurance responsibility relies on ATM system information, other than the onboard system. 
Table C.2 summarises the list of aural annunciations. 
AC102
FL 80
8000
8200
8400
8500
8100
82
80
90
2
1
1
2
0
12
130
110
140
100
4
3
140
 
Figure C.2. PFD display showing resolution information. 
 
Figure C.3. CDTI display showing resolution information. 
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Table C.2. Aural annunciations. 
SA&CA Function Aural Annunciation 
Conflict Alert Conflict, Conflict 
Climb Resolution Climb, Climb 
Descend Resolution Descend, Descend 
Speed change resolution Speed up/down 
Ground track change resolution Turn left/right 
Conflict resolved Clear 
Resolution to climb/turn right Climb/turn right 
 
C.4 Information Display  
Different formats are presented on the ground pilot display units according to the 
characteristics of detected obstacles. The obstacle information can be combined in the 
CDTI as shown earlier in Figure C.1. In this display, obstacles/other traffic depicted in red 
indicate an assessed conflict in the immediate time frame. Specifically, obstacles that 
are identified as conflicts are indicated with a triangle encircled in the cross-sections of 
the avoidance volumes. Avoidance volumes are represented as white circles, 
corresponding to the maximum cross-sections of the avoidance volume bounding 
spheres. The maximum altitude of the obstacles relative to the aircraft’s current position 
is indicated in red beside the avoidance volumes. Other traffic Obstacles/other traffic in 
yellow indicate a possible conflict in the tactical time frame (within 5 to 20 minutes). 
Obstacles/other traffic in amber indicate that there exists a lower probability of collision. 
In the first case (Figure C.4), two obstacles are detected corresponding to a) wire 
obstacles and b) extended structure.  
In this case, a “CLIMB” command is issued and communicated to the ground pilot 
(remotely controlled) or automatically performed by the aircraft. Geo-fences are 
generated for the detected obstacles and are integrated in the TID as shown in               
Figure C.5. 
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Figure C.4. Case 1 - Detection of wires and an extended structure. 
 
CLIMB
ALT
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
 
Figure C.5. CDTI – Case 1. 
Guidance and resolution information is provided to the ground pilot and to the autopilot 
to implement full automated functionalities. The resolution information is categorised as: 
 horizontal guidance: the directive wedges and chords supporting avoidance of 
any conflict; 
 vertical guidance: the desired altitude required to avoid any conflict; 
 vertical rate guidance: the desired vertical speed required to avoid any conflict; 
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 auditory alerts: similar to the Resolution Advisories (RAs) provided by TCAS II; 
 text based commands: guidance commands including “CLIMB”, “DESCEND”, 
“TURN RIGHT” and “TURN LEFT”. 
In the second case, one extended structure (e.g. tall building) is detected and trajectory 
re-optimisation is performed to avoid a collision (Figure C.6). In this case, a “CLIMB 
UP”/“TURN LEFT”/“TURN RIGHT” command is issued and communicated to the ground 
pilot (remotely controlled) or automatically executed by the aircraft. The TID for this 
scenario is shown in Figure C.7.  
 
Figure C.6. Case 1 - Detection of wires and an extended structure. 
TURN
LEFT
ALT
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
 
Figure C.7. TID - Case 2. 
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In the third case, a single small extended structure (e.g. a tree) is detected by the 
SA&CA algorithms (Figure C.8). In this case, a “CLIMB UP”/” TURN LEFT”/“TURN RIGHT” 
command is issued and communicated to the ground pilot (remotely controlled) or 
automatically performed in autonomous mode. The TID for this scenario is shown in 
Figure C.9. 
 
Figure C.8. Case 3 - Detection of wires and an extended structure. 
TURN
LEFT
ALT
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
 
Figure C.9. TID - Case 3. 
After estimating the tracking observables of other traffic, steering commands are 
automatically issued to the autopilot and also communicated to the ground pilot. 
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C.5 Adaptive HMI2  
Adaptive HMI2 are intended to assist human operators by using several intelligent 
functions including managing displayed information, adaptive alerting, assessing the 
situation, determining the human conditions and recommending timely responses. This 
set of functions employs models of the human operators, the human operators' 
cognition and intentions, and the situation. Additionally, adaptive HMI2 integrates 
several state-of-the-art technologies for achieving an optimum interaction between the 
pilot and a virtual (automation) system [15, 16].  The adaptive HMI2 architecture is 
illustrated in Figure C.10.  
The novel functions required are: 
 Continuous cognition assessment;  
 Environment and operations assessment;  
 Dynamic task allocation; 
 Adaptive alerting.  
Adaptive HMI2
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Figure C.10. Adaptive HMI2 architecture.  
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The adaptive HMI integrates several state-of-the-art technologies for achieving an 
optimum interaction between the pilot and the automation system.  The first introduced 
technology is the Head-Up Display (HUD), which has been equipped on the Boeing B787 
aircraft. The HUD provides enhanced vision and enables the single pilot to operate the 
aircraft with greater ease. Another technology that is envisaged to be adopted is the 
use of touch screens. The integration of adaptive HMI2 into NG-FMS is shown in Figure 
C.11. 
Sensor Data Management and Multi-Sensor Data Fusion
Cooperative and Non-cooperative SA&CA
CNS+A Integrity Manager
Caution Integrity Flags (CIF) Warning Integrity Flags (WIF)
Cooperative 
System
ATM 
Non-
cooperative 
Sensors
Weather 
Radar 
Navigation 
Sensors 
Pilot/Remote Pilot Interaction
NG-FMS Performance Management
Adaptive HMI
2
4D 
Intents
 
Figure C.11. Adaptive HMI2 integration in the NG-FMS. 
Using this technology, the hand-eye coordination problems can be reduced, leading to 
a faster operation and a reduction in the opportunity for errors.  Currently, automatic 
speech recognition technology is used for conducting checklist tasks. The automation 
system attends to the call while the pilot interacts with the voice instructions and 
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completes the cross checking by the communication system. This technology reduces 
the heads-down time so that the pilot can concentrate on his primary tasks. It also 
enables interactivity between the pilot and his virtual assistant, which leads to a 
significant reduction in workload. These technologies make a more intuitive and user-
friendly interface, which naturally eases the workload for pilots. Additionally, the 
adaptive HMI2 enhances the situational awareness of the pilot by displaying a real-time 
status of some key parameters, such as automation level and control authority, in a 
status mode display. The multimodal alerts, including visual, aural and haptic, are 
provided to keep the pilot in the loop in case of abnormal conditions or emergencies.  
The design features of NG-FMS provide increased inner-loop automation, creating a 
greater shift in the pilot’s responsibilities from low-level, tactical tasks like aviating and 
navigating, towards higher-level, strategic tasks like managing and decision-making. 
However, the pilot is still responsible for directing the aircraft during all phases of flight, 
either in terms of having the final authority to approve a specific decision made by the 
system, or in response either to external events, or during different flight phases. In 
particular, perhaps the most important technological advancement required to support 
fully autonomous flight (FMS for single pilot operations during pilot incapacitation and for 
unmanned aircraft) is proving safety in the presence of anomalies such as unexpected 
traffic, on board failures, and conflicting data. Current aircraft automation is mostly 
considered rigid in the sense that designers have favoured simplicity over adaptability in 
their strategies.  
The adaptive HMI2 is introduced within the NG-FMS, providing it with the capability of 
adaptive automation and thus enhancing the system’s adaptability to unanticipated 
events. The integration allows the NG-FMS to estimate the pilot’s cognitive state through 
a combination of physiological sensors as well as external complexity inputs from the                   
NG-FMS subsystems. Through beyond-line-of-sight communication datalinks, adaptive 
HMI2 provides periodic updates to the ground-based flight crew. During transitions 
between strategic and tactical tasks, adaptive HMI2 is able to monitor and aid the pilot, 
and if necessary, support making the transition. For example, in the event of pilot 
overload or incapacitation, the adaptive HMI2 reduces the pilot’s workload by either 
assuming responsibility of some of these functionalities, or by allocating them to the 
ground-based flight crew.  
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C.6 Conclusions 
After an introductory note on HMI2 systems for NG-FMS, the formats and functions 
required for SA&CA were presented. In particular, the formats and functions developed 
for ground obstacle SA&CA were described. The appendix also presented the 
emergence of adaptive HMI2 systems. With an appropriate system implementation, 
pilots’ errors can be reduced and enhanced synergies can be attained between 
human and machine, improving the total system performance. Moreover, the 
implementation of suitable decision logics (based on the estimated cognitive states of 
the pilot or remote pilot) allows a continuous and optimal reconfiguration of the 
automation levels. The design of adaptive HMI2 is still very much in the research phase, 
as experimental measurements and results, especially in real-world flight situations, are 
yet to be fully captured and evaluated. 
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